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INTRODUCTION 
Reflection upon the procedure followed by anyone who 
is try1ng to determ1ne the mean1ng of some author's words 
reveals that the first step 1s necessarily an analysis of 
what has been written or spoken, so that the indiv1dual 
elements of the whole are clear 1n themselves, combined w1th 
a first effort to draw these elements together into a un1f1ed 
whole. Even 1n the first reading of a text, these two 
procedures are be1ng performed, the collection of data from the 
text and 1ts 1nterrelation and synthes1s. If the student 
of the text concerned w1shes to work more carefully w1th h1s 
text, he w1ll go over 1t again, several times, search1ng out 
elements wh1ch he m1ght have overlooked in the first read1ng, 
and 10ok1ng for interrelat1onsh1ps of these elements, and 
patterns of relationsh1ps, and repeated ~se of s1gn1ficant 
terms, and terms wh1ch mean similar th1ngs. These first 
efforts of the student of a text, moreover, prov1de the 
groundwork for every scholarly effort which might come after; 
for no investigation of the language used in the text, no study 
of its historical background, no evaluat10n of secondary 
sources concerning the text, no study of the effort beyond 
the first steps of analysis and synthesis 1s even poss1ble 
~1thout the f1rst steps. 
1 
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What is be1ng said here is, of oourse, noth1ng 
revolutionary; it oould hardly be more evident' that every 
/ 
study of any text by any author must begin with the simplest 
first reading and first efforts to put what has been read 
together. It is olear that the results of later soholarly 
efforts oonoerning the text will be of s1gnifioanoe only 
insofar as they fulfill two oonditions: they must be founded 
upon and grow out of an aoourate and deta11ed analys1s of the 
texts and a oarefully drawn and properly qualified synthes1s 
based upon that analys1s; and seoondly, they must in every 
oase be referred baok to the text itself as the ultimate 
oriterion of their value, whioh means that they must not 
oonfliot with the ev1denoe of the text itself, or if they do, 
they must be held as of doubtful value in regard to the 
text oonoerned. 
Beoause of th1s fundamental importanoe of analysis 
and synthesis of the original text 1n understanding any 
author's thought, it 1s reasonable to establish the goal of 
a paper suoh as this aSI the analysis and synthesis of the 
works of an author, oonoerned only w1th the ev1dence of 
the texts themselves; an analys1s standing prior to and 
therefore not oont1ngent on detailed scholarship 1n philology, 
history of thought and culture, doxography, ano1ent oommentators, 
textual cr1ticism, paleography, and so on. 
In th1s paper, the author oonoerned 1s Herao11tus ot 
Ephesus, the Ion1an Greek ph1losopher ot the late sixth oentury 
.J 
before Chr1st. The text concerned 1s the corpus of Heraolitus's 
fragments aocepted as genu1ne 1n the sixth and subsequent 
/ 
ed1t10ns of ~ Fragmente Dar Vorsokrat1ker by H. D1els and 
W. Kranz (Ber11n, 1951-1952). 
It 1s olear, of course, that th1s paper does depend upon 
the soholarly work of D1ehls-Kranz, whose determ1nat10n of 
the oorpus of tragments to be exam1ned here l1m1ts the 
ult1mate poss1b1l1t1es of th1s paper. Wh1le th1s 1s true, 
and 1s a va11d qua11f1oat10n of the results of the fundamental 
analys1s and synthes1s wh1ch w1l1 be g1ven here, 1t 1s also 
true that nearly every modern soholar of Herao11tus's thought 
beg1ns h1s work w1th the texts found 1n D1ehls-Kranz. Some 
of these men prooeed to quest10n and or1t101ze the work of 
D1ehls-Kranz, 1n an effort to better the first analys1s of 
the texts, upon wh10h all later study must depend; but it 1s 
olear that the first analys1s performed by D1ehls-Kranz 
through the or1ter1a of philology, paleography, and textual 
or1t101sm 1s an adequate start1ng p01nt for an analys1s and 
synthes1s us1ng the tools or the student described above: the 
searoh for repeated terms and express10ns, the searoh for 
themes and patterns of thought, for relat10nsh1ps of terms and 
themes wh10h repeat or wh10h are related to each other, and 
so on. For the goal of the textual cr1t10 1s d1fferent from 
that of the student of the texts, and the latter must always 
be dependent upon the former; the simplest first read1ng 
! 
1s 1mposs1ble w1thout a book. 
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Yet it may be argued that the student seeking to under-
stand the author's thought will be misled unless he has the 
/ 
proper texts on hand. This objection is certainly valid; 
it contains the qualification which must be attached to this 
entire paper, which will be dependent upon the textual work 
of Diehls-Kranz· and does not at all call their work into 
question. But textual criticism itself reaches a point at 
which it must understand the impact of additions and deletions 
upon an established body of texts; and the evidence ot recent 
critical efforts within overall studies of Heraclitus by such 
scholars as Kirk and Guthrie indicates that textual criticism 
of Heraclitus has reached this stage, and the established 
body of texts which is being evaluated 1s the corpus accepted 
as genuine by the sixth and subsequent editions of Diehls-Kranz. 
Other scholars might well offer the same objections to 
the sort of study proposed here: How can it hope to deal 
with Heraclitus's thought without accounting for all the 
philological,cultural, and other factors which are significant? 
How can it simply ignore what ancient commentators have told 
us? Yet again, how shall these sources of evidence be judged 
to be of value to us unless we have on hand a carefully 
prepared and understood study of Heraclitus's thought based on 
the texts themselves? The only alternative is a haphazard 
combinatlon of data from many realms whlch is really unable to 
be evaluated because the texts themselves are not understood. 
What is needed is an explicit and detailed analysi~ and synthesis 
of one established text of Heraolitus's writings, whioh will 
not be oalled into question until the analysis and synthesis 
/ 
are done; and no other evidenoe must be allowed to influenoe 
this analysis and synthesis save what oan be gleaned from 
the fragments themselves either by explioit statement or by. 
varying degrees of implioation, whose degrees of removal 
from explicit confirmation by the texts must be made clear. 
Only in this way will further scholarly work be able to be 
performed, onoe the area of question and 'doubt is olarified. 
and evaluated, once the fundamental oontent ~f the texts 
themselves has been established and properly detailed and 
qualified. 
While this paper claims to perform this funotion and 
thus be an addition to soholarship on Heraolitus, it does not 
intend to deny the value of soholarly efforts which have 
preoeded it. Many great scholars over the last hundred 
years have contributed to our understanding of Heraclitus, 
and their guidance and assistanoe in the aohievement of the 
foundational synthesis presented here is signifioant. 
Nevertheless it remains true that, while eaoh of these men 
formulated his own foundational synthesis before moving on 
to study the fragments in depth from one or another or several 
pOints of view, none of these men has presented for examination 
the foundational synthesis with whioh he began. In every oase, 
we have reoeived from the soholars who have studied Heraclitus 
the later results of their work, never the first steps upon 
·6 
which the rest was founded, and in terms of wh10h the later 
work must ultimately be judged. 
/ 
Numerous shorter studies of part10ular fragments, 
terms, and themes are available by suoh noted scholars as 
Ylastos and Frankel and many others; but none of them seeks 
to offer a detailed study of more than one or two terms or 
lines of thought from the f;ragments. Nor can any of the 
shorter syntheses of Herac11tus's thought--such as the chapters 
on Heraclitus in: Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers 
(Cambridge, 1964); Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. I 
(Westminster, Md., 1963); Owens, A H1storz of Ancient Western 
PhilosophY (New York, 1959); and so on--engage in a detailed 
analysis and synthesis of Herac11tus's thought. As for the 
longer treatments of Herac11tus's thought--such as the chapter 
in Guthrie, H1storz Qf Greek Ph110sophZ Vol. I (Cambridge, 
1962); the chapter in G1gon, ~ Ursprung der Gr1ech1schen 
Ph110sophie (Basel, 1945); Kirk, Heraclitus: The Cosmic 
Fragments (Cambridge, 1959); Wheelwright, Heraclitus (Pr1noeton, 
1959); and so on--none of them actually attempts to present 
the foundational synthesis which is needed, based upon an 
established corpus which remains unquestioned until the 
foundational work is done and basing its conclusions solely 
upon the ev1denoe to be found in the fragments themselves. 
None of these engages in the exhaustive analysis of inter-
relationships of terms and themes which is the primary method 
of the desired foundational synthesis. Several ot these works 
7 
deal with only one group of Heraolltus's fragments; one deals 
with the ~ragments only a handful at a time; and all of/ them 
/ 
draw signlfioant evidenoe for their syntheses from outslde the 
analysls of the fragment~ themselves. 
The work of these and other scholars ls of great 
slgnlflcance, as has been sald; but untll a foundatlonal 
synthesls of Heraclltus's thought ls avallable, one based upon 
an unquestloned corpus of fragments and achleved by palnstaking 
analysls of every slgniflcant term, theme, and lnterrelatlonshlp 
of terms and themes, lt wlll be dlfflcult to estlmate accurat~ly 
the value of such men's work. Thls lmportant gap ln avallable 
studles of Heraclltus's thought wlll be fllled, lt 1s hoped, 
by thls paper. 
The whole detalled analysls of all the terms, themes, 
and relatlonshlps of the fragments could be Simply presented, 
without followlng any deflnlte order; such a procedure would 
be tedlous ln the extreme, hlghly repetltlve, and serve no 
great purpose. Therefore, ln this paper, the analytl0 materlal 
on a partlcular term, theme, or relatlonshlp wlll be presented 
as the term, theme, or relatlonshlp comes up wlthln the develop-
ment of the synthesls. That ls, although the foundatlonal 
analysls had to precede the foundatlonal synthesls in the 
orlginal work, the two will be presented here lntermixed. 
As the ideas develop in the orderly manner of the synthesls, 
the detailed analysis whioh permitted the synthesls to be 
formed in the first plaoe will be presented. It 1$ important 
8 
to realize and keep in the torefront ot attention, however, the 
important fact that the analysis of the evidence ot the fragments 
/ 
themselves, not any preconceived notion of what would make 
a nice synthesis, has guided this paper to 1ts oono1usions, 
whatever the degree ot certainty attributed to them. The 
fact that a conclusion is mentioned before the evidenoe for 
it does not reflect the manner in which the conclusion and 
evidenoe are actually related; the analysis oame first. 
Ideally, the reader oould have on hand simply a master 
index containing all the results of the analySiS, with no 
cono1usions drawn at all, and form his own synthesis. But 
the purpose of this paper has been to provide both the 
foundational analysis and the foundational synthes1s; for without 
the latter, the work of others based on evidence from outside 
the fragments cannot be evaluated. Yet, .so that the reader 
can put together for himself if he wishes the materials 
whioh have been collected and put together here, an index of 
all the signifioant terms and themes will be tound at the end 
of this paper; by searching out what is said about them in 
the paper, he will have a complete knowledge of the relationships 
ot terms and themes whioh have led to the synthes1s presented 
here. 
Three appendioes are also provided, ohiefly to permit 
footnotes to remain contentual, and to keep their number down. 
The first appendix contains the oomplete Greek text of the 
! 
fragments as found in the sixth and subsequent ed1t10ns of 
Diehls-Kranz Die Fragmente ~ Vorsokratiker. The second 
appendix contains the complete text of the fragments in the 
/ 
translations of them used in the paper; these translations are 
based on the work of Freeman and Guthrie, a~ is indicated in 
the introductory comments of the appendix; each fragment's 
translation is aocompanied by an indioation of thesouroe 
of the translation and what ohanges, if any, have been made for 
its use in this paper, and why. The third appendix contains 
the texts of the fragm,ents of the Diehls-Kranz oorpus whioh stand 
outside the synthesis presented in this paper, generally 
because their excessive brevity prevented the discovery of 
significant links with the fragments of the present synthesis 
on the basis of internal evidenoe alone. 
The footnotes will avoid materials oovered in these 
appendioes, and will leave all cross-referenoing to the index; 
the statements of interrelationships, of oourse, will be found 
predominately in the text of the paper itself, or in the foot-
~otes if the matter is of questionable significanoe or for 
some reason notably uncertain. Moreove~, every evaluation of 
the meaning of a Greek term independent of its partioular 
function within its fragment will be based upon Liddell 
and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford ~ ,1940 ); there 
will be no footnote referenoes in such matters unless they are 
of special significance. As was explained already, the meaning 
of terms within their fragments is examined in Appendix II, under 
the guidance of Guthrie and Freeman. ?:,he fragments will be 
10 
ldentlfied ln the text of thls paper and ln the footnotes by 
the numbers asslgned them ln the slxth and subsequent edltlons 
of Dlehls-Kranz; the number wlll appear in parentheses/whlch 
follow the citation or reference which it identifies. 
/ 
CHAPTER I 
KNo\iING AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE 
One of the most reourrent and self-evident themes in 
the ~ragments of Herao11tus 1s the theme of know1ng. The 
numerous referenoes to knowing 1n the fragments, to 1ts 
objeot, to 1ts absenoe, and to other closely-related top1os 
make th1s a oonven1ent and most eff1c1ent start1ng po1nt 
for an analys1s of Herao11tus's thought. 
There are other start1ng po1nts wh1ch could have been 
chosen just as well, of oourse. For 1t there 1s any un1ty 
to Herao11tus's thought as we have 1t in the . fragments , we 
ought to be able to d1scover it by examin1ng the interrelat1on-
ships of mean1ng 1n the terms and themes of the fragments; 
and any truly thorough analys1s of any theme or important 
term of the fragments ought to g1ve acoess to the whole 
body of themes and terms, as well as ind10ate such themes 
and terms as are not 1nterrelated with1n th1s body of themes 
and terms. Nevertheless, some.::start1ng pOints are bound to 
be more conven1ent and eff101ent and ot greater s1gn1f1oanoe 
w1thin philosoph1cal thought in general; the theme ot know1ng 
1s suoh a one. 
Th1s theme has not been ohosen as the start1ng po1nt 
of this analysis and the hoped-for synthes1s beoause 1t 1s 
11 
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Herao11tus's start1ng po1nt; nowhere in the fragments does 
he 1nd1oate the log1oal starting po1nt of h1s thought, nor 
/ 
1s there any statement 1ndioating how he oame 1n t1me to hold 
the v1ews expressed 1n the fragments. Nor has th1s starting 
po1nt been seleoted out of any pred1leot1on for ep1stemolog1oal 
and or1t1oal quest1o~ but s1mply beoause the whole body ot 
the fragments, w1th all its themes and 1mportant terms 1s 
read1ly aooess1ble from th1s po1nt of 1noept1on. 
Herao11tus's v1ews on human know1ng w1ll be grouped 
here under four head1ngs. In the first seotion, the most 
strongly ev1denoed of all the themes in the fragments, the 
not-knowing of men in general, w1ll be exam1ned, together 
w1th the related theme of men~s ab1l1ty to reaoh genu1ne 
knowledge at all. The seoond seotion wiil examine Heraolitus's 
posit1ve statements about know1ng, wh10h ooour 1n the form of 
statements about h1mself as knower, gu1delines for genu1ne 
know1ng, and several oharaoter1zat1ons of wisdom. The 
objeot of the knowledge wh10h men laok and of genu1ne knowing 
w1ll be stud1ed 1n the th1rd seot1on, w1th a v1ew to olar1fy1ng 
the type of know1ng wh10h Herao11tus has 1n ~1nd 1n the 
statements on know1ng and not-know1ng. In the fourth seotion, 
the relation of this d1st1not1ve type of knowing to the 
data of ord1nary, everyday exper1enoe will be examined. 
13 
Not-knowing and men's ability to know 
/ Heraolitus's statements about knowing in the fragments 
deal more frequently with not-knowing, men's ignorance and 
their general failure to understan~ than'with knowledge 
possessed and understanding actually achieved. Men in general, 
he says repeatedly, do not know and are void of understanding; 
they are capable of genuine knowing, but fail to aohieve it. 
This is a theme of far greater importanoe in the fragments 
than Heraolitus's muoh-written-of oritioism of his 
predecessors' ignoranoe. 
The statements 2! men's not-knowing 
Twenty-one times in the fragments, Heraolitus pOints 
direotly to some lack in men's knowing, understanding, or 
awareness of the way things are. There is no set form of 
these expressions, however; the one expression whioh appears 
the most frequently--seven times--is a negation of some form 
or derivative of ytYV~crKW, "to know" with the nuanoe of 
"by observation" (5, 17, 56, 57, 86, 106, 108). The verb 
£i'ow, "to know by refleotion" appears in a statement of 
men's not-knowing only onoe (104). Only one other expression 
appears tw1ce, &~UV£,.oC; , "void of understanding" (1, 34). 
Negated once each in various ways are these different 
terms: l!uv(11ll\ "to bring data together in understanding" (51); 
~rr(cr-rallat, "to know how" (19); CPPov{Clj "to be aware" (7); 
cpprfv, "heart or m'ind as the seat of mental faoulties, 
14 
peroept10n, and thought" (104);v6'oc;, "m1nd" (104); ll;EUp(C1KCI)t 
"to f1nd" (45). To men, he says 1n plaoe, oerta1n th1ngs 
, / . 
"seem strange (l;€va cpa(vE-ra1.)" (72);' 1n another plaoe, 
human nature has no yv~ac; , "means of know1ng" (78); 1 onoe 
eaoh he employs these term of not-know1ngl &~ae(~ "1gnorance" 
J! (95); ~7t'EtpOC;, "unaoqua1nted W1th" (1); and }..aveavCl), "escape 
the not1oe of" (1).2 
On seven other oocas10ns, Herac11tus comments on men's 
laok of know1ng and understand1ng somewhat less d1rectly. 
The po1nt 1s generally that men are m1staken 1n th1nk1ng 
that they have genu1ne knowledge, rather than a stra1ghtforward 
statement that they do not have such genu1ne knowledge. 
Thus "one must follow that wh10h 1s oommon (-rb l;uv6'v), 
but •.• :;. most men l1ve as 1f they had a pr1vate understand1ng 
( l cdav cpp6'vfjCYt v) of the1r own" (2). Although men do not 
understand or know, "to themselves they seem (to understand)" 
1The mean1ng of this term, wh1ch appears onoe 1n the 
s1ngular (41) and once 1n the plural (78) 1n the fragments, 
1s not certa1n. For the purposes of the moment, the bas1c 
mean1ng of "means of know1ng" 1s suff1c1ent. The two fragments 
w111 be treated 1n several d1fferent plaoes below. 
2Several other fragments also seem related to thts ph~me of 
not-know1ng. In one fragment, a man is "not aware ( OUK E7t'a?CI)v)" 
where he is go1ng (117); 1n another, Heraol1tus speaks of "the 
man who forgets wh1ch way the road leads" (71), where the "way" 
may have the relat10nsh1p w1th genu1ne know1ng that it has 
elsewhere (45, 59, 60). In two places, men seem not to know 
"justice" properly, although they have some knowledge of 1t: 
"they would not know the name of just1ce, 1f these th1ngs d1d 
not ex1st"(23), where "these th1ngs" 1s left unexpla1ned; also 
1n the statement that "to the god all things are just • • • but 
men have assumed some things to be unjust, others just" (102). 
F1nally, there is the m1stake of Homer over the boys' r1ddle 
1n one statement (56). . 
15 
(17); "the knowledge (YtV~crKE' ) of the most famous man is but 
opinion" (28). Although he did not know even day ansi night, 
"most men's teaoher is Hesiod--they are sure ( ~rr(cr~av~a, ) 
he knew most things" (57); not knowing that most men are bad 
and the good are few, "they put their trust in popular bards 
and take the mob for their teaoher" (104). Onoe, the less. 
direot referenoe to men's not-knowing takes the form of a 
general statement with no definite subjeot expressedl "muoh 
learning (rroAu~ae(~) does not teaoh one to have intelligence 
( v60v ) tI (40). Onoe Heraolitus states, "though men assooiate 
with the logos most olosely, yet they are separated (O,a~€pov~ 
from it" (72).3 
The subjeot of not-knowing: !!!!ill 1n general 
Who is it who does not know? Who is the subjeot of 
not-knowing as Heraolitus speaks of it in the fragments? For 
the most part, the answer to this question is men, men in 
general. 
Four times in the fragments, "men (avepwrrO\ )" is 
speoified as the subject of not-knowing (three times in 1, 56). 
Onoe the subjeot name.d;1s~:.~hUlD@l nature (~eoc; &Vep~rrEto'V" (78). 
3Several terms have been left untranslated in this paper 
beoause translating them would inevitably be a pre-judgment on 
oertain themes and relationships in the fragments, and beoause 
the terms have oonsiderable breadth of meaning whioh no English 
term or expression oarries very well. The most important of the 
terms handled this way is logos (AOYOC; ), whioh is translated 
only in its three non-teohnioal appearanoes in which it means, 
quite olearly, "word, disoourse, report, fame" (39, 87, 108). 
Other terms treated in this way are cosmos (K6cr~oC;) and daimon 
(Oa(woov). The fragments conoerned are examined in Appendix II. 
16 
Five times the subject is left 1ndefinite, "one" or "they" 
(5, 19, 51, 72 twice). Once the subject is second p~son 
singular, "you" (45). Three of the statements are general 
statements without any definite subject, but the context 
suggests that they are intended to apply universally to all men 
(40, 86, 95). Five times the subject is given as nOAAo/, 
ol nollol, or nAe(O'-r01., "many men, the many, most men" 
(17 three times, 2, 57). Four times the subjeot is "those 
men(a~-rot' )," used without a definite antecedent (all in 104). 
In several places, Heraclitus specifies the subjeot a 
little more, referring onoe to "those whose discourse (A6you~) 
I have heard" (108), and also in another place where &~~VE-r01.' 
"those who are void of understanding," may be used substantively 
rather than as a modifier of an unexpressed "they" (34). 
Once the subject of not-knowing is OOKtpW-ra-ro~, "the most 
famous" (28); twioe Hesiod is named as the subject of not-
knowing (57, 106). 
Clearly then, the subject of not-knowing is usual~y a 
general one, almost without exception in fact. Herac11tus 
speaks of men in general as being deficient 1n knowing; 
further analysis of the fragments will enable us to further 
characterize the knowing whioh they lack and the nature of 
its object. 
Men's ability to __ know 
Before examining men's not-knowing in greater detail, 
however, an important question needs to be answered, namely 
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whether Heraclitus believed men inoapable of genuine knowing. 
Only three statements from the fragments offer eJp11cit 
answers to this question 1n any way. One fragment states, 
"the think1ng faculty (,.~ IlJPOV€EtV ) is oommon to all," 
where flall tl most certainly means "all men" (113). In another 
fragment, Heraolitus states, "all men have the capacity 
(~€"Ecr"t ) of knowing (ytvwcrKEtY ) themselves" (116); here, 
however, the knowing is only explioitly extended to "knowing 
themselves," but the faculty of know1ng is affirmed at least 
to that degree. In a third plaoe, he says that: "to those who 
are awake, there is one oommon oosmos," but when asleep 
eaoh man turns away to "a private one ('f(HOY )," ('89), whioh 
at least imp11es that men could be "awake"; "waking" here 
seems rather olearly to be a figure for genuine knowing, 
espec1ally 1n v1ew of the related statement that "the rest 
of mankind (that is, men besides himself) are unaware of what 
they do wh1le awake just as they forget what they do while 
asleep" (1). Wh1le the question is by no means answered in 
stra1ghtforward terms, these three statements suggest that 
men 1n general are able to know genuinely as tar as Heraolitus 
1s oonoerned. 4 
Much stronger evidenoe on th1s question is the negative 
ev1denoe; nowhere in any of the numerous statements of men's 
4Similarly, Herao11tus oompares those who are void of 
understand1ng to the deaf (34), desoribes them as "present 
yet absent," acoording to some proverb (34), and speaks of 
them as "arr1ving at understand1ng" (108). 
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not-know1ng does Herac11tus deny the1r ab1l1ty to know genuinely 
nor anywhere else 1n the fragments. For one so conc~ned 
w1th the absence of genu1ne know1ng, th1s lack of comment 
about the absence of the ab1l1ty to know seems s1gn1f1cant. 
St1ll more 1mportant than the three vague statements 
1n favor of men's ability to know genuinely, and really more 
1mportant than the absence of negat10ns of th1s ab1l1ty, there 
1s the fact that Herac11tus spoke out, tr1ed to commun1cate 
h1s understand1ng of th1ngs to other men. It 1s surely 
reasonable to conclude that he hoped that they would 
understand h1s words, that he be11eved that they were able 
to atta1n to genu1ne know1ng. Moreover, 1t 1s clear that he 
be11eved that he had ach1eved some degree of genu1ne 
understand1ng; yet he nowhere 1nd1cates that he possessed 
spec1al g1fts or was 1n any other way d1fferent from ordinary 
men, save 1n h1s hav1ng ach1eved some genu1ne understand1ng 
of th1ngs. 
From these var10us sources of eVidence from w1th1n the 
fragments, 1t seems clear that men 1n general are, for 
Herac11tus, able to ach1eve genu1ne know1ng, but are failing 
1n the actual aooomp11shment of th1s poss1b1l1ty. 
Herac11tus 2n h1s predecessors 
Heraclitus has often been set down as pr1mar1ly oonoerned 
w1th attack1ng h1s various predecessors tor the1r errors and 
general ignorance, and the op1n1on that Herao11tus 1s 
supposed to have den1ed men's ab1l1ty to know genu1nely oan 
19 
probably be traced in part to this presentation of him. As 
a matter of fact, within the corpus of fragments at 9Ur 
disposal, the negative statements about his predeoessors are 
not very numerous--seven fragments are concerned--and are 
balanced by several apparently oomplimentary statements about 
others of his predeoessors or even about those he oritioizes--
three fragments are oomplimentary. 
Heraolitus critioizes six of his predeoessors in the 
fragments: Hesiod three times, Homer three times, Pythagoras 
twioe, and onoe eaoh Arohiloohus, Heoataeus, and Xenophanes 
(40, 42, 56, 57, 81, 105, 106).5 He speaks in oomplimentary 
terms of speoifio men in 'three plaoesl onoe of Bias of 
Priene (J9); onoe of Homer (56), whom he also oritioizes 
elsewhere; and onoe in praise of Hermodorus (121), on whose 
behalf he takes the Ephesians to task~ 
The volume of evidenoe clearly favors the oonclusion that 
Heraclitus was much more oonoerned with men's failure to 
aohieve the genuine knowing of whiohthey were oapable than 
he was about the errors or ignorance of his various 
predeoessors. As for those predecessors, it also seems that 
Heraclitus's famed critical attitude towards them has been 
somewhat overstated, at least insofar as the fragments at 
our disposal serve to indicate. 
5Heraclitus also says in one plaoe: "the knowledge ot 
the most famous ~n is but opinion" (28); and in another 
plaoe: ."they believe the popular bards" ( 104) • Both of 
these statements may be related to Heraolitus's -oomments 
on his predeoessors. 
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Know1ng 
Herac11tus's pos1tive statements about knowing ~ctually 
achieved by men can be grouped conven1ently under three 
headings: the statements about himself as knower; the state~'~ 
ments in which he indicates certain "guidelines" for genuine 
knowing; and the statements in which he characterizes wisdom 
and "that which is wise (,-b crocpcSv )." All three groups 
taken together form a set of fragments not half as 'large 
as the body of materials on not-knowing in the fragments; but 
they indicate nevertheless certain characteristics ot genuine 
knowing when it is actually achieved. 
Heracl1tus 2n h1mself ~ knower 
Heraclitus most certainly considered himself to be 
know1ng genuinely, "distinguishing each thing according to 
nature and telling how it is" (1). He may well have seen 
h1mself as unique among men in the achievement of genuine 
knowing; for he speaks of "the rest 'of mankind" who are as 
if asleep (1), and in another place he s~ys that "none of 
those whose discourse (AcSyOU<;) I have heard has ~r.1.ved; 'at" 
an understanding of wisdom (108). But, on the other hand, 
he does speak in apparently complimentary terms of some'of 
his predecessors; and in one place he refers to "men who love 
wisdom (cptAOcrcScpOU<; livbpa<; )--philosophers~" (35), but Odesn't 
make it clear if there are such men besides himself. 
What is clear is that Heraclitus considered himself to 
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be a genuine knower, unique or one of a few among men. But 
he also implies quite olearly that ultimately he too is only 
a listener; for he states that wisdom belongs to those "listening 
not to me, but to ~ logos (~ou A6you )" (50). And he also 
indioates that his own knowing was related to peroeption and 
ordinary experienoe, a topio that will be examined in detail 
in the fourth seotion of this ohapter: "things of wh10h there 
is sight, hearing, learn1ng--these are what I prefer" (55). 
Heraolitus presents himself as a knower, but one who 
knows by listening to the logos as to some sort ot souroe or 
prino1ple of wisdom, and by preferring the things of ordinary 
experience in some way.6 
~ guidelines for genuine knowing 
In five plaoes in the fragments, Heraclitus seems to be 
offering guidelines to men to help them know genuinely; some 
of these statements are not very striking, while others offer 
important hints about the nature of the knowing whioh Heraclitus 
is concerned about; all of them deserve at least a mention. 
"Let us not oonjeoture at random (~~ ElK~ au~~a~~~Eea ) 
about the greatest things (.rillv ~EY(O'~(J.)V )," he says in one 
fragment (47), but without further speCifying the phrase tithe 
greatest things." 
60ne other statement may be taken as explaining something 
about Heraclitus the knower: ·'1 searohed myself" (101); but 
the fragment says no more. and the only parallel in terminology 
is the statement about searohing for gold (22). He does state 
in one plaoe that men can know themselves and aot with moderation; 
this statement will be examined in ohapter three (116). 
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"Men who love wisdom (cp1.Aocr6cpou<; o.vOpa.<; ) must be 
inquirers (to"(opa.<; ) into very many things indeed" (35,. This 
breadth of inquiry will be seen to be a characteristic of the 
type of knowing whioh Heraolitus is conoerned about. 
"If we speak with intelligenoe (~uv v60a }..€yov"(a.<; ), 
we must (Xp~) base our strength on that whioh is common to all 
(-rW1. ~UvW1. 7lav"(wv )" (114) The relationship of genuine knowing 
to "that which is common't also appears in another statement a 
"therefore one must follow ( OEi' E71Ecrea.1. ) that which is common 
~W1. ~uV~1. )" (2). In a third statement, the same pattern 
appears in a slightly different forma "one must know (E(oeva.1. 
Os' Xp~ ) that war is common (~uv6v)" (80). Then the last 
quoted statement continues: "and [one must know that] justice 
[is) strife and that all things come about (Y1.V6~EVa. nav"(a.) by 
way of strife and necessity," where the breadth of the knowing 
(ltall things") again appears as a characteristio (80). 
In four of these statements, Heraolitus is insistent 
about the characteristios of knowing set down, "it is neoessary 
( Xp~ )" and "one mus t ( a E i' )." Knowing is open to "all things" 
and must be in touch with what is 'Common" if it is to be genuine 
knowing. It will be necessary to examine the themes of "all 
things" and "that Which is common" in the fragments in order 
to understand the knowing which Heraclitus has in mind. This 
will be the aim of the third seotion of this ohapter when it deals 
with the object of knowing and not-knowing.7 
7"Justice is also presented as related to genuine 
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The oha.raoteristios of wisdom 
Hera.olitus speaks of wisdom or that which is w1'e 1n 
seven plaoes in the fragments. He refers to w1sdom by the 
abstraot nounO'oCP(l1 , "w1sdom," only onoe, however; and therefore 
there may seem to be a oertain assumpt10n be1ng made when we 
take the other express ions (o'oqx.6-ra-roc;, "the w1sest"; -rb O'ocpeSv 
"that wh1ch 1s wise"; O'ocpeSv "the wise tthingl ") to reter to the 
same thing. This is not s1mply an assumption, however, but 
rather a conolusion based on the use of the var10us express10ns 
w1thin the fragments. 
Herac11tus does not make it explicit anywhere in the 
fragments that wisdom is the state or oondit1on of actually 
possessing genuine knowledge. The terms used to refer to 
wisdom in the fragments are, however, substantive;8 and thus 
they suggest a state or oondition rather' than a power or 
aotivity; the one exoeption 1s the adject1ve, "wise" which 
appears twice (56, 118). The statements on wisdom frequently 
knowing, as the criterion or judge of knowing: "justice will 
conviot those who fabrioate and testify to l1es" (28); justice·" 
will be oonsidered in detail 1n chapter two, but its relat1onsh1p 
to genuine knowing and themes such as "all things" and un1ty 
1s noteworthy. 
8Mos t of the expressions by which Heraolitus refers to 
knowing and not-knowing are aotive or infinitive forms; the 
exoeptions are veSoC; and cppTjv (104), veSov and n'oAUl1ae(f} (40), 
y,vc.6atc; (56), yvc.6l1f} (41), yvwl1a<; (78),6.n'tO'-r(f) (86), 6.l1ae(1) 
(95). Though these exoeptions may appear quite numerous, they 
are oertainly not a quarter of all the referenoe to ~nowing 
or not-knowing in the fragments; the suggest10n 1s that 
Herao11tus generally v1ewed know1ng as relat1vely dynam1c, as 
an act10n of man rather than a state. 
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link it with other cognitive activities--knowing (41), agreeing 
50), speaking (112)--but only once in a more ethically/oriented 
context (112, the second part). In ~um, the basic meaning of 
wisdom refers chiefly to genuine knowing, although it carries 
with it a certain ethical connotation. ThUs, although the 
evidence is indirect and inexplicit, there is reason to take 
Heraclitus's statements characterizing wisdom as related to 
his gu1delines on genuine knowing insofar as they indicate 
the same or related characteristics of genuine knowing in 
some way. The place ofcwisdom in Heraclitus's comments on 
man's ethical life will be studied in chapter three of this 
paper. 
There is a third problem about the statements on wisdom 
which deserves brief mention here, but will be examined in 
detail later. For in one statement Heraclitus Sf1.ys that "that 
which alone is wise • • • is willing and unwilling to be called 
by the name of Zeus" (32); and the question arises whether 
wisdom, a.s substantive knowing, is posses.sed by or to be 
identified with only some divine being. The other statements 
a.bout wisdom indicate that it is a human characteristic, however; 
and we may therefore proceed to study its characteristics as 
they relate to genuine knowing, but with the cautions and 
reservations suggested by the foregoing comments. 
nIt is wise to agree (d~OAOYEtV ~o~6v lcr~(v) that all 
th1ngs are one (ev 1Cav~a Elvat )" (50). In another place. 
,. 
~ " "That which is w1se (~b cro~uv ) is one o;"!':~,: E.. (ev )-a to know 
the thought (In{a~aaeat yvw~~v) by wh1ch all th1ngs are 
steered through all th1ngs" (41). In both of these statements, 
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w1sdom reaches out to all th1ngs, just as genu1ne know1ng 
was sa1d to do. Both statements also deal with someth1ng 
which 1s in some way common, namely with the un1ty of all things 
in the first statement, and w.ith the "thought (yv~~~v)" wh1ch 
steers all things somehow 1n the second. 
Both of these statements speak of unity 1n connect10n 
w1th wisdom, but do so 1n d1fferent senses. In the f1rst case, 
the un1ty spoken of 1s the,,'un1ty of all things; 1n the second 
statement, it 1s the unity of w1sdom 1tself as 1t reaches out 
to all things and the "thought" wh1ch steers them. In another 
statement, Heraclitus says: "That alone wh1ch 1s w1se 1s 
one (EV ~o aocpov ~ouvov )" (:32); here w1sdom' s un1ty 1s one 
of uniqueness, that there 1s only one "wh1ch' 1s w1se If; th1s 1s the 
statement Which 1s concluded by "it is willing and unw1111ng to 
be called by the name of Zeus" (:32). W1sdom, in the manner 
1t 1s spoken of here, as a un1que and spec1al un1ty wh1ch 1s 
d1rected to all th1ngs, does not seem to be1dent1f1ed w1th 
man's knowing, although th1s 1s partly an 1nterpretat10n based 
upon our usual refusal to grant such a un1que and separated 
character to man's know1ng of th1ngs. In fact, the separat10n 
of "what 1s w1se" is made exp11c1t in another fragment: "what 
1s w1se ( aocpov) is set apart from all th1ngs (1Cav~CJ)v 'KEXCJ)P \~€\OI) " 
(108) • 
Thus w1sdom 1s both the same as genu1ne knowing 1n 1ts 
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orientation towards all things and what is oommon to all things. 
But it seems to differ from genuine knowing 1n'1ts 1nt71nsi0 
unity, its uniqueness, and its separateness from all things, 
even to the point of accepting in some sense ("willing and· 
unwilling") the title of the divinity. One might oonclude that 
Heraclitus means that genuine knowing, as a state in man, ls 
in fact so integrating and penetrating of the unity of all 
things that it can be itself termed intrinSically one and 
unique; it is not to be identified with the intelligibility of 
all things, however, because wisdom is clearly stated to be a 
knowing of the "thought" which steers all things. On the other 
hand, the uniqueness, separateness, and assoo1at1on of wisdom 
with the unity and government of all things could be stressed, 
with emphasis laid upon the association of wisdom with the title 
of divinity. In this latter view, wisdom would be a sort of 
divine wisdom, governing all things as the source of intel-
ligibility and truth for all things and for all knowers: in 
such a view, it would be significant that "wise" and "wisdom" 
when clearly applied to human acts and human soula are spoken 
of by the forms of the term O'ocp(1') and its adjective O'ocp6c; 
(112, S0, 118, 56), while the neuter O'ocp6v1s used substantively 
when referring to the divine wisdom (41, 32, 108); this matter 1s 
not as clear as would seem from this last comment, however, s1nce 
Uwhat 1s wise" (108) has no art10le to1nd1cate 1ts substantive 
character clearly, and thus does not d1ffer in form from "w1se 
~ocp6v )" in the statement "it 1s w1se to agree that all th1ngs 
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are one" (.50). 
If we accept the different expressions of wisdo~ as 
referring to basically the same reality, the reality referred to 
seems to be the state or condition of genuine knowing in man; 
but the case is not clear in this regard as yet, and further 
analysis of the unity of all things and what is common will 
not clarify it altogether. Further analysis of Heraclitus's 
views on divinity, however, will suggest that a separate divine 
intelligibility of all things was probably not held by him; 
these matters will be taken up in the second chapter of this 
paper. 
Three of Heraclitus's statements clearly do refer to man, 
regardless of the problems with the other four. In one of 
these, Heraclitus explains that "a dry soul is wisest and best" 
(118), a statement whose significance will become evident only 
later when the soul and wetness can be examined in detail. 
He states: "Homer was wiser (O'OCPc.tS-rEPO~ ) than all the Greeks" 
(.56). Finally, he says of wisdom: "Wisdom (O'ocp(~) is to speak 
the truth (&A~eea AeYE\v) and to act according to nature 
~O\EtV Ka-ra cpuO'\V ), paying heed ( l~a?ov-ra~)" (112). Wisdom 
here combines knowing truly with acting in a certain way; the 
criterion of action given here, however, is the same as 
Heraclitus's description of his own knowing, "distinguishing 
each thing according to nature ( Ka-ra cpuO'\~" (1). Thus the 
wisdom spoken of here is clearly relate~ to .genuine knowing, and 
would seem to be the link between knowing genuinely and acting 
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upon that knowledge. A further link between this wisdom and 
genuine knowing appears in the word "paying heed (l1ca~o/-rac; )," 
for it indicates, as Heraclitus indicates of himself as knower, 
a relationship between knowing and. ordinary experience and 
perception. Homer's wisdom is also spoken of in a context 
concerned with human knowing. 
If wisdom and "that which is wise" are the same basic 
reality, they refer to the state or cond1t1on of genuine 
knowing in man, espec1ally as it directs his aotion, on the 
one hand, and. penetrates to the unity and governing "thought" 
of all things, on the other. If these two forms of expression 
are taken to refer to two dist1nct realities, then "wisdom" 
must still be taken to refer to man's genuine knowing as it 
guides h~s actions (and is somehow a perfeotion of his. soul). 
"That which is wise" must then be granted to be rather vague 
both in what it refers to and in its grammatioal variations 1n 
the fragments. Further analys1s, partioularly of the theme 
of the divine, the governor of all things, the unity of all 
things, that whioh is common, and the logos, will help to olarity 
the matter; but the most internally consistent position seems 
to prefer wisdom to be one thing, the state or oondition of 
genuine knowing 1n man, oharaoterized by its grasp of all things 
and that wh1ch is common to all things, but go1ng beyond to 
the depth of un1ty and. order, and. oarrying the fruits ot genuine 
knowing into action. 
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The Object of Knowing and Not-Knowing 
What is it that Heraclitus says men are capable~f 
knowing but in fact fail to know? What is it that men know 
when their knowing is genuine and they have attained to wisdom? 
A thorough analysis of the objects of no~-knowing and genuine 
lqlowing will permit us to further charac.terize in greater q,etail 
the type of knowing which Heraclitus has in mind in these two 
sets of statements, and to determine whether what has here been 
termed "genuine knowing" and characterized is several ways from 
pertinent statements in the fragments is to be ident1fied with 
the knowing which Heraclitus says men are failing at. This 
identification seems likely, of course; but sUbstantiation of this 
conclusion from the fragments is a necessary step in accepting 
it as a valid interpretation of Heraolitus's thought. 
The objects of not-knowing 
In eight of the not-knowing statements, no objeot of 
not-knowing is specified (2, 34, 40, 78, 86, 95, 104 twioe). 
Analysis of the rest of the not-knowing statements brings to 
light several already familiar themes again as objects of 
, 
not-knowing or as intimately linked with the stated objects, 
and introduces several new themes. 
1. All things 
The theme of "all things" is explicitly linked with the 
objeot of not-knowing only onoe: "though all things oome to 
pass (ytvo~€vrov yap rrav~rov ) in acoordance with this logos, 
men seem as if ignorant" (1). The expression Ylv6~Eva rrdv~~ 
"all things coming to pass," has been variously interp;sted, how-
ever, as referring simply to "everyth1ng that happens". or as 
1nd1cat1ng that all th1ngs are 1nvolved 1n a process of com1ng-
to-be. Wh11e both 1nterpretat1ons 1nd1oate the breadth of 
the knowing wh1ch men laok, and th1s 1s adequate for our present 
purposes, 1t w111 nevertheless be neoessary to examine and 
oompare this phrase with other instanoes of "all th1ngs" and 
other forms of y(yvo~a l, "oome to be It or "happen," 1n the 
fragments. For the moment, 1t 1s suff101ent to point out the 
un1versality of the objeot of not-know1ng 1n th1s fragment; 
the other quest10n w111 pe exam1ned in ohapter two. 
2. That wh1ch is common 
The reference to "th1s logos" 1n the statement just 
quoted 1s the only reference 1n the fragments 1n wh1ch the 
, 
objeot of not-know1ng 1s olearly related to "all things" (or 
"all th1ngs that happen" or whatever) as somehow "oommon." 
h1s logos" is not the expressed objeot of not-knowing, however--
rather, "this logos";Sthe common aspeot of a total situation 
wh10h 1s not-known: "though all things come to pass in 
aooordance with this logos, men seem as 1f ignorant" (1). "That 
which is common" is not the express objeot of not-know1ng, but 
1s 1nt1mately related to it. 
3. Un1ty and oneness 
Un1ty and oneness appears as the explio1t objeots of 
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not-know1ng 1n several statements. "Hes1od was unaware that the 
nature of every day 1s one (~ucrtV ~~€pa~ drracr~~ ~(av 93crav )" 
(106); here the un1ty-theme 1s l1nked w1th the theme ot the 
un1versa11ty of not-know1ng, 1ts relat10n to "all th1ngs," 
at least 1n the un1ty of the nature of every day. "Nature 
( ~~crt~)" 1s the expressed bas1s of this un1ty ot all days, and 
stands therefore as someth1ng wh1ch 1s common to them all. 
"Hes1od d1d not understand n1ght and day: ~or they are 
one (ecr~t yap EV )" (57). Here the un1ty 1s not based on 
someth1ng wh1ch 1s common to all, but rather 1s the un1ty of 
elements wh1ch are ord1nar1ly opposed to eaoh other, ord1narily 
cons1dered to be opposites wh1ch exolude eaoh other and are 
not un1ted. 
Another fragment expresses th1s second type ot un1ty 
as an object of not-know1ng: "they do not grasp how that wh10h 
d1ffers from 1tself 1s 1n agreement (OKill~ ota~Ep6~EVOV ~illU~W' 
d~OAOY€E' )" (51). 
Thus two types of un1ty are presented as objects of 
en's not-knowing, the un1ty based upon someth1ng common to 
11 the elements concerned, and the un1ty of elements ordinarily 
cons1dered to be opposed to each other 1n some way. This theme 
f un1ty, 1n 1ts f1rst-ment1oned form, relates to the themes of 
"all th1ngs" and "that wh10h 1s common" to some extent as well. 
• The near at hand 
The object of not-know1ng 1s descr1bed as be1ng "near-at 
1n several places. "Those th1ngs wh10h 'they enoounter 
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daily (or~ Kae' ~~tpav lY.KUPOUcrt) 'seem to them strange" (72). 
"IJIany do not understand such things, indeed all who cO)lle 
upon them (~K6crot lYKUP€ucrtv )U (17). Men fail to understand 
even though the object is near-at-hand and met with even dally. 
Th1s closeness of the object of not-knowing further suggests 
1ts universality and commonness as well. 
In two other places, the object of not-knOWing is 
near-at-hand and linked with logos, although one statement 
refers to "this logos" and the other to "the logos," which 
w1ll have to be compared and studied later on. ."Though they 
· ,..,.,..-
assoc1ate w1th the logos most closely (~t ~aAtcr~a bt~V€KOO~ OptAOU , 
~ 6YOOt >rwt ), yet they are separated from 1 t," an express 10n 
taken to f1guratively indicate not-knowing (72). "Although 
this logos exists forever (~ou b~ A6you ~oub' l6v~o~ &€l )," 
w1th a temporal "near-at-hand-ness," yet men continue to fail 
to understand 1t (1). 
Finally, in another statement, Heraclit~s suggests that 
what men fail to understand is near-at-hand in a certain sense 
by saying, "not understanding, although they have heard, they 
are like the deaf. The proverb bears witness to them: present 
yet absent (rrap€6v-ra~ &rrEivat )" (34). 
Thus, although men encounter the not-known and are 
present to it and associate with it, yet they do not know it, 
are separated from it and are as if deaf and absent. The 
object of not-knowing seems clearly to touch the whole of 
man's experience in this near-at-hand-ness, even perhaps 
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being timeless (tlexists forever"). The universa11ty of the 
object of not-knowing is again aff1rmed, and 1ts presen~e as 
/ 
somehow common to everyth1ng 1s some way. It w1ll be 
neoessary to ask later on why 1t 1s that someth1ng wh10h 1s 
so near-at-hand 1s not evident and eas1ly known by men. 
s. The hidden 
A few of the fragments ind10ate that the object ot 
not-know1ng is hidden. Th1s would seem to be an oby10us 
statement, in v1ew of the numerous statements about men's 
not-knowing th1s object. It 1s worth 1nd1cat1ng, moreover, that 
what 1s h1dden 1s not necessar1ly therefore no longer near-at-
hand. Its h1ddenness, 1n fact, helps us understand why men ta1l 
to know what 1s so near-at-hand. 
"Nature l1kes to h1de (cpucrt.C;; rtpUicr,Ecreat. CPt.AEi)" (123). 
Nature has already been referred to as the bas1s of un1ty of 
every day by be1ng somehow oommon to every day (106); however, 
1t may be that "the nature of every day" and "nature" as a 
general, abstract noun refer to two d1fferent aspects ot rea11ty, 
as 1s the case in Eng11sh with the word "nature"; th1s matter 
w1ll be exam1ned later 1n this paper. 
"The limits of the soul (ljfuXflC;; 7rE(pa-ra ) would you not 
find (l~EUpotO ) though you should travel every road: so deep 
a logos has it (oth(J) ~aeDv A6yov ~~Et. )" (45). Here again 
there is a reference to logos, this time to "the ~ogos of the 
soul," which 1s described as "deep" and whose depth seems to 
be the reason for the h1ddenness of the "11m1ts of 'the soul." 
The theme of "soul" will be studied in detail in the second 
chapter of this paper. 9 / 
"The hidden harmony is stronger than the evident 
(ctPp,ov(T1 &cpavTj<; cpavcpt)'<; lipc(-r-r(}Jv)" (54). The object of 
not-knowing is hidden; here seems to be a hierarchy of objects, 
in which the hidden not-known is preferred to the more evident 
and known; hence men are not totally ignorant, it would seem, 
but simply lacking in more important knowing, whose objeot is 
hidden. 
6. Logos 
As has already become eVident, the term logos is 
frequently associated with the object of not-knowing. Twice 
the reference is to "this logos": "Although this logos exists 
forever, men fail to understand it" (1); "though all things oome 
to pass (ytVOp,EV(}JV yap naVT(}JV ) in accordance with this 
logos (lia~a ~ov Aayov ~OVO€ ), men seem as if ignorant" (1). 
Once the reference is to "the logos": "though they associate 
with the logos most closely, yet they are separated from it" (72). 
Finally, the soul's logos is mentioned once in connection with 
the object of not-knowing: "the limits of the soul would you not 
9The only other use of "limit (nEpa<; )" is in a fragment 
which explains that "beginning and end (nEpa<; ) are common in 
the circumference of a circle" (103). The concept seems related 
to the term "measures" in the statement" "the sun will not 
transgress his measures (p,E~pa )" (94); another possibly related 
term is translated "limits" in the statement: "the limits 
(T£pp,aTa ) of morning andllevening are the Bear and, opposite the 
Bear, the boundary-mark (OpOC; ) of Zeus, god of the clear sky" 
(120). These fragments will receive oonsideration.again later; 
see especially footnote 24 of chapter two. 
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find though you should travel every road: so deep a logos 
has it ~~TW ~aeOv A6yov ~xEt)1t (45). The relationship 
of these different uses of this term will be examined later. 
The connection of the term with the themes of "all th1ngs" 
and universality, that which is common, unity and oneness, 
the near-at-hand, and the hidden here in the not-know1ng 
statements is already clear. 
7. Other objects of not-knowing 
The relationship between men's not-know1ng and Lhe 
ordinary actions of their lives appears in several fragments 
and through several images, espec1ally the comparison of 
not-knowing to sleep (1, 73, 89); this matter will be exam1ned 
in detail in chapter three of this paper. 
In one statement, Heraclitus speaks of the man who 
orships statues as "not understand1ng what gods and 
eroes really are (oi'''nv{<; dol. )" (5). This theme of the gods 
nd what is divine will be treated in detail in chapters two 
nd three. 
Finally, in two places, Heraclitus indicates that men 
o not understand genuine knowing itself: "none arrives at 
he realization that what is wise (oo~6v ) is set apart from 
11 things" (108), and, although they do not understand, 
themselves, they seem (to understand)" (17). They are 
gnorant of what wisdom is 11ke--a difficult matter in the 
ragments, as has already been noted--and they are unaware 
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that they lack genuine knowing.10 
8. Summary / 
The knowing which men lack is knowing directed to 
"all things" and to what is common and universal, to unity and. 
oneness both of seemingly opposed elements and of elements 
which have something in common, to nature in some sense, and 
to logos in three different senses which still need to be 
examined. The objects of not-knowing are near-at-hand within 
man's experience, yet hidden, and affect h1s ord1nary actions 
and 11fe. ~1en 's ignorance extends to what is d1 v1ne in some 
way; and men in general are ignorant of the sort of know1ng 
which they are lack1ng. 
Now these characteristics of the knowing which men 
lack must be compared with the statements about genuine 
knowing and its objects. 
The object of genuine knowing 
Only a few of the statements about Heracl1tus's own 
knowing, his guidelines for genuine knowing, and his 
characterizations of wisdom are definite in their reference 
to an object, but conSideration of these will be helpful. 
10As was noted above, several other statements seem 
related to these; they are concerned with not knowing the 
"way" (71), not be ing aware where one is go ing· (117), and 
lacking a proper understanding of justice (23, 102). This 
last object of not-knowing, justice, is a theme which will 
become important in chapter two; its relationship to all things, 
to unity, to "that which is common" and. so on will become 
clearer when it is examined in detail. 
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1. The object of Heraclitus's knowing 
Heraclitus explains that in his knowing he is ltd.ist1ngu1sh-
ing each thing (€~aa~ov ) according to nature (~a~a ~~atv) 
and telling how it is (07tCJ.><;; EXet )" (1). The reference to 
"each thing" parallels the orientation of not-knowing to "all 
things" in some sense. "Nature ( ~uat<;;)" has already appea,red 
as the object of not-knowing in a context in which it was linked 
with the theme of oneness and unity. The phrase "how it 
(each thing) is II does not ap.pear anywhere else in the fragments; 
here it indicates that Heraol1tus believed that he was 
explaining the actual characteristics of the real world, a 
notion which fits well with his comparisons of 19noranoe to 
what a man does in his sleep or in a world of "private" 
reality (1, 2, 73, 89). 
Elsewhere he states that wisdom belongs to those 
I/listen1ng not to me, but to the logos ( ~ou A6you)" (50); 
here the logos seems to be the source of wisdom, and by 
implication the source of Heraclitus's wisdom; it is not the 
object of his. knowing, at least not expl1c1t~y. The metaphor of 
"listening to the logos" could be interpreted as meaning 
"knowing the logos," but the sense of it is more in the d1reot1on 
of a source of genuine knowledge; in any case, the logos is 
clearly related to the objeot of genuine knowing. 
In another place, Heraclitus opts .for "things of which 
there is sight, hearing, learn1ng--these are what I prefer 
(7tp o~q.H~CJ.> ) II (55). The relationship of ordinary experience to 
• genuine knowing will be examined in the last sect10n of this 
chapter; but its significance in Heraolitus's mind is ~ear 
from this strongly worded comment. 
2. The object in the guideline statements 
Several familiar themes appear in the desoriptions of 
what Heraclitus says knowing must be. "One must know that· 
war is common, and justice (is1strife, and that all things 
come about (y't v61l£va rrc!v-ra ) by way of strife and. necessity" (80). 
Here, "all things" appears a~ part of what men must know, again 
in the phrase whose interpretation needs attention in ohapter 
two, ytv61l£va rrc!v-ra, "everything that happens" or "all be comings 
of things.1I Knowing must reach "that which is common," just as 
not-knowing was related to it. Additional themes which are 
clearly closely related to "all things" and. what is oommon area 
war, strife, justice, and neoessity, all of which will be 
examined later in detail. 
"1"1en who love wisdom (cp'tAocr6CfX)u<;'t ~C;)must be 
inquirers into very many things indeed (eO l1a~ a 7t'OAAWV)'\; (35); 
here is another oblique but, as far as it goes, pertinent 
comment upon the universality of genuine knowing and. its 
openness to "all things" in some way. 
Finally, in one place, Heraclitus bids us not to 
"conjecture at random about the greatest things" (47), but 
without further specifying these "greatest things"; clearly, 
however, the knowing oonoerned 1s not to be adjudged triv1al 
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or shallow in its compass and depth. 11 
3. The object of wisdom / 
Only two of the statements about wisdom indicate the 
object of wisdom and the genuine knowing associated with it. 
"It is wise to agree that all things are one (~v rrclv-ra € 1'va, ) It 
(50); here "all things" appears without further attributes. 
as part of the object of knowing, and unity and oneness as well. 
The unity in this case is general, limited neither to unity by 
reason of a common nature nor to unity of apparent opposites; here 
the unity which knowing grasps is universal unity of all things 
without qualification. 
"That which is wise is one thing: to know the thought 
(yvGi51111v) by which all tbings are steered through all things" 
(41). Again the object of wisdom includes all things without 
further qualification. The unity here spoken of is attributed 
to wisdom, however, rather than to wisdom's object. But that 
object clearly includes a common aspect of all things, namely 
their common "steerer," referred to by the term yvc6p.1), which 
has been variously interpreted and will be examined in detail 
later. 
The statements on wisdom are the olearest among the 
statements of Heraclitus about positive knowing when it comes 
11lt has already been noted that "justice" is also 
presented as a judge of those lacking genuine knowing, as a 
critic and criterion of genuine knowing (28). The significance 
of justice's place in relationship to genuine knowing will 
become clear in chapter two when the theme is exam1ned in 
some detail. B 'e 11 arm :1, n e 
o 
h 
o 
" 
E' 
o 
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to examining the object. Wisdom's object clearly relates to 
all things, to what is common, to unity and oneness. Also· 
," 
associated with these themes is the unity of wisdom itself, 
although this is not present as an object as such, and the.;; 
theme of the governing or "steering" of all things. Similarly, 
the most often expressed objects of genuine know1ng 1n the 
other two sets of posit1ve knowing statements are "all th1rigs," 
oneness and unity, and "that wh1ch is common"; and the various ~ 
other themes wh1ch occur as objects of genuine knowing or as 
closely linked with these objects are all olosely related 
to these three themes. 
Genuine knowing as philosophica.l 
Is the knowing which men failattohe identified with 
the knowing which Heraclitus speaks of positively and offers 
guidelines for? The evidence from the analysis of the obJeots 
expressed in the two sets of statements ind10ates that 
Herac11tus was concerned about one realm of know1ng, that 
he felt men were fa1l1ng to achieve th1s form of knowledge, and 
that he could speak pos1tively of 1t 1n terms of h1s own 
knowing, of certa1n gu1delines for its ach1evement, and of 
certain characterist1cs of 1ts presence as part of w1sdom. The 
knowing wh1ch has been termed "genuine" 1n these pages and the 
knowing wh1ch men are fa1l1ng at are the same; th1s 1s the 
conclus1on indicated by the frequent ident1ty of the objeots 
in the two sets of statements, and the undeniable s1m1larity 
and interrelationsh1p of all the objects d1scovered. 
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Another question now comes to mind. We must ask whether 
this genuine knowing which men are lacking inoludes al} of man's 
knowing activities, for Heraclitus has been often thought of 
as a sceptic of one sort or another. This question oan be 
answered in two ways: How is genuine knowing to be oharaoterized? 
Does it include all knowing; and, if it does not inolude all 
knowing--if genuine knowing is somehow a speoialized form of 
knowing--how is it related to the rest of human knowing? The 
characterization of genuine knowing, by examining its objeots, 
is the task of this subseotion. The seoond question will be c), 
answered in the section that follows. 
Genuine knowing is oharaoterized most frequently in the 
two sets of statements about it as a knowing direoted to all 
things, to that whioh is common, and to oneness and unity. 
Nature, and. especially logos under variou.s speoifioations 
are linked with the objeot of thing knowing, as are war, strite, 
justice, and necessity. The gods and what is divine and. the 
wisdom that is "separated from all things" are also related 
to this objeot, as is the "thought ( yvc.5p.ll) whioh steers all 
things through all things." The objeot of this knowing is 
near-at-hand, and is charaoterized by oommon-ness in all things, 
but it is nevertheless hidden. In the effort to reaoh this 
object, tithe greatest things" are at stake, as are wisdom 
itself and truth. 
Thus genuine knowing is specifie~ by its objeots to be 
a relatively abstraot, universal, synthetio knowing. Its objeots 
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and the themes related to them suggest that :th1s,:~.:genu1ne 
knowing which Heraclitus is speaking of is not all huma)l knowing, 
but is the realm of knowing ordinarily spoken of as I'''''philosophical 
W1thout any effort to use th1s term technically, the know1ng 
which Heraclitus is dealing with 1n the statements wh1ch we 
have been examining seems aptly desoribed by it; Herao11tus 
himself used the term once (35). But regardless of the term 
used to describe this realm of know1ng, 1t 1s olear from 
the objects of th1s knowing that Herac11tus 1s not referr1ng 
to ord1nary everyday exper1ent1al and perceptual knowledge; 
his concern 1s with the un1ty and common aspeots of all things 
and w1th the struotures and prooesses 1n wh10h th1s un1ty 1s 
to be found. 
If genuine knowing then 1s a speo1a11zed, "ph11osoph1oal" 
realm of knowing, what is 1ts relat10nship to what 1s peroeived 
and understood in ordinary exper1enoe? Th1s question 1s the 
topio of the next section. 
Genu1ne Know1ng and the Data 
of Ordinary Experience 
Heraclitus has often been presented as a soeptic, as a 
man radically distrustful of human pretentions to genuine 
knowledge. This sceptioism has been 1nterpreted as Heraclitean 
in several different forms, eaoh of whioh needs to be exam1ned 
here at least br1efly. 
The Sophists produoed a doctrine that there are truths, 
but no truth; every man 1s the measure of h1s own truth at 
any particular moment, because all sense data are radioally 
different from all other sense data. Heraolitus's v1e~that 
all things are in flux and h1s statements about men~s 19noranoe 
were received by the Soph1sts as evidence for their position; 
and many commentators sinoe the Sophists have treated 
Heraolitus similarly, even attributing the Sophist pos1t1on as 
a whole to him. It should already be man1fest, however, that 
a rad1cally different view of Heraolitus 1s tak1ng shape in 
these pages, based upon what Heraolitus himself says 1n t~e 
fragments at our disposal. The ev1denoe of the fragments 
ava11able to us pOints strongly to the oonolusion that 
Heraclitus believed in a genu1ne objeot of human knowledge 
and in man's ability to achieve knowledge of that object. 
Plato believed that there 1s a genu1ne object of man's 
knowing and that 1t is knowable by man; but he judged that 
ordinary experience is radically incapable of help1ng man 1n 
his efforts to attain genuine knowledge, except to prov1de 
reminders of the Ideas which he may oome to know aga1n. Plato 
justified his views on ordinary human experienoe, 1n part, 
by presenting Heraclitus's doctrines about the changing world 
which he received, more than likely, thrQugh the Sophists. 
Plato sometimes seems to hold that the senses are actually ly1ng 
to man, supplying him w1th data of apparent stability 1n a world 
of flux, data which are fundamentally false therefore; Plato 
seems to attr1bute this posit1on to Heraclitus as well. It 1s 
therefore important to determine from the fragments wh10h we 
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have what Herac11tus does 1n fact say about the plaoe of the 
senses and ord1nary exper1ence 1n men's efforts to att~n 
genu1ne, "ph11osoph1cal," know1ng. 
The senses ~ liars 
Only two of the fragments even suggest that the senses 
are false to man; and 1n both cases, 1t 1s some factor other 
than the senses themselves which is the cause of ignorance or 
error. In one fragment, Heraclitus refers to "men who do 
not know how to listen or how to speak" (19), but "listening 
, -( U,I.OUO'U 1. )" is not the cause of the ignorance; "listening" 1s 
rather the pos1tive power about which these men are 19norant. 
In the second statement, Heraclitus says: Itt;he1"eyes and ears 
of those having barbarous souls (~up~apou~ *uxa~ ) are bad 
itnesses" (107); again the error is not attr1buted to the senses, 
but here rather to the cond1t1on of the soul. 
In a third statement that is pert1nent, Heraclitus states: 
"much learning (rroAUl1Ue(1) ) does not teach one to have 1ntel-
l1gence; for it would have taught Hes10d and Pythagoras, and 
gain, Xenophanes and Hecataeus" (40). "Much learning" seems 
likely to refer here to learning beyond ord1nary experience, 
otherwise the choice of four famous teachers and wise men as 
exemplars would be a little strange. There 1s a problem with 
his word, how'ever; forrroAul1ue (1) m1ght also be 1nterpreted as 
"much ordinary exper1ent1al learning," just as llae1) 0' , ~ seems 
o refer to the ordinary "learning" of ordinary exper1ence (55) 
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and 1J.ae 6v'n: <; as well (17) .12 If "much learning (TCOAU1J.Ue (11 )" 
is taken to mean a lot of ordinary experiential learni~, then 
the conclusion would follow from Heraclitus's statement that 
ordinary experience does not give rise to intelligence, or 
at least not immediately; in either case, the senses are not 
necessarily liars, but simply inadequate to produce intelligence 
unaided--which is not a particularly striking conclusion, nor 
a particularly sceptical one. 
The relationship of ordinary perceptual experience and 
"learning" to genuine, "philosophical" knowing has not yet 
been determined, of course, from the examination of these three 
statements. It can be concluded, however, that Heraclitus 
nowhere in the fragments denies the validity of sense knowledge 
as such, nor attributes ignorance or error to them as chief 
causes in any sceptical sense. The senses are not to be Judged 
liars, although they are not able to produce genuine, "philosophiec 
cal," knowing on their own. 
"HearingU and genuine, philosophical knowing 
The sense-knowledge which Heraclitus most frequently 
~ssociates with "philosophical" knowing or its absence is 
hearing (ctKoucrat). In the statements concerned, however, he is 
~ost assuredly speaking of hearing figuratively. Thus he says: 
12In addition to the three a~eady noted here (17, 45, 55>, 
there is a fourth derivative of 1J.Ue€tv which appears once in 
~he fragments; but it is not clear from this fourth usage 
IWhich realm of learning is in question& "it is better to 
!hide ignorance (ct1J.U e (11 ) tt ( 95) • 
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"Listening not to me but to the logos, it is wise to agree 
that all things are one" (SO). Again, in another fra~ent· 
he speaks of "men void of understanding both before they hear 
this logos and when they have heard it for the first time 
{Kal rcp6oe£v ~ chwuoat xal &xouoav-re<; -r~'np~" (1), and in 
another plaoe ot men tlvoid ot understanding although theY' have 
heard II (34); these, he says, are "like the deaf ( ~(1)cpo i crt v -
lo(xaot )" (34). 
This figurative interpretation of "hearing" in these 
fragments seems the preferable one, particularly since 
Heraclitus explicitly gives priority to hearing the logos 
rather than listening to a man, even himself. Thus the inter-
pretations of "this logos" and "the logos" as referring to 
Heraclitus's own doctrine (or book if there was one) seem 
less than likely; the references to logos in the fragments 
will receive detailed study in the next chapter. The treatment 
of "hearing" as a figure for man's contact- with genuine 
knowing or its objeot, while it might betaken to suggest a 
dependence of genuine knowing upon ordinary experience beoause 
Heraclitus chose so common an experienoe for his figure, does 
not really help our examination of the relationship between 
genuine, "philosophical" knowing and ordinary peroeptual 
experience very signifioantly. 
Ordinary knowing and genuine philosophical knowing 
Ordinary experiential knowledge is set down as the 
context of philosophical knowing in several places in the 
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fragments without any hint of the statements being figures. 
In one place, Heraclitus speaks of experienoe il}' generala 
limen seem as if ignorant when they experienoe (1C€'P~ll€VO' ) 
such words and things ('Kal l1C{.mv 'Kal ~P"(illv ) II (1). In 
another place, he refers to ordinary learning .(l1cfe 1')CH c; )" "they 
do not grasp them after they have learnt (~ae6V~Ec; )" (17). 
Elsewhere, "perceiving, being aware (l1Ca7ov-rac; )" is set down 
as a characteristio of those who praotioe wisdom, speaking 
the truth and acting according to nature (112).13 
On the other hand, there is one statement which could be 
translated: "men are deceived in the knowledge of visible 
things (-rwv ~av€pwv )" (56). But the key term in this statement, 
~av£pwv, is probably intended in a more figurative sense of 
"manifest, evident." This sense of the term is more suited to 
the example of deception which is given in the fragment 
concerned,14 as well as to the general conclusion being formed 
from the fragments that the senses do not deceive man and 
do contribute positively to genuine knowing. The other use 
of the term in the fragments, moreover, makes far better sense 
when interpreted in the figurative sense (54). Thus, although the 
13The term t1Ca "tmv, translated here as "perceiving, 
being aware" is translated as "paying heed" by Freeman; this 
latter is retained when the whole fragment is presented, since 
it fits the sentence structure more aptly;. the term appears in 
one other place (11?) where it also refers to awareness: 
"unaware of where he is going." 
14The fragment reads: "for he too'was deoeived by boys 
killing lice, who said" 'what we saw and oaught, that we left 
behind; but what we did not see and did not oatoh,. that we 
br ing '" ( 56 ) • 
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the matter is debateable and the evidence not irrepressible 
on either side, the preferabl~ reading would be: tlmen ~e 
deceived in the knowledge of things which are evident" (56). 
The evidence from the fragments, even taking the last-
studied statement in its less probable interpretation, .favors 
the conclusion that ordinary experience does have a place in 
the acquisition of genuine knowing. Heraclitus seems to say 
that men, "having experienced" and "having learnt" (and "having 
heard" in the figurative sense), ought not be ignorant, and 
that those who act wisely are those who are aware. In a related 
statement of considerable directness, Heraclitus opts not only 
for "ordinary learning (llcfeT}CH C; ) .. but for "sight and hearing. 
(o\)rt C;, dl(o-?j)" as well; he does not make explicit mention of 
genuine, "philosophical" knowing in this statement, however: 
"things of which there is sight, hearing,: learning--these 
are what I prefer (rrpO'['1'll€W)" (55). 
Thus, while the place of ordinary perceptual experience 
in the process of genuine knowing is not carefully delineated 
by Heraclitus, it is clear that it had a place as far as he was 
concerned. There can be little doubt that Heraclitus was neither 
a sceptic in the Sophist sense, nor an idealist in the Platonic 
sense. He respected, "preferred," the senses of man and saw 
their activity as the context of, and perhaps even the way to 
genuine philosophic knowing. 
The senses among themselves 
The senses which Heraclitus ·,mentions most often are 
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sight and hearing. Two fragments, in whioh they are mentioned 
together and without comparison have already been exam;ned 
above (55, 107). A third statement which mentions them both 
prefers sight to hearing, although the real intent of the 
comment may well be simply a preference for first-hand knowledge 
over mere hearsay: "eyes (~cpeu~:p.ol ) are more exact witness 
( " than ears (J.)'r(J.)V )" (lOla). This preference for sight, if 
such is the intent of this fragment, is not repeated anywhere 
in the fragments. 
Single referencesto sight occur in two fragments (21, 26); 
but neither of them adds anything or complicates anything which 
has not already been examined. There are also single referenoes 
to hearing in two fragments; in one case the object of til heard" 
is 1.6you<;;, "men's words" (108); in the other case, a form of 
, , . 
~KOU(J.)· is used in a sense that is passive in English with the 
meaning "he is called tl (79); neither coqtributes anything new 
to what we have already ooncluded. 
Smell is mentioned twice in the fragments. In one plaoe, 
, -Heracli tus says: "souls have the sense of smell ( OC1llo(J.)V-ru t ) 
in Hades tI (98). In another place, "if all exis:ting things 
turned to smoke (KU1CVb<;;), the nose would distinguish ( ptVE<;; av 
61.uyvotEV )" (7); the nose, rather than the eyes and ears 
which do the distinguishing at present,' apparently, would then 
take over this task. (The nose's ability to discriminate 
smoke may account for the soul's having the sense of smell in 
Hades, rather than Sight and hearing; this matter will be 
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examined in more detail in chapter three of this paper.) 
Summa.ry / 
Heraclitus views the senses much as any man would after 
reflecting upon his ordinary experience. The primary senses 
for him are sight and hearing, as for most men, and he speaks 
of them in quite ordinary ways. There is a preference, more 
than likely, for first-hand sight over hear-say, which is not 
particularly profound. The signs of scepticism and general 
distrust of the senses are few in the fragments at our disposal. 
Heraclitus seems rather toaccept ordinary experience and sense-
knowledge as accurate and'_;useful, and as preliminary to the 
philosophical knowing which was his main concern. 
Tha.t th1s!:.'genu1ne, philosophical knowing is of prime 
importance in Heraclitus's view of things is already clear, 
and it will become still clearer as we turn to examine its 
object in detail, the realm of all things, of that which is 
common to all, of unity and oneness, of the structures and 
processes which have thus far only been mentioned insofar as 
knowing could be better characterized arid understood through 
them. Man's ordinary experience is the baSis of genuine 
knowing of a special sort, directed to a speCial, universal, 
somewhat abstracted, deeply synthetic knowing of the world 
of all things. We now turn to that world in order to examine 
how Heraclitus saw it and believed all men ought to be able 
to see it. 
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CHAPl'ER II 
THE UNITY OF ALL THINGS 
The world of which Heraclitus writes is the world of 
everyday and ordinary experience which men of insight are 
able to understand in all its profundity. Their genuine 
knowing of the world reaches out beyond their own individual 
lives to all things, and seeks to understand the unity of 
all things, the most profound characteristics of the unity, and 
the ways in which men can speak of it. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine Hera.cli tus 's views on these matters 
as we have them expressed for us in the fragments. 
The first section will deal with Heraolitus's statements 
about all things; it will seek to understand the breadth of 
his concern, and the importance of coming-to-be as it relates 
to all things. In the second section, the theme of unity will 
be examined in detail, not only the explicit references to 
unity, but also the related theme of "that whioh is common," 
and two other aspects of unity which are 'important in the 
fragments, nature and cosmos. In the third seotion, the most 
baSic aspects of the unity of all things will be examined; they 
are two: the unity of all things in the process called the 
"turnings of fire," and the aspect of unity called, in one 
place, lithe joinings" of opposites. The final section of the 
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ohapter will deal with the prinoiples to whioh Heraolitus 
attributes the unity of all things, examining their. / 
substantiality and what is meant by eaoh of the prinoiples 
named-- nthe god, tf the thunderbolt, the ··thought (yvc6p,1'}).· 
tfthe logos," war, strife, and justioe. 
All Things 
The referenoes to "all things" in the statements on 
knowing have already made it olear that this is a theme of 
the greatest 1mportanoe in the fragments, and a theme to 
w~ioh almost every other major theme is tied. But Heraolitus 
speaks in several different ways of "all things" in the 
fragments, and refers twioe to ytV6~Eva n~a, a phrase 
involving all things but able to be interpreted in several 
different ways; this phrase, and then the theme of "all th1ngs" 
itself will be examined in this section. 
·:YiY61.ie:va-rrav-ra 
Although the phrase ytv6~Eva nav-raappears only twioe 
(1, 80) in the fragments, both of its a~pearances are of 
considerable importance in the formation of a fundamental 
synthesis of Heraolitus's thought from the fragments, as well 
as in the interpretation of various other themes and terms 
within that synthesis. 
The problem of interpretation of this phrase rests first 
with the verby{yvo~at , for this word can be translated into 
various English words, "happen, come a~out, come to- pass, come 
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to be, beoome, oome into being," and even "be born," as well 
as "ohange into." / 
Heraclitus uses a form of the verb y(yvo~a, in one plaoe 
in the fragments with the eVident meaning of "be born" (39). 
He also uses the verb onoe with the olear meaning of "happen, 
oome to pass" (110). In one fragment, the oontext leaves the 
meaning of ~a y'v6~Eva unoertain beoause its gender is 
unoertain (75).1 In one fragment, the form Y€VOt~O olearly 
means "change into" (7). In two appearances of the verb, the 
infinitive YEV€craat is oontrasted with 'tdeath (ecfva~o<; )" and 
seems rather olearly to mean "coming to be, coming into being" 
as contrasted with "passing away, passing out of being " 
()6, 77). In one fragment, the infinitive oould either mean 
"ohange into" or "come into being," but there is not any 
oontrasting mention of death or passing out of being (31). 
Finally, in one place, the infinitive is used with the sense of 
Itbe (in the future), beoome" (20). 
In examining and oomparing these various usages in searoh 
of some o ommon , basio meaning, it becomes clear that the verb 
always refers to some form of "actualizing what was formerly 
potential, within a prooess." The change or beooming or 
ooming into being whioh is spoken of in these fragments is 
not an absolute beginning of being, which the extreme inter-
lSince the meaning of the fragment is that those who 
sleep are cooperators in ~wv ytvo~€vwv, the preferable inter-
pretation would seem to take this phrase as "things happening, 
ooming to pass"; the statement that men who sleep are among 
"those being born" in the world makes less sense. 
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pretation of "coming into being" would suggest; it is rather 
a becoming that is part of a prooess, and therefore is/the 
actualization of what was possible and, in a sense, prepared 
for, led up to, in the prooess, rather than an arbitrary 
aotual1zation of something without preoedent d1reot1on towards it 
within the prooess. 
Heraclitus has been presented as teaoh1ng that things 
are so ,unstable and that things oome into being and pass out 
of being with suoh laok of direot1on and unity that, within the 
world he desoribes, it is possible to speak only of ohange 
itself enduring; for suoh 1nterpretors of Herael1tus's views, 
the only reality is change. 2 
While a thorough oritique of this interpretation of .~ 
Heraolitus's thought oannot depend solely upon the analysis of 
one verb, the ev1denoe from the fragments is that the important 
verb under oonsideration here does not mean "ohange" in the 
way in which these oommentators have taken it. The analysis of 
such themes as !qgqs, war, unity, strife, and just1oe, moreover, 
will confirm the present interpretation of this verb as well as 
strengthen the evidence against interpreting Heraol1tus's world 
to be a world of absolute ohange. 
In summary, the basio meaning of y(yvo~a, whioh underlies 
each of the individual uses of the verb in the fragments 
2A position like the one mentioned here is proposed by 
Nietzsche in his Philosophy in the Tragio Age of tae Greeks: 
Nietzsche makes much of the arbitrariness of the beoom1ng of 
all things, placing great signif1oanoe in the statement& "time 
is a Child"p.~~a~inga.game of draughts; the kingship is . 
a child's. -'C2~L ',', 
t ~ ~ __ ~~ ______________________________________________ ~ 
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lndicates that new being occurs ln the path of old, that what 
comes to be comes from somethlng, that all th1ngs wh1c~ come to 
be are parts of a process; the process ls not more real than 
the thlngs whlch, ln their comlng to be, are the process; 
but the process ls not arbltrary, lt has unlty and dlrectlon 
and continulty. "Coming into belng" was not arbitrary 
emergence of somethlng utterly new for Herac11tus, but the 
actualization of somethlng whlch the process ho.1ds ln readiness.· 
This ls the meanlng of the verby(yvo~a, whlch under11es every 
partlcular use of lt ln the fragments. 3 ; 
But there ls a second dlfficulty wlth the phrase ytv6~£va 
rravTa, namely the questlon of whlch term ls belng used 
substantively and which as predicate. The phrase could mean 
"all coming-to-be-things," that ls, all the thlngs whlch come 
to be;. or lt could mean "all-thlngs comlng-to-be," that ls, 
everything that ls ls comlng-to-be. The former lnterpretation 
would llmit the reference to whichever, thlngs are actually part 
of the process wlthout lndlcatlng the lncluslveness of the 
process; the latter lnterpretatlon ls clear ln lncludlng all 
things in the process of coming to be. 
A careful study of the fragments at our dlsposal lndlcates 
that Heraclitus permits a part1clple be1ng used as a noun to be 
modlfled dlrectly by another par~iclple or by an adject1ve only 
3rt is possible that the use of y{VOtTO 1n the hypothet1c . 
context of the statement, ''If all exlstlng thlngs turned (y€vo t TO ) 
to smoke" (7) carries a note of arb1trarlness about 1t; but that 
note ls provlded by the overall hypothetlc~l character of the 
statement, lt does not reside ln the form of y(yvo~a' alone. 
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once. This occurs in the statement that "while living (a man) 
approximates to a dead man during sleep" (26): ~)DV ot Cl,-rE-ra, 
.... c, 
-rE6vEW-rOC; £UQWV here the participle EUOWV, "sleeping," 
modifies the participle r,wv, "living one. tI Even in this 
example, how'ever, there is a prior antecedent noun earlier in 
" , the sentenoe, a.v6pw7t'oC;;, 'man. " In one phrase, Heraclitus 
speaks of flall existing things" (7) & m1.v-ra. -ra ov-ra; but here 
the participle which is modified is oombined with an artiole. 
There is no such article in the phraseYtvo~Eva. 7t'av-ra. Finally, 
in another place, Heraclitus combines the passive partioiples 
"connected" and "separate" (10): O'UV,EPOl1EVOV 0, aq>Ep6~EVOV ; 
but the rest of the fragment suggests that there is an "and 
( 'Kal ) .. implied connec.ting them. 
The evidence from Heraclitus's use of partioiples 
throughout the fragments pOints to "all things" as the 
substantive and "coming to be" as the predicate in the phrase 
ytV6~EVa. 7t'dv-ra. Thus, as a first step in our study of all 
things, we may conclude that all things are involved in prooess, 
in a continuing unfolding of new being that has, at least by 
implication from the basic meaning of y(yvol1a , , some sort 
of direction or continuity. Further examination of the theme 
of unity and the themes related to it, as well as Heraclitus's 
statements about various aspects of the prooess of all things 
itself, wil~ confirm·this incipient conclusion and olarity 
it in many details. 
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All things 
j ~ ~ / 
Forms of the adjective rcac; , rcav, "all," appear in the 
fragments twenty-six times. Two of these have already been 
examined in the analysis ofYtv6~£va rcav~a. SiX other t1mes, 
"all" is used to modify some substantive (7, 45, 56, 87, 106, 
116); but only one of these, "all existing things ( rcav~a i~ 
ov-ra ) tr (7), needs to be cons idered in more detail here. 
This statement is the only one in the fragments in which 
Heraclitus specifies "all things" as being "all existing 
things." But the numerous other references to "all things" 
suggest that the term ov-ra, "existing," in this fragment is used 
to contrast reality with the hypothetical content of the 
statement rather than to indicate different statuses of reality 
of "all things": "if all existing things turned to smoke, the 
nose would disttngu~s.h~1f (7).4 
Twice in the fragments, Heraclitus speaks of "all things" 
by using the article with the neuter plural of'the adjective: 
-ret rcav-ra (64, 90). Thus he says: "the thunder-bolt steers all 
things" (64); and ttthere is an exchange: all things (~a n'av~a ) 
for fire and fire for all things (~rcav~c.ov )" (90). 
- -The remaining sixteen appearances of forms of rcac;, rcav 
are all substantives without articles. SiX of these are of the 
4Forms of £!~{, "to be," serve this function of predi-
cating real existence in at least three other plaoes in the 
fragments, where the verb is more than simply a copula; there 
are two statements dealing with time (1, 30); one other use 
of the term may also be of this sort (89); one other surely 
is (23). 
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form nav~a, which could be either accusative masculine singular, 
"every man," or nominative or accusative neuter plural.,. "all 
things." But four of them are clearly neuter plural, "all 
things," for the context allows of no other interpretation. 
Thus Heraclitus speaks of: "joinings: • • • from all things 
( ' ; .-one eft nav~(J.)v ev ) and from one all things (l~ lvb~ ~dv~a )" 
(10); and of "the thought ( yvc.6lt'l1 ) which steers all things 
through all things (nav~a bta ~av~(J.)v )" (41). Elsewhere 
Heraclitus says that it is wise to agree that: "all things are 
one (EV ~av~a elvat )" (50); and. that "to the god (~Qh aECO' ) 
all things (nav~a ) are beautiful and good and just" (102). 
In two places, the form ~av~acould possibly mean 
"every manu without destroying the sense of the fragment. 
Thus Heraclitus could be saying that fire will oome and judge 
and conviot "all things" or "every man" (66), and that the 
"hours (wpa~) It bring "all things II or "every man" (100). But 
Heraol1tus rarely allows a singular adjective to stand alone 
as a substantive--only three times in the fragments: 
(1); eubov~o~ (26); lv6~ (33). MoreoveJ;", both statements make 
better sense and fit the overall context of the whole body 
of fragments better if the forms are taken to be neuter plural, 
and Heraolitus is referring to "all things." 
Eight times in the fragments, the genitive plural 
stands alone as a substantive. Three of these have already been 
noted in the consideration of~av~a and ~a ~c!v~a (10, 41, 90). 
Two other 1nstanoes of this form ooou~ in oonjunction with 
59 
"that which is common" (114 first part) and a related use of 
"the same" (30); their meaning depends upon the sense Q.t 
"common" in these fragments and they will be examined when the ~; 
theme of "that which is common" is studied below. 
In one fragment, rrav~IDv appears twice: "war is the father 
of all and the king of all·
' 
(53). The fragment could make 
sense whether rra.v~IDv meant "all men" or "all things." But 
later in the fragment, war's jurisdiction is specified to oover 
both gods and men, making the interpretation of rrav~IDv as. "all 
men" unlikely; furthermore, in another fragment (80), war 
is described as "common," a term which will be seen to reter 
generally.':to "all things" rather than "all men." In this 
fragment, rrav~IDv means "all things." 
The context of another fragment also indicates that the 
form rra.v~IDv is neuter: "the best men ohoose one thing rather 
than all else ( ~v &v~l clrra.v~IDv)" (29). For the neuter form 
" t , EV, "one thing," stands parallel to arrav~IDv, suggesting that the 
latter is most likely neuter as well, "all things." 
Finally there is the ~av~IDv in the statement that "that 
which is wise is set apart from all" (108). As has already been 
indicated in the previous chapter, the meaning of this statement 
and the whole problem of "that which is wise" cannot be clarified 
until more data can be uncovered in the fragmants. Yet the 
position proposed in chapter one, that "that whioh is wise" 
refers in part to "genuine knowing," and that "genuine knowing" 
is in fact possible for men in general, suggests that "all men" 
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is the less likely interpretation of thisnav~illv , partioularly 
in view of Heraolitus's own possess1on of genu1ne know~ng. 
Nevertheless, even w1th1n the 11m1ts of the pos1t1on proposed 
1n ohapter one, "that wh10h is wise" oould here be the goal 
wh10h all men strive towards 1n knowledge but wh10h none attain 
oompletely, even though they travel the whole way (45). 
Tw10e in the fragments, the dative plural, nao, , appears 
alone as a substant1ve. One of these appears 1n oonjunction with 
what 1s "oommon" and w111 be oons1dered when that theme is taken 
up (113); but 1t most l1kely means "all ;men," unless "the thinking 
faoulty" oan somehow be pred1oa.ted of "all th1ngs." 5 
-In the last use of "all t• to be exam1ned here, "n.cx:O',"r'<I could 
mean "all th1ngs" or "all men" or "all human laws" without 
turning the fragment to nonsense (114 seoond part): "1f ,,'", 
we speak with intelligenoe, we must base our strength on that 
whioh 1s oommon to all (n~v~illv), as the oity on the law and 
even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished by one 
whioh is div1ne. For it governs as far as ( ~oO'ou~ov &K6oov) 
1t will, and is suffioient for all (~~apKei nao, ) and more than 
enough" (114). Again, however, the more likely meaning seems 
to be "all things"; for the verbs "is suffio1ent and more than 
enough," as well as the neuter adverbial in the preoeding clause, 
lias far as it wills," suggest that rraO'1. 1s non-personal, that is, 
.5It is poss1ble that, by referr1ng to "all th1ngs," 
the statement would mean that "all th1ngs are 1ntell1g1ble";" 
but th1s 1nterpretat1on of the fragment seems most unlikely. 
On the intell1gibil1ty of all things, see below in "the section 
on the prinoiples of unity. 
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refers to "things" rather than men. 11oreover, as later study 
of themes related to this law's jurisdiotion and that wh10h is 
/ 
divine will show, the jurisd1otion is over all things, not only 
over men, and the theme of divine law is here linked with "that 
whioh is common" wh10h ultimately refers to all th1ngs. 6 
Nevertheless, the whole statement oould be an extended metaphor, 
with Itall human laws" being the preferable interpretation of 
rr(lq;; or the word oould mean "all men." It is beoause of the 
fragment's place within the whole body of. the fragments, then, 
rather than by reason of the evidenoe oontained solely in the 
fragment itself, that "all things" is oons1dered the~ost 
likely meaning of rrao; in this fragment. 
viere the uses of "all" wh10h have been generally inter-
preted here to mean "all things" quite variant and their 
contexts quite different, then the plaoe of eaoh fragment in 
relationship to the whole body of fragments and the ev1denoe 
from within the fragment itself would be all that the student 
of the fragment has to go on. But Heraolitus uses and repeats 
these similar forms aga1n and aga1n 1n ~im1lar oontexts; 
and th1s in itself is ev1denoe for the un1f1ed 1nterpretat1on 
g1ven to these uses in this section. The fragments 1ndividually 
might bear different interpretations of the form of rrac; than 
the ones given here if only the isolated fragment 1tself 1s 
6This theme is linked in this fragment with "all th1ngs" 
explicitly through the word rrav~illv in the first part of the 
fragment. It is of no great help to oonsult other uses of the 
term v6110C;, "law,·t in th1s matter however; while the term 
ordinarily refers to the politioa! law- of men, its' other appear-
anoes do not exolude broader interpretation (114); see ohapter III 
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considered; but in every case presented in this section where 
"all things" has been preferred, that 1nterpretat10n was adm1se:L;,J. 
sible by internal oriteria and confirmed by the 1nterrelattQD-~ 
sh1ps with other terms and themes, and by the overall s1m1lar1ty 
of this group of fragments about "all th1ngs" as well. 
Before turning to the theme of unity in the fragments, 
it w111 be worthwhile to note br1efly the var10us themes w1th 
wh10h "all things" has been repeatedly associated in the fragments 
just examined. In four of the fragments ment10ned, "all things" 
was l1nked with the themes of un1ty, "that whioh is oommon," and 
"the same." In f1ve of the fragments, "all th1ngs" was oonnected 
with the themes of fire, exchange, and joinings; themes which 
will be seen to be related to the process of all th1ngs; the 
two statements on "all things coming to be" should also be 
ment10ned in this connection. Six times in th1s group of~~ 
"all things" was associated with a power having jurisdiction, 
giving direction, governing, or steering. In three of these 
fragments, "all things" are linked with" war, strife, and justioe. 
Each of these themes will be studied in detail in the sections 
which follow. 
Unity 
The importance of the theme of unity in the fragments 
has already been pointed out both in relation to knowing and 
its object in chapter one and in relation to the theme of 
"all things" in the first section of this chapter. It 1s 
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one of the most important themes to be found in the fragments. 
Yet it remains true that explicit referenoe to unity, py way 
of various forms of the term e~' e; , '}l(a, ev, "one," is not all 
that frequent. Rathe~ certain key themes are clearly related 
to the theme of unity without the word "one" being used, or 
with only one or two actual uses of the term. Thus espeoially 
the statements concerning "that which is common," the 
exchanges of all things for fire and fire for all things, and 
the unity of opposites are clearly related to the theme of 
unity and clearly imply unity of one sort or another, but 
do not often speak of it in so many words. 
Thorough treatment of this theme, therefore, demands that 
all of these related themes be examined along with the expl101t 
statements about oneness in the fragments. 
Oneness 
Heraclitus characterizes a number of d1fferent th1ngs as 
"one." Wisdom, "that which is Wise," is twice characterized 
as "one," as has already been p01nted out above (32, 41). Several 
of the fragments make it clear that oneness is part of the object 
of genuine knowing and men's not-knowing (50, 57, 106); these 
have also been examined in chapter one. In three statements, 
oneness is associated with the "best men," a theme wh1ch w1ll be 
examined in the third chapter of this paperl another statement, 
in which the gender of €voe; is not certain, is probably best 
interpreted together with these three: "to obey the w1ll of one 
( tvee;) is also law (v6'}loe; )" (33). 
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Oneness is explicitly associated with "that whioh is 
common" in two places: tI ••• we must base our strengt~ on that 
which is common to all ( ~ill\ ~uvill\ nav~wv), as the o1ty on 
the law and even more strongly. For all human laws are nourished 
by one which is divine (Jnb lvbc; -rou ee:(ou )" (114); "to those 
who are awake there is one common o~smos ( ~va Kat KO~V~V K6o~ov)n 
(89), where waking is a figure for genuine knowing. "Common" 
and oneness are also linked, by implication, in the statement 
that "the nature of every day is one (cp110t v ~(av 030av )" (106), 
where "nature" is a common aspect of every day.7 The analysis of 
"that which is common" will further confirm the relationship 
between these two themes. 
In three places in the fragments, the oneness of 
apparently opposing things is mentioned explicitly: "for the 
fuller'ssQrew, the way, straight and crooked, is one and the 
same ( p.(a • • l t '11' • Ka 'T) au~ )8t (59) ; "the way up and down is one 
and the same (~(a Kal dlu-r1! ) 'f (60) ; "day and night • • • are 
(zo'C'\ yap " ) " one eV (57) • 8 In a Significant number of other:..' 
statements, Heraclitus takes up this same theme without explicit 
7To judge from the other appearances of the term "nature," 
nature is also characterized by unity itself. But this use of 
the term differs from the others, and the relating of the one 
use of the term to the other uses seems questionable. See 
the treatment of nature in the third subsection of this seotion. 
8The expression "the same" appears in several other 
statements related to the joinings of opposites; these will be 
considered when that topic is examined in detail below (49a, 
58, 84b, 88, 91,12). Other uses of "the same" are related 
to the theme' of "that which is oommon n and will be examined when 
that topic is being considered (17, 30, 31, 72). 
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, 
reference to oneness, simply identifying the apparently 
opposite elements with each other by means of the copula "is" 
/ 
itself, either stated or implied. This theme will be examined 
in detail below. 
In the statement noted in the second paragraph above, 
oneness is attributed to the "divine law," which has juris-
dictiotn over all things: "for it governs as far as it will, 
and is sufficient for all and more than enough" (114).9 The 
questlon of that which is divlne wl11 be examlned later. It 
is important to note here, however, that every steerer or 
governing principle mentioned in the fragments ls referred to 
in the singular. This is what we mdght expeot, of course, 
that the ultimate governing prlnciple be one; but it is worth-
whl1e to mention thls explicit charac~erization of one of the 
governing princlples as "one" and the general treatment of all 
of them that are mentioned as, in each oase, being one. The 
questlon then becomes: why are several such prlnciples named, 
and what is their relation? Or are there really several 
principles; that ls, are all thlngs rather ultimately related 
to one basic prlnciple of some sort? A study of the various 
principles named ln the fragments will be found later in this 
9As has already been indlcated ln chapter one, lt is 
possible that "that whlch is wise" is related to what is divine; 
in that case, there would be a 11nk between the explicit 
characterizations of "that which is wise" as "one" and the 
!unity of what is divine; for "that which alone is wise is 
••• willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus" (32). 
This relationship will be examined below in section four and again 
in chapter three. 
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chapter. 
It ls clear however, even wlthout a detailed ex~lnation 
of the governlng prlnciples expressly named in the fragments, 
that all thlngs are somehow one. Heraclitus makes this point 
ln so many words in one fragment: ''It ls wise to agree that all 
things are one (~v TCav-ra. e r va t) It (50). In another fragment, 
in the midst of a 11st of "jolnlngs" of apparent opposites, he 
states: "from all things one and from one all th1ngs ( ~K TCav-rmv 
ev Ka~ l~ ~vb~ TCav-ra )" (10); the exact meaning of the 
statement may not be clear--the parallei w1th another statement 
about the exchange of all th~s for f1re and fire for all 
th1ngs seems sign1f1cant--but the oneness of all things seems 
clear. The same conclusion is implied in the statement noted 
above that"to those who are awake, there is one oommon cosmos~' 
(89) • 
Thus the theme of un1ty touches upon every 1mportant 
general theme 1n the fragments; its importance is great, not 
only because of its exp11c1t appearances, but also because it 
1s a theme which 1s at the heart of other important themes and 
ls, 1n some sense, the underly1ng direction of Heraclitus's 
thought in general. Herac11tus's exam1nation of all things is 
dlrected above all to their unity and oneness in its various 
aspects; and it 1s already clear that this understanding of ' 
the un1ty of all things in 1ts various aspects is the very knowing 
wh1ch he held to be genu1ne and the fulfilling object of his· 
own and all men's efforts to know. The va~10us aspects of 
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this oneness of all things need now to be exam1ned 1n deta11. 
/ 
That 1<Thich is common 
~ 
Herac11tus uses the term "common (~uvo~ or Ko'v6~ )" 
seven times in the fragments. Two of these are references to 
"that which is common (TO) ~6vov) tI (2, 114), and the other 
five are characterizations of var10us things as common (2, .80, 
89, 103, 113). Four uses of "same" are also closely related to 
"that which is common" in meaning (17, 30, 31,'72). 
Both of the references to "that wh1ch 1s common (TO 
~6vov )" present 1t as the object of genuine know1ngl tlone must 
follow that which is common" (2); "1f we speak w1th 1nte111gence, 
we must base our strength on that which 1s common to all ( TWI 
~uVWt rcavTillv )" t'114) .10 This assoc1at10n of "that wh1ch 1s 
common" with genuine know1ng is enforced as "the 10gostl 1s 
said to be "common" a little later 1n the f1rst of these 
fragments, and then contrasted w1th each man's "private under-
standing": "the logos (TOU .A6"(ou ) 1s common, but most men 
live as if they had a private understand1ng of their own ( ~~ 
lb{av rXOVTE~ ~p6v~a,v )" (2). Moreover~ tithe logos" is the 
Inear-at-hand logos (72) which is not-known by men and "the 
liogostl which 1s to be listened to rather than Herac11tus as the 
~ource of wisdom (50). 
10It is worth pointing out that the form used here 
is generative; if the objective referent of "common" were 
limen" we would expect the dative indirect object; the use of tile 
fgenitive suggests an impersonal referent, at least 1nsofar 
~s the more personal dative has not been employed •. 
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It is clear that "that which is common" is one way in 
which Heraclitus expresses the object of genuine know1rig. 
Thus it follows that "the logos" which is the object of genuine 
, 
knowing in several other statements is here referred to as 
"common." Thus too in another fragment, Heraolitus says that: 
lito those '\'J"ho are awake, there is one common cosmos ( Mva Kat 
xo 1. vbv X6CY).10V ) II (89), where waking and sleeping are taken as 
figures for knowing and not-knowing.ll Similarly, in another 
place, Heracl1tus refers to "this cosmos, the same for all 
( x6'CY1l0V -r6voe, -rbv a6-rbv ChCclV-rOJV)" (30). 
It 1s 1mportant to determ1ne whether "common" means 
tlcommon to all men," as the common object of all men's efforts 
to achieve genuine knowledge, or "common to all th1ngs," as a 
common pr1nciple governing all th1ngs or in some other way 
related to all things. The two expl1cit 11nks between "all" 
and "common" or "same" noted thus far (114, 30) do not 
1mmed1ately resolve the problem s1nce, as has already been 
pointed out, both uses of "all" are w1thout expressed antecedents 
or substantives to indicate their gender. The Same is true 
of the third (113). 
Some help can be obtained by examin1ng the various 
l1The use of sleep as a figure for not-knowing and the 
character1zation of those possessing genuine knowing as 
't'raking appears several times (1, 89); related to th1s figure 
1~ the comment about a pr1vate understandinguof one's own 
(t.c)(av cpp6vf}c)'t.v ) (2), and the reference to 1.01.0V, "one's 
own,1l 1n contrast with wak1ng and the common cosmos (89). 
This matter 1s treated 1n a number of places 1n th~s study. 
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things referred. to as common: the logos (2), cosmos (89), war 
80), the thinking faculty (113); and as the same: the ~ear~ 
at-hand (17, 72), cosmos (30), and logos ·as a principle of 
measure (31). Cosmos, for example, is directly identif1ed 
with fire in f1re's coming-to-be and passing-away (30), whioh 
in turn is elsewhere olosely assooiated with all things (66, 90). 
Logos as a principle of measure is operative in this prooess (31) 
and therefore linked with all things; and "this logos," a 
principle or pattern "according to which all things oome-to-be" 
(1), is identified as the object of not-knowing and thus most 
likely linked with "the logos." The theme of "the near-at-hand" 
is certainly linked by logioal implication with all things; and 
in one place, as was pOinted out in chapter one, this link 
seems somewhat explicit (1). Finally war, whioh is oharacterized 
as common (80), is spoken of in that statement in a context 
dealing with all things in their coming-to-be, and seems related 
in thought to the theme of "strife" aocording to which all things 
come to be (80); moreover, in its other. appearance in the frag-
ments, war seems most likely related to and having jurisdiotion 
over all things, as was pOinted out above (53). 
The only one of these "common" things, in fact, which 
does not bear a fairly direct relationship with all things 
is ''the thinking faculty": "the thinking faoulty is oommon to 
all (l;uvc5v to"n 'TCaO'1. orb CPPOV££1.V )" (113). It is vaguely 
possible that some passive sense of the verb might be intended, 
and the statement mean "all things are able to be understood"; 
?-o 
but this.:seems highly unlikely, and the ~a(H seems better taken 
as "all men.,,12 
In summary, the analysis of all those things oharaoterized 
as common, or as "same" in the sense of oommon, suggests that 
whatever is oommon is related to all things, is in some sense 
"oommon to all things." On the other hand, "tha.t whioh is 
oommon," as well as several of the things whioh are oharaoter-
ized as oommon, are very closely related to the objeot of 
genuine knowing, and in that sense are "oommon to all men." 
But sinoe "all men" are not, in fact, genuine knowers, sinoe 
most men do not-know, "that whioh is oommon I, is not in faot 
common to all men as possessed but only as aooessible. Henoe, 
"common to all men lt is an aoourate desoription of the objeot ot 
genuine knowing in only a qualified sense. Our oonolusion is 
that "that whioh is oommon" is not common to all men in faot, 
but is rather the common goal of their striving tor genuine 
knowledge, a knowledge whioh enoompasses all things in the~.: 
various aspects of their unity. "That which is common" is 
common to all things, then, and to all men, but in different 
senses; it is a general way of speaking of the underlying unity 
12There is a fifth reference to something which is 
Ilcommon" in the fragments: lithe beginning and end are common in 
the circumference of a circle" (103). The sense may be that any 
point can be beginning and end; or it may be that the point which 
is the beginning is also the end, so that "common" means Itone and. 
the same." In the latter oase, the fragment is related to the 
joinings of opposites; in the former oase, it reters to the topio 
of the present seotion. The fragment itself does not make the 
matter clear; but if the term is be1ng used oonsistently, the 
former 1nterpretation is to be preferred. 
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of all things which is the one, common object of all men's 
s tr i ving for genuine knowledge • "That which 1s common~' 1s, 
1n sum, a bridge between unity and all things; 1t 1s one, very 
general way of speaking of the unity of all th1ngs w1th part1c-
ular reference to men's know1ng bhat unity; we must now turn to 
other and more concrete statements about that un1ty ot all things 
in its various aspects. 
Nature and cosmos 
Nature ( ~~crt~) and cosmos ( x6cr~o~) are terms wh10h 
stand, 1n a sense, on the fr1nge of the nexus of 1nterrelat1on-
ships of terms and themes w1th1n the fragments. Each of them 
carr1es a content which we would expeot to be of oons1derable 
significance in the overall view of the world found 1n the 
fragments, and each of them 1s in faot related to most of the 
most important and unifying themes. But ne1ther appears more 
than four times, and the1r plaoe with1n the thought of Heraolitus 
simply does not seem as sign1f1cant as many of the other terms. 
What they do have to offer, of course, is worth determ1ning. 
Nature appears in four statements wh10h all deal 1n some 
way with knowing. In one place, Herac11tus descr1bes himself 
as knower, "distinguish1ng each th1ng accord1ng to nature (xa-ra 
cpuc)tv otatpewv Exao'-rov ) and telling how 1t is" (1). In another 
place, he says: "Hesiod was unaware that the nature of every 
day is one" (106). These two statements po1nt to nature as a 
common aspect, the baSis of unity grasped 1n genuine knowing. 
A third statement fits with these two on knowing: "nature likes 
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to hide" (123); for the hiddenness of the obJeot of genuine 
knowing has already been noted. Finally, Heraolitus spates 
that: "wisdom ( O'oCP(1) ) is to speak the truth and to aot aooording 
to nature (TCot Ei v 'Ka't'a. CP\JO' tv), paying heed 11 (112); here knowing 
and acting are brought together in wisdom, and what is elsewhere 
treated as an objeot of genuine knowing now is presented as the 
criterion of wise action, as seems reasonable. Nature is thus 
related to the theme of unity in the fragments, it is never 
directly cited with the theme of "all things," but the reference 
is somewhat implied both in the referenoe to "distinguishing 
ea.ch thing ( E'KaO''t'ov) according to nature ( cp\JeH v )" (1) and in 
~'t.&' the reference to the "nature of every (aTCuO'1)<;; ) day" (106). 
In sum, nature seems to refer to the unity of basio oharaoteris~ 
tics of a thing, and perhaps of all things, which is the objeot 
of genuine knowing; it oan be oontrasted:with "that whioh is 
common" by noting the latter's emphasis on the aspeot of unity, 
while nature stresses in its oonoept the basioness of the unity 
of characteristics to the th~ngs being considered; ultimately, 
however, the concept simply is not elaborated in detail by 
Heraclitus, and not of the greatest importanoe in the fragments. 
Insofar as it applies to actions as a norm, hOlfever, it will be 
examined again in chapter three of this paper. 
Cosmos is a ooncept whioh is oloser to the nexus of 
interrelationships of terms and themes in the fragments than 
nature. The term itself carries the basio meaning of "order 
within a multiplioity"; this ohsraoteristio of order, it will 
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be seen here, applies to the unity of all things in one statement 
and is associated with that unity as the object of menls genuine 
knowing, namely "that which is common," in another. Two other 
statements emphasize the theme of order within a multiplicity. 
"This cosmos, tt says Heraclitus, ". • .• was always, and is, 
and will be ever-living fire, kindled in measure and quenched 
in measure (chc-r611EVOV l1E-rpa. xa.1 chrocrf3Evv\!l1EVOV', l1~-rpa. )" <:~O). 
The fire in its coming-to-be and passing-away is the order, 
cosmos, of the multiplicity; thus elsewhere Heraclitus states: 
"there is an exchange: all things for fire and fire for all 
things" (90). So also in the examination of the twice-used 
phrase ytV611EVa. ~av-ra., "all things come-to-be within a process," 
the unity and directedness of the coming to be was emphasized; 
thus too in both appearances of this phrase, some principle 
governing the com1ng-to-be is named explicitly: "all things 
come to pass (ytVOl1EVWV ~av'{'wv ) in accordance with this logos 
(lia.-rCt. -rov }..6yov '{'6v5E) Ii (1); and "all things come about 
) " (YOV611EVa. ~av-ra. ) according to strife and. necessity ( xa.-r,j, EPt.V 
xat XPEWV )11 (80). 
In another employment of cosmos, Heraclitus speaks 
perhaps of "the things happening ('{'wv ytVOl1EVWV ) in the cosmos 
( ' ,... EV -rWt li6crl1illt ) tI (75); but even if -rillv yt VOl1EVWV means "men 
being born,fI the sense of cosmos as the ordered unity of events 
taking place remains much the same. Thus elsewhere he speaks 
of "a dust-heap piled up at random" as "the most beautiful 
, t 
cosmos" (0 xclJ...)" t cr-roC; li6crl10C;} II (124) + That is the ·e."te~ of the 
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fragment, but it is clear that cosmos refers to the order of the 
multiplicity described--it may also be signifioant tha~ 
"beautiful" is elsewhere associated with the important 
theme of tljustioe" (102), whioh is involved in ordering of all 
things according to strife and necessity (80). 
Finally, Heraclitus explicitly associated cosmos with 
unity and "that which is common" in one fragment: "to those who 
are awake," those possessing genuine knowledge, "there is one, 
common cosmos (Eva 'I'm l 11.0" VQV K6allOV )" (89). Thus, as an 
aspect of the unity of all things which is the goal of human 
knowing, c6smos is part of what is common. Cosmos adds to our 
understanding of the unity of all things the important note 
of order, already implied strongly by the basic sense of 
y~v611Eva n~astudied earlier in this chapter, but here made 
explicit. 
Nature is the aspect of unity which emphasizes the basio-
ness of the characteristics grasped as one, and forms, along with 
wisdom, a link between the object of knowing and man's other 
actions. Cosmos is the aspect of the unity of all things 
which emphasizes the order of all things as they change, 
f, come-to-be, pass-away within a process yet to be examined here. 
"That which is common" deals with the basis of unity as it is 
grasped by the genuine knower. Each of these aspects helps us 
understand how the oneness of all things is the ultimate goal of 
human knowing. But this oneness does not exist only in the 
abstract; for Heraclitus, all things are one in the ooncrete, as 
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part of a process in which the central role is played by fire, 
and as constituted into concrete unities by the "joinil)gs" of 
opposites, an important aspect of Heraclitus's world hardly 
touched on here up to this pOint. These two topios w111 be 
the matter of the ne~t section. 
The Basic Unities 
Heraclitus's statements on fire form probably the most 
compact group of statements in the fragments; and the group of 
statements on the "joinings" of opposites is one of the largest 
groups of statements. But this can be m1s1eading, partioularly 
because these two themes have been among the most widely 
commented on and interpreted from Heraolitus, both among bpe 
ancient commentators and especially in recent times. We need 
to determine what exactly the fragments themselves say about these 
two topics, and then to ask whether they are related to eaoh 
other by the internal evidence of the fragments themselves. 
The present stage of explication of Heraclitus's view of 
the world is that all things are one in a unity of orderly 
process, which unity is in turn the object of men's searoh for 
genuine knowing. This process has already been found to be 
described as the orderly coming-to-be of all things, and as the 
orderly coming-to-be and passing-away of fire; we wish to 
understand these two descriptions and their relationship 
more clearly. Th~s unity has also been desoribed in a few 
places as a unity, in part at least, not only of a oommon prooess 
involving one chief element, but also as a unity of apparent 
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opposites; this aspect of the unity of all things als~ needs 
examination. As these themes are examined, it will be~me 
significant to investigate the relatiohship between these two 
asuects of the unity of all things; this' will be the third 
.. 
goal of this section. 
The turnings of fire 
"This cosmos," says Heraclitus, "the same for all ( -rbv 
a0-rbv ct~av-rwv), none of the gods and none of men has made, but 
it was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire, kindled in 
mee.sure and quenched in measure (ct~-r611EVOV l1Etpa ;Kal &~Oo'13EVVUl1EVO 
l1E-rpa ) fI (30). This fragment not only carries the important thought 
noted above that the coming-to-be and passing-away of fire is 
ordered, but indicates that some sort of "measure" is the basis 
of that order; it is also clear that the process is all-inclusive 
in a temporal sense, "was ever and is and shall be." This all-
inclusiveness in terms of all things is made clear in another 
statement: "there is an exchange: all things for fire and fire 
for all things (~up6~ -rE av-ral1ot13D -ru ~dv-ra Kal ~up ~~dv-rwv ), 
like goods for gold and gold for goods" (90). All things are 
involved in the process of fire. 
It is important to determine whether the "exchange" of 
all things for fire and fire for all things is to be identified 
l'lith the fire's being "kindled in measure and. quenched in 
measure." The answer to this question is not given in so many 
words; but it seems quite clear nevertheless. For Heraclitus 
explains in one place: "the turnings (-rpo~at ) .of fire: first 
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sea; and of sea, half is earth and half fiery water-spout 
(1CP110'-r1jP ). Earth is liquified into sea, and has its measure 
(~£-rp££-rat ) in the same logos ( £i~ -rov a~-rov A6yov)as existed 
before it became earth" (31).13 Here Heraolitus presents a 
pioture of fire's "turnings," a term whioh suggests ohange over 
and back again, much as the "exohange of all things tor f1re 
and fire for all things tl suggests .14 In this process of ohange 
over and back again, fire turns into "sea (ec!AaO'O'a >," whioh is 
really half -earth and half firey water spout, midway in the pro~(,~ 
cess and perhaps, in some sense, unstable. Earth's part in 
the process is to beoome sea. The measure whioh guides and orders 
the prooess, already mentioned in the first fragment noted 
above where the prooess was oalled oosmos, resides in a logos 
whioh is oommon to the various stages of the prooess, "the same 
13The term 1CP11 o'-r1jp has long been a souroe of comment among 
interpretors of Heraclitus. A summary of suoh oomment will be 
found in Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 463, 
n. 1. Guthrie points out that whatever term means exaotly, it 
clearly indicates that water is midway between fire and earth 
in the prooess, and that the process is not one of statio 
positions, but one of dynamic change; water is always partly 
fire, always in prooess towards fire and away from it. 
14The term &v-ra~otf3~, riexohange," is not repeated in the 
fragments; nor is any other term meaning "change" except the 
term -rpon'at, translated here as "turnings," whioh has an 
important correlate in the term 1CaA{v-rpo1CO~, translated as 
nopposing tension" (51); this similarity will be examined below. 
Other terms expressing "ohange" appear in several fragments whioh 
are examined in appropriate parts of this paper (67, 88). One 
statement follows the pattern of the othyrs only indireotly: 
"in changing, it is at rest (~£-ra~c!AAov ava1Cau£-rat )" (84a); 
it could mean that the stages of prooess whioh appear to be statio 
(e.g. the state of water) are still part of the prooess, while 
parts of the process seem to stand still; but there is no other 
fragment l-Thioh explioitly confirms this interpretation. 
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as existed before it (sea) became earth." Thus there is a 
linking of the ever-living fire, always existing, and / 
the logos wherein the fire's ordering measure resides also 
existing before and after every part of the process, the 
logos of the measure of fire's coming-to-be and passing-away 
seems from these statements to have been, to be, and to be 
about to be always the same; the fire changes, is exchanged, 
and the measure orders the changes, but the logos which founds 
the measure is "the same as existed before." 
It is also significant that the termy€v~a6a' is used in 
this fragment about the turnings of fire: "It has its measure 
in the same logos as existed before it (sea) became (y€v€a6a, ) 
earth." For the ordered process sPQken of when the basic 
meaning of ytV6~Eva ~av~awas being examined and spoken of 
again in the analysis of cosmos and its relation to all things 
is here explicitly related to the turnings of fire, whioh is 
the one concrete ordered process which Heraclitus assooiates with 
all things; (the relationship of the process of fire's turnings 
to the joinings of opposites will be examined below). 
Summarizing to this point, we may say that the ordered 
process of coming-to-be of all things is the ordered coming-to-
be and passing-away of fire; this process is called fire's 
Ii turnings ," as it becomes water and then earth, and then earth 
becomes water and goes back into fire again; it is a process 
'of exchange involving all things, changing over and ,back again. 
It is an ordered process, a cosmos of measured ooming-to-be and 
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passing-away, whose measure resides in a logos which is as 
enduring as the process itself--which ever was and is ~d will 
be ever-living--and is the same throughout the process. 1S 
These conclusions are based upon the assumption that 
the three fragments concerned belong together; this is not 
a blind assumption, but not one which is self-evident either. 
Yet clearly all three refer to "fire (1CUp)" in the same way. 
Two of the three speak of "all things" in relation to fire: 
"this cosmos, the same for all I. (30); and "there is an exchange: 
all things for fire and fire for all things" (90). Two of them 
speak of the measure of the process (30, 31). Finally, all 
three statements fit in similar ways into the nexus of inter-
related terms and themes which has been developed already, 
especially concerning coming-to-be (y£v{a6at ), all things, 
cosmos and unity generally, and which will grow in complexity 
of mutually involved and mutually implied relationships as this 
study continues. It therefore seems quite reasonable to deal 
with the three fragments together, and to trust their remarkable 
unity of content regardless of what might be deemed a rather 
slim overlap of terminology. 
There are several other fragments which deal with fire; 
15The term l1 E-rpa, "measures," appears in one other 
fragment: "the sun will not transgress his measures (l1{-rpa ); 
otherwise the Furies, ministers of justice, will find him 
out" (94). It is possible that there is a relationship between 
"suntl and IIfire" intended by Heraclitus; but the fragments at 
our disposal never confirm this relationship, but only raise 
the possibility. The possibility of a relationship between 
"measures" and "justice" will be examined below. . 
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one of these will be examined when the mystery rites are studied 
in chapter three (14), and another when that chapter t~ns· 
to Heraclitus's ethical comments (43). One other has already 
been mentioned in a footnote and will receive attention when 
the "joinings" of opposites are examined (67). Finally, there 
is a fragment which reads as follows: .Ifor fire (1"~ 1CUp ) 
will come and judge and convict all things (1CaVl"a )" (66).16 
This last fragment has been offered as evidenoe that 
Heraclitus believed in ecpyrosis, the ultimate destructio~ of 
the universe in fire, despite the contradictory evidenoe of 
"was ever and is and shall be ever-living fire" in the fragment 
noted above (30). While it is not impossible to take "come, 
judge, and convict" as a metaphor for fire's primacy as it is 
exchanged for all things and all things for it, the exact 
intent of the fragment is not clear; nor is the relationship of 
this fragment to the other fragments on fire and those on 
all things very clear. The reiteration of fire's primacy over 
all things is worth noting, of course; but fire is nowhere else 
in the fragments given jurisdiction or governing power over 
all things; and it has already become clear that fire itself is 
subject to the ordering of the measure b~sed upon a logos of 
some sort. Thus it does not seem consistent with what has 
16 It is worth notlng that this is the only referen~e 
in the fragments to l"b 7t'UP; every other reference is to 1CUp 
without the article; while there may be some significance in 
this difference, it is difficult to say what it might be. 
Concerning ecpyrosis, an examination of various positions on 
this matter will be found in Guthrie, History of Greek 
PhilosOphl Vol. I, p. 455. 
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already been dlsoovered to attrlbute some ultimate jurisdlotlon 
to fire; flre ls rather the prlmary element ln the prooess 
ot all things, and in that sense it metaphorloally "oonvlots tt 
all things as it beoomes all thlngs and all things ultlmately 
beoome flre onoe again, and so on for all ttae (wlthout an 
ultimate endlng of the prooess ln whloh at some t1me all thlngs 
would tinally revert to flre). 
Is tlre the basl0 element ot the prooess ot all thlngs 
bY belng the basio element out ot whloh the other elements 
oome-to-be? This seems to be aoourate as tar as lt goesl 
.ea and earth oome-to-be ln the turnings ot flre, and ohange 
back agaln. But there ls more that must be sald, tor none ot 
these are oonsldered statl0 elements from whloh the world i8 
oonstructed, the prooess ls unending tor all t1JRe, was ever and 
ls and w111 be ever-11_lns. Heraolltus treats flre as the 
baslc ele.ent, and ln that sense follows the path ot other 
Presooratlosl but the basls ot unlty ot all thlngs ls not t'ls 
oommon ele .. nt, but the prooess, the oo.ing-to-be ot all thlngs, 
whloh ls the ordered oomlng-to-be and pass lng-away of tlre. 
The prooess ls the all lmportant basls ot unltYI tire ls slmply 
the prlmary element ln the prooess, and thus one aspect ot 
the process's unlty. But tlre ls not the only, or even the most 
basl0 aspect ot the unlty ot the prooess, tor tlre's turnlngs are 
subjeot to a m.asure tounded upon a 108081 and ln other tragments 
varlous other prlnolples ot jurlsdlotlon and governanoe and 
steering are n .. ed whose authorlty extends to all thlngs. Thus 
i 
,I 
,I 
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the process of all things in the coming-to-be and passing-away 
of fire will not be adequately explained until logos, ip its 
various appearances in the fragments, and other prinoiples 
of unity have been examined. 
There are still a few fragments dealing with oonorete 
aspeots of the prooess of fire's turnings whioh need to be 
examined. These are the statements in whioh "soul ( )jfux1'f )" 
seems to take the place of fire in the turnings involving 
water and earth: "To souls it is death (eava-ro<;; ) to beoome 
water (uowp y€v{~eat ); to water, it is death to beoome earth 
(YDv Y€VEcreat ). From earth comes (y{vE-rat ) water, and from 
water, soul" (36); and "for souls it 1serijoyment, 0~ -rath..e.r 
death (-rEp*tV B eava-rov ), to beoome (YEV{~eat ) wet" (77).17 
In both fragments, the passing-away is presented as 
"death," a term used in this way only of "soul." In both 
fragments, both ooming-to-be and passing away are predioated 
by the same term, some form of y(yvo~a~; it seems reasonable 
to conclude that there is one processwhioh is under oonsideration 
in these fragments, which involves ohange over and baok again, 
17It is assumed in this and other studies of the soul 
becoming wet or coming to be water, both here and in chapter 
three when the matter is examined in ethical terms and questions 
about the soul's pleasure and death are studied, the terms 
v.Tater (Uowp ) and wet (Jyp6<;; ) are parallel in meaning. In 
the statement about the· "turnings" of fire, the termeaAa~~a , 
'which literally means "sea," is used; another fragment makes 
it clear, however, that the sea (eaAa~~a) oonsists of water 
(uowp ) (61). If water and sea are to be distinguished, with 
fire's turning to sea and soul's turning to water thus also 
distinguished, the fragments are not clear on the matter. In 
the translations used here, fire is said t9 beoome water (31). 
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both coming-to-be and passing-away; all of this confirms the 
conclusions reached earlier on this subject. What is ~st 
peculiar about these fragments is the place occup1ed by "soul." 
for soul stands in relation to earth and water in the same way 
as fire in the statements examined above. There is a th1rd 
statement in which the same thing happens: "souls are exhaled 
from moist things (d7t'b -rilly ~ypillv dvaaup,tillv-rat)" (12);18 this 
fragment's wording is somewhat doubtful however. 
Hhat is the relation of soul to fire? Is soul the element 
called "air" which is missing from Heraclitus's other statements 
about fire's turnings, and which would stand between water and 
fire presumably? This is a poss1ble explanation, but not 
supported by any of the texts accepted as genuine by D1e1s-
Kranz. 'rhe association of soul with fire itself seems more 
likely from the fragments at our disposal; this is especially 
true because in two places soul is associated with a logos, 
although the logos concerned seems to belong properly to soul 
itself, rather than to have a certain jurisdiction over soul 
as the 10&9S referred to fire has over fire: "the logos of the 
soul is increasing itself" (115); "the limits of the soul you 
will not find • • • so deep a logos has it (ou-rm ~aauv A6yov 
) (45). The logos clearly belongs to soul in both 
, ~8There is some question as to the accuracy of reading 
avaeup.tmv-rat in the Greek text, as indicated by Diehls-
Kranz in the critical notes; the sense of the statement however 
fits with what has already been explained if "are exhaled" 
is retained; that is, this interpretation accords w1th the 
evidence of the other ~ragments. But the uncertainty about 
the reading is deserving of mention. 
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cases; but in both cases there is a certain similarity to the 
logos associated with the measure of fire's process, for the 
soul's logos is related to the soul's "limits (1t'E(pa,-a)tt and 
to "increasing itself {au~(l)v)." In sum, while the indioations 
are that soul is related to fire, and that it reaots within 
the process of all things in the Same way as tire is said to 
react, Heraclitus never makes soul the basio element, never 
associates it with all things, and deals with its logos in a 
way which distinguishes it from the logos assooiated with fire. 
The questions of soul in relation to death, .enjoyment, getting 
wet, and similar matters will be examined in the third ohapter 
of this paper. 
The order of all things in their process of ooming-to-be 
and passing-away is one aspect of the basio unity of all things. 
Within this process, the primary element is fire, whose turnings 
are ordered by a measure founded upon a log~ whioh 1s as 
enduring as the process and the same after every ohange baok as 
~efore the ohange-over began. 
The joinings of opposites 
In chapter one, when the objeots of not-knowing were 
under conSideration, it was already evident that Heraolitus 
makes mention several times of a un1ty of elements whioh are 
apparently opposed. In this chapter, in the seotion on unity, 
more examples of this phenomenon were reoorded; and later the 
term "joinings," whioh appears in one of the fragments, was 
applied. Now it is important to examine these "joinings n of 
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opposites and determine their relation to the rest of 
Heraclitus's thought as explicated thus far. / 
"That which is in opposition (TO &VT(~OUV ) is in 
concert (O'Ul1qH~pOV ) and from things that differ (TWV ot.aCPEp6v'T'Q)v ) 
comes the most beautiful harmony ( liaA)do'T'fjv dpl1ov(av)" (8). 
In another place, Itthat which differs with itself' ( Otacpep611EvoV 
tWU'T'Wt ) is in agreement ( ~110AOY~€t.); harmony (dpl1ov(fj ) 
consists of opposing tension ~aA{V'T'pOrro~) like that of the 
bow and the lyre" (51). Opposites form unities, harmonies, 
beautiful harmonies--the theme of beauty is Signifioant for its 
relation to "justice," whioh will be examined later. The unity 
and harmony is the result of ftopposing tension," whioh is 
exemplified by the bow and lyre; apparently the very opposition 
is the basis of unity in some way. Heraolitus also speaks of: 
"joinings:. ( ouvd\jlt €S ): wholES and not wholES (OAa xal OOli oAa ), 
oonnected-separate~, ( OUV(pEP 611 EVOV 0 t aCPEp;6p.EVO~, oonsonant-
dissonant" ouvatoov otatoo~, and from all things one and from 
, '" (\ ) 'J: t).. .e 
one all things (Eli rrav'T'WV €V lia~ E~ €VuC; rruV'T'a )It (10). 
This last statement could well have been intended as 
a classification of types of unities of opposing elements, or 
at least as a listing of the most general types; on the other 
hand, the conneoted-separate oategory would seem to inolude 
almost every other type, whioh is the ,joining of "united n and 
trdisunited," whioh is the sense the Same terms oarry in the first 
t't'10 fragments on the unity of oPPosites noted above (auvcpep6p.evov 
and otacpsp6p.EVOV) (8, 51). In any oase, four more· examples 
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of Heraclitus's concern with this theme are provided here. 
Other examples of joined opposites are more con~ete& 
"for the fuller's screw, the way, straight and crooked, is 
one and the same" (59); "the way up and down is one and the 
same" (60) ; "day and night • • • are one" (57). 
In another group of fragments, Heraolitus not only speaks 
of joined opposites, but expands some on how they are joined. 
The comments parallel significantly the few words on the 
harmony of opposing tension as in the bow and lyre noted above 
(51) • Thus: "the god (6 e Eb~ ) is day and night, winter and, 
summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger; but he changes 
(&AAOtOu-rat be ), just as fire, when it is mingled with~'perfumes, 
is named according to the scent of each" (67). The question of 
what is divine will be examined later; but what is clear is that 
the opposites are joined "but (this 1s the sense of be in the 
fragment) he changes." The sense of th1s seems to be that the 
un1ty of opposites, "he," lithe god," 1s not stat1c; the un1ty 
is changing, a posit1on somewhat akin to: "oppos1ng tens1on" and 
"harmony. « 
In another place, Heraclitus says that: "the same th1ng 
I ~ I" in us (-rau-ru -r Evt ) 1s living and dead, and waking and sleep1ng, 
and young and old ll (88). The reference to "the same thing 1n 
us" could be to "soul," a matter which w111 be cons1dered 1n 
chapter three; but 1t 1s clear a&ain that the oppos1tes concerned 
are joined together in some sort of unity. In this case, 
the unity is founded, according to the fragment, upon 
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change, a change over and back again not unlike_.the turning 
of fire: "for these things (des.d, waking, old) when the, have 
changed (~~~anEo6v~a ) are (lo~t ) those, and those (liv1ng~ 
sleeping, young) when they have changed back again (naAtv 
l1E~anEo6v~a ) are these" (88). The use of naA1.V, "baok," 
parallels its appearance i~aA(v~pOnO~ "the term translated 
"opposing tension" above (51). 
The same term, naAtv, makes its only other appearance in 
another statement about joined opposites: If ••• they scatter and 
combine again (ordOvT)Ot! ,xat naAtV ouvaYEt ) ••• and approach 
and separate (xal npOOEtOt xal ~nE1.0t )" (91); .the subject 
of these verbs is uncertain, but again opposing actions are 
joined together and the process is one of "over and back again." 
There are also concrete examples of opposites joined 
in some sort of over-and-back interohange: "sickness makes 
health pleasant and good, hunger (does so tol satisfaction, 
weariness (does so to) rest" (111); "cold things grow hot, 
hot things grow cold, the wet dries, the parched is moistened" 
(126) • 
There are also a number of examples of opposites joined 
in which either the opposition or the joining is really, as 
far as we are concerned at least, only a matter of one's point 
of view. In a certain logical sense, however, they are joinings 
of opposites, and as such serve as examples of the unity of 
opposites Heraclitus is concerned about. "Sea water is the 
purest and the most polluted: for fish it is drinkable and 
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life-giving; for men, not drinkable and destructive" (61); 
"the name of the bow is 'life,' but its work is death"/(48); 
"physicians, who cut and burn, demand payment of a fee though 
undeserving, since they produce the same [that is, pa1n)" (58); 
"pigs wash themselves in mud, birds lwash themselves1 in dust or 
ashes ll (37).19 
In several places in the fragments, Heraclitus contrasts 
sleeping and waking (1, 21,,26, 88, and perhaps also 73, 89); 1n 
one fragment he explains: "Sleepers are workers and cooperators 
in the things happening in the cosmos (lpya-ra°t; ••• Kat O'UVEpYOtic;; 
)" (75); again the sense 
is that, though opposed to those actively awake, the sleepers 
are one in the events of the cosmos. Similarly, in several places, 
Heraclitus speaks of human life and death in contrast (20, 
21, 26, 48, 88, 63, and perhaps 27); in one fragment he speaks 
of mortal immortals, immortal mortals, living their life 
and dying their death" (62), a statement which is somewhat 
ambiguous, but seems to refer to man who is both immortal 
(living) and mortal (dying); death and life, like coming-to-be 
and passing-away, are somehow one. He~ce Heraclitus says, in 
a fragment already noted above: lithe same thing in us is living 
19There may be a similar reference intended in the 
short fragment: "donkeys would choose sweepings rather than 
gold il (9). Here sweepings and gold, opposites in some sense, 
are the same, for they are both chosen as good; this compares 
with the sameness of mud with dust and ashes, both used for 
washing (37). The ethical significance of these statements 
which compare men and brutes will be examined in chapter 
three. 
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and dying, and waking and sleeping" (88).20 
Finally, in perhaps the most famous set of frag~nts on 
this theme of joined opposites, Heraclitus speaks of a river: 
"those going into the same river have different waters ( e1'epa Kal 
E"t"spa uoa:ra ) flowing ever upon them" (12); "for it is not 
possible to step into the same river twice" (91); "we step and 
do not step in the same rivers" (49a). Heraclitus ooncludes 
this last statement with a striking comment which recalls his 
words on sleep and death in the fragments noted in the previous 
paragraph: "we both are and are not ( stllev T'S Kat o6x et.,.ev)" 
(49a). There is one river of different waters; one river which 
is, in a sense, two rivers, one stepping that is two steppings; 
even two of us as we step into different rivers; perhaps 
Heraclitus even intends the full weight of the final comment, 
that we are and are not the same persons who step. 
Again and again, Heraclitus pOints to the numerous 
unities of our experience that are really joinings of oPPosites 
--ti'1enty-one places in the fragments; in fact, this theme is 
numerically second only to the theme of not-knowing. Yet 
l?' 
...;O:rhere are several other fra.gments which might belong to 
this group in at least some remote way: "it is weariness to 
toil and obey for the same [meri"a" (84b), which is vague but may 
refer to working for and listening to the same man at once, 
or some such thing (which might be oompared to simultaneously 
being at rest and changing; see 84a); another fragment mentions 
iineed and satiety" (65); it is possible that the reference to 
the beginning and end of a circle as "common" means that they 
are the same (see footnote 12 of this chapter for an examination 
of this fragment) (103); finally, in one place, Heraclitus 
states: IIWe live their death, and they live our death" (77), 
where "they" is uncertain, but may refer to souls;·that 
possibility will be examined in chapter three. 
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strangely this theme of the joinings of opposites is explicitly 
linked with very few of the other terms and themes of ~he frag-
ments. The unity of opposites is, of 'course, an object of 
not-knowing and therefore also part of the object of genuine 
knowing.21 This unity is one of the two chief aspects of the 
unity of things which concerned Heraclitus, and stands parallel 
therefore with the ordered oneness of the process of all things. 
But many themes which have already been found important are 
not explicitly related to the joinings of opposites; 
not logos in any of its various forms, nor cosmos, nor "that 
which is common," nor war, nor strife. "All things" is explicitly 
connected with the theme in only one place (10), where unity and 
all things are presented as opposites joined together. Fire 
is explicitly related to it only as a metaphor (67). 
What then is the relationship of this theme of the 
joining of oppOSites, so frequently repeated in the fragments, 
to the rest of the themes and terms in, the fragments? Only 
further examination of these themes and terms, especially the 
theme of "opposing tension" and the theme of "beautiful harmony" 
associated with the joining~ will provide an answer to this 
question. 
21This is espeCially clear from the statement: "The 
hidden harmony is stronger than that which is evident" (54); 
the hidden harmony, the one which men fail to understand, is 
the one associated, it would seenf;: with all things in their 
unity, which is the object of genuine knowing. The evident 
harmony might be that of the bow and the lyre, since these 
are the only other sources of harmony which Heraclitus refers 
to in the fragments. In any case, the primacy of harmony 
and that which is hidden is clear from the statement. . 
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Interrelation of the joinings and the turnings 
/ The term which was translated "opposing tension," 
rraA(v~porros appears as an explanation of the harmony of 
opposites (51). It is exemplified, when first presented, by 
the bow' and lyre, which are functional o~ly when the two 
opposite ends produce a situation of tension in the string. 
In another place, "the god (d acoS )" was a joining of 
opposites in some way, and was said to change as well; the 
joining is not static (67). In another place, "the same thing 
in us" is a joining of oppOSites, and the opposites concerned 
change over and back (rraAtv ) again; the joining is not static 
(88). Again in another place, "they scatter and combine again 
(7t'clAtV. ) ••• and approach and separate" (91). 
Both Heraclitus's general explanation of the unity of 
opposites and a number of his particular examples point to 
the fact that the dynamic opposition is what preserves the 
unity. 
It is significant to note that in the study of the 
~urnings of fire (~porral , the term recalls rraA(v~porros, 
"opposing tension,tI noted above), it was the process which was 
found to be the basic unity which concerned Heraclitus; the 
ordered process is treated by him as the basic unity of all 
things, not the common element, fire. Similarly in this exami-
nation of the joinings of oppOSites, it is not the fact that the 
opposing or different elements have something in common which 
is most basic; the basis of unity is in the dynamic tension. 
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In both realms of unity, the unity which concerns Heraclitus, 
is not the static fact of a common element or a mutuaL' 
relationship; the unity which concerns him is the basis of this 
static unity, the dynamic ordered process of exchange on the 
one hand, and the dynamic cooperation of the opposites, the 
tension of the joining, on the other. 
From several pOints of view it is possible tosaY that 
the turnings of fire, the ordered process of all things in their 
coming-to-be and passing-away, is simply one of the many 
kinds of joinings of opposites. Thus his joining of "from 
all things one and from one all things" (10) might be taken 
to place the process of all things into a category of joinings. 
Yet the universality of the process, involving the coming-to-be 
af.::.all things, is never predicated of the joining of opposites. 
How is it that the unity whose universality is made very clear 
can be subsumed in thought under a unifying principle whose 
universality does not~seem.:to,_b.e,c:a.·:matter of real oonoern 
to Heraclitus (assuming the absence of predication of 
universality in twenty-three statements to be significant 
evidence)? The matter must be examined further. 
Reflection upon the two themes suggests that the theme 
of the process of all things is the more concrete of the two, 
the theme of joinings of opposites the more abstract. For the 
conclusion that all things are one in their ordered process of 
coming-to-be remains in touch with the things of experience in 
a much more explicit way than the oonolusion that whatever is 
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, j6ined into a unity is joined in a dynamic tension of opposites; 
the former is a reflection upon all things which concl~es·to 
their unity; the latter is a reflection upon unities which 
seeks to understand the ultimate nature of unity itself. It is 
not surprising, then, that the universality of the joinings is 
not a matter of concern; the refleotion upon joining is a. 
reflection upon the nature of unity itself, whether the unity 
concerned be the unity of all things or the oneness of the way 
up and the way dow'n. 
Heraclitus, as has been seen, offered his views to men 
who ~\j'ere, in general, failing to attain to genuine knowing. 
Their failure is evidenced, for Heraclitus, above all in their 
failure to grasp what is presented to them in all things, namely 
the unity of all things. This unity, he observed, is the unity 
of an ordered process, guided by a measure and a logos which we 
have still to examine. But his examination carried him to 
something even more basic, to the nature of unity itself, as it 
is presented to man in the things of his experience and in the 
process of all things as well. Every joining of elements which 
are different in any way, which includes the unity of every 
multiplicity, is a dynamic joining, a'.~harmony, founded upon the 
tension between the opposites; unity means opposing tension, 
land Itstatic unity" is an empty concept: tlThat which is in oppo-
sition is in concert and from things that differ comes the most 
beautiful harmony." (8). 
The two themes neither totally include nor totally imply 
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one another; they are on different levels of reflection. 
Heraclitus saw that all things are one in their ordered process 
of coming-to-be, and he saw that their unity and every unity 
i'ras a harmony of opposites in tension, was a dynamio unity. 
The former insight tells men that there is nothing static in 
the world, nor anything arbitrary or isolated, but all things 
are one in dynamic process. The latter insight tells men 
that unity itself is such as the unity of all things which he 
is explaining: to be one means to be in tension; unity itself 
is dynamic. 
~ Principles of Unity 
Heraclitus indicates that the process of all things in 
the turnings of fire is directed by a measure and a logos (31); 
he speaks of all things coming-to-be according to "this logos" 
(1) and according to strife and necessity (80); war is common 
(80), the father and king of all things (53); the divine law 
is sufficient for all things and more than enough (114); the 
thunder-bolt steers all things (64), and also the thought 
(yvWll11 ) steers all things through all things (41). Yet "this 
cosmos the same for all, none of the gods and none of men has 
made" (30). How are these governors and sources of structures 
and jurisdiction related and what is their relation to the process 
of all things and the joinings of opposites, which are the two 
fundamental types of unity which are Heraclitus's concern? 
These are the questions which will be examined in this section. 
Before treating war, strife, and justice and the various 
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forms of logos, which are the most important themes of this 
section, "that which is divine" and the various other :' 
sources of jurisdiction mentioned in the fragments will be 
examined. 
As far as concerns "the gods," Heraclitus speaks of· them 
on a par with men in the two statements which are pertinent 
here: "this cosmos, the same for all, none of the gods (eEQ)V )' 
and none of men has made; but it was ever and is and shall be 
ever-living fire" (30); and "war is the father of all and the king 
of all, and some he reveals as gods (eEo6S ) and some as men, 
some he makes slaves, others free" (53). The relationship 
between ttthe gods" and men will be studied in chapter three in 
detail; 't'lhat is significant here is that "the gods" are clearly 
not ultimate sources of unity or jurisdiction in Heracl1tus:~s 
world. 
In several places, however, Heraclitus speaks of "the god 
(6 6EOS )" with an evidently different content in mind for 
this singular use of the term: "the god (6 eEOS ) is day and 
night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger; 
Whatever the god is--there is no d1ff1oulty in ooncluding 
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that Heraclitus is not simply referr1ng to one of the trad1t1onal 
gods whom he has rejected as a group 1n the statements/hoted 
in the previous paragraph--"the god" is clearly connected 
with the unity of things. In the second statement, "the god" 
is contrasted with men, who deal w1th things as opposed 
in such a way as to exclude un1ty with each other; for lithe 
god,1i who is identified with the un1ty of opposites in the 
first fragment, all th1ngs are one 1n their goodness, beauty, 
and justice. Since there is nothing 1n the text of the second 
fragment which demands that "the god" be taken as personal, it 
remains possible to identify the un1ty w1th "the god" 1n that 
statement as well, taking it more to mean "1n the god all th1ngs 
are beautiful and good and just." Nevertheless, the matter 
of lithe god" is not clear, either 1n the relat10n of "the god" 
to men (who could be said to fa11 to know properly 1n the 
first statement too because they name f1re--and "the god"?--
differently in each manifestationwhen all the man1festat1ons 
are really one), or in the place of "the god" with1n the process 
22 
of all things and the joinings of opposites. 
22There is one other reference to lithe god (d e£bc; )" in 
1'lhich Heraclitus refers to "the Sibyl, with raving mouth, uttering 
her unlaughing, unadorned, unincensed words under the inspiration 
of the god (cp9£"("(OllEV1') 5t.a -rbv e£6v )" (92). The reference may 
fit flthe gods" better than what has been said concerning "the god," 
but it is not necessary that the s1byl be gu1ded by a personal 
being. Yet there is a similar reference in the statement: 
"the lord (d cha.~), whose oracle is at"::Delphi, neither speaks 
nor conceals, but indicates" (93). The relation of these 
statements to the gods and the ~ysteries will be examined 
below. The comment that the divine nature has the power of 
understanding (,,(v~lla.C; ) might also be of s1gn1f1cance w1th 
regard to these two statements (78). 
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Heraclitus speaks of the divine 1n other fragments as 
well, however, which may shed 11ght on "the god." In one plaoe 
he says: "human nature (~eo<; dvep<.6n'E't ov) has no power of 
understanding (yv<.611a <; ), but " divine (nature) has (eEioY O~ 
)11 (78). It is not clear, unfortunately, whether 
Hdivine il is intended to refer to lithe gods" or lithe god." In 
another place Heraclitus has written: "that whioh alone 1s wise 
is one ( EV ~O ao~ov 110UVOV); it is willing and unwilling 'to be 
called by the name of Zeus" (32). It is possible that what is 
divine in Heraclitus's eyes is a supreme knower of some sort, 
to be identified with "that whioh is wise." The other state-
ments concerning "that whioh is wise" and "what is wise" do not 
contradict this view immediately: "that whioh is wise is onez 
to know (or perhaps: the understanding of, in'(Cd~aO'e,(H 
thought ( yvc.611T)V) which steers all things" (41); "what is 
wise is set apart fr.om all things" (108).23 It is also of 
possible significance that the termyv<.6p,T), "thought whioh 
steers all things" (41), appears in only one other fragment, 
namely the one noted above: "human nature has no power of 
understanding (yv<.611a <;), but the divine nature has" (78); but 
in the former oase it is singular, and in the latter plural, 
and the connection is obscure. Finally, it may be of signifioanoe 
23It is noteworthy that the term ~TC{o'-raaea t. is used in 
both of its other appearances in the fragments of human knowing 
~in the concrete (19, 57); this suggests that it is an unlikely 
term to apply to some abstracted souroe of intelligibility, as 
contrasted, for example, with "that whioh is wise" whioh is 
referred to human wisdom but has other oonnotations olearly 
expressed in the fragments. 
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that it is with Zeus that the thunder-bolt was associated, and 
Heraclitus says in one place: "the thunder-bolt steers/all thingft 
(64) . 
Nevertheless, Heraclitus has excluded "the gods" from 
an ultimate place in the governing of things, and refers to 
Zeus in only one other fragment about the stars and the weather 
(120);24 the statement read here as "what is wise is set apart 
from all things" could read just as well "what is set apart 
from all things is wise" (108) since the phrase contains no 
article (crocp6v to'-o rrav-rwv XEXWP t crllEVOV ). The relationship 
between the thunder-bolt and Zeus, and then through Zeus to what 
24 11 The limits (-r~plla-ra) of morning and evening are the 
Bear and, oPPosite the Bear, the boundary-mark of Zeus, god of 
the clear sky" (120). This reference to limits may suggest a 
connection with sun, which does not transgress his measures 
~E-rpa ) (94), and which stands as the difference between night 
and day: "if there were no sun, so far as depended on the other 
stars, it i'1ould be night" (99). A case could be made which links 
sun with fire; sun and the joining of day and night with the 
joining of oPPosites; the limits of morning and evening and 
the measures of sun with the measures of fire (30, 31), and 
perhaps 'Vlith the "limits (rrE(pa-ra)" of the soul which are 
associated with its logos (45) Such a linking"of materials might 
also explain the statement about "the hours (wpa<; ) that bring 
all things ( ai' rrcfv-ra CPEPOUcrt )" (100J, for both Guthrie and 
Freeman explain "hours 11 as tIthe seasons." It is poss ible that 
"god of the clear sky" refers to the sun. The closest link 
between the process ,and unities of all things and the pattern 
suggested here is in the statement: the sun"is new every day, "(6) 
provided that Heraclitus is referring to the sun, as Aristotle 
indicates. (Diehls-Kranz do not accept the word "sunil as part of 
the genuine fragment~If this 1s so, then the sun is in process, 
changes over and back again, and in this changing binds together 
day and night, which are one (57), and which are identified with 
. lithe god" (67), and also relating every day with every other 
day, each one new yet having the same nature (106). There is als 
a statement:"how could anyone hide from that which never sets?" 
(16), which suggests extensive jurisdiction attributed perhaps to 
the sun, even with reference to men. Still,however, the 
connections between and among all these fragments are not com-
pletely clear or~ explici~ 
9.9 
is divine is most tenuous; the meaning of "willing and unwill1ng. 
to be called by the name of Zeus" (32) is hardly olear " 
although it bears some parallel with the naming of "the god" 
according to each opposite in which he is manifested (if in 
fact this is the meaning of the metaphor about fire and 
perfume) (67). Finally, and most important, wisdom and being 
wise are spoken of by Heraclitus in ways clearly indicative 
of human wisdom, both wisdom in speaking and acting (112), 
and wisdom in judgment (50); these statements, as was pOinted 
out in chapter one, bear strong resemblance to Heraclitus's 
statements on his own knowing and his guidelines for genuine 
knowing, and most of them make sense interpreted solely in terms 
of human efforts to attain to genuine knowing. In fact, the 
only real exception to this position is the statement involving 
the name of Zeus ,;::which does bear some resemblance, as was 
indicated, to one of the statements about 'the god." 
The only definite conclusion that can be reached is 
that the matter is not clear. Heraclitus's statements do not 
settle it definitely. It is certain that what he has to say about 
human knowing is reflected in statements on wisdom and what 
is wise; it is also certain that the fra~ents concerned are 
not completely explained within that context, and that a number 
of the statements could support a position favoring the existenc~ 
of some divine knower, or at least some divine knowing. In 
any case it is clear that Heraclitus does in fact refer to 
something as "the god" and associate it, however vaguely from 
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our vantage pOint, with knowing and with the ultimate principles 
of unity of all things. The best thing seems to be to ~eave 
the conclusions. reached concerning human wisdom in chapter 
one intact, but to add that Heraclitus speaks of the ultimate 
unifying principles, which are abstract principles indicating 
. the ultimate and profound unity of things rather than personal 
governors, in terms assooiated with divinity; moreover, because 
of his own ooncern to reach these principles as a knower, he 
deals with them within a context of being known, as he has been 
seen to deal with many other topics. This position is supported 
by the evidence of the fragments, and nowhere contradicted by 
that evidence. Any effort to formulate a stronger position 
concerning what is divine, whether in favor of it or against 
it, must face evidence from the fragments which is inconsistent 
with such a position. Again, in summary, we can only accept 
both of the things which Heraclitus says, although we cannot 
understand how they were connected in his mind. 
This position is particularly confirmed by the evident 
relationship between "the god" and the joinings of opposites, 
in which lithe god" seems to be the joining, the unity itself. 
Analysis of the terms "beautiful" and. "just" in later sections 
will make this point still clearer. Another fragment dealing 
in fairly clear terms with the divine also confirms that 
position proposed here: "if we wish to speak with intelligence, 
we must base our strength on that which is common to all, as 
the oity on the law and even more strongly. For all human laws 
lOt 
are nourished by one which is divine. For it governs as far 
as it will, and is sufficient for all and more than enough" (114). 
For once again the divine aspect is contrasted with the 
human, and the realm of genuine knowing is part of the context; 
but tIthe divine law" spoken of is not personal; there is 
no particular divinity indicated. What is indicated is that 
there is a lsw, a principle, which is valid for all things, and 
that it seems to be related to "that which is common," the basic 
unity of things as grasped in knowledge. 
The question of the divine in Heraclitus's thought is 
obscure. Many fragments seem significant, but none of them 
and no group of them sets down a single, unimpeded line of 
thought. Heraclitus's comments on wisdom in man, studied in 
chapter one, are confirmed by the whole body of statements on 
knowing; yet he clearly speaks about "the god" and a "divine law". 
The best position, it is judged here, is to accept as much as is 
clear and affirm that he says more which we do not understand. 
Thus he clearly associates the ultimate principles of unity, 
the basic principles associated with the unity of all things in 
their process of coming-to-be and the unity of opposites which 
pertains to the nature of unity itself, with what is divine; 
but he does not seem to posit a divinity so much as to affirm, 
by his manner of speaking, the ultimateness of the principles 
unity with which he is dealing. 
HiS comments on the traditional gods of Greece and on 
the various rites associated with them will be examined in 
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chapter three. 
The thought and thunder-bolt that steer all things 
"The thunder-bolt steers all things (Ta b~ navTa olax(te, 
Kspauv6s )" (64). Th1s thunder-bolt is not 1dent1f1ed 
anywhere else in the fragments. It 1s poss1ble, as has been 
pOinted out, that 1t refers to the thunder-bolt of Zeus~ but 
no such connection 1s even hinted at in the fragments. It is 
possible that the thunder-bolt is seen as a man1festat10n of 
fire; in this case the fragment examined prev10usly on fire 
which "will come and judge and conv1ct all things" (66) might 
be related and significant. But in the examinat10n of that 
fragment it was made clear that the fragments clearly indicate 
that f1re 1s under the jur1sd1ct10n of measure and a logos, 
and is Significant because of the ordered process rather than 
in itself. Moreover, there is no particular reason to assooiate 
the thunder-bolt with f1re-~no more reason than to deny this 
association; for the fragments give no h1nt either way on the 
matter. 
This fragment is linked with the other terms and themes 
of the fragments in only two ways. First of all, 1t deals with 
all things and is predicated as a governing power over them. 
But falling outside the nexus of interrelated terms and themes 
of the fragments, the thunder-bolt does not help us understand 
the unity of all things in process or in the j01n1ng of oppos1tes 
which underlies all unity; the clear statement that the thunder-
bolt steers all th1ngs tells us really very l1ttle. Secondly, 
1().3 
however, the use of the term oial·dr,Et, "steer," in the . fragment 
, . 
parallels the use of a similar term, EKu~{pv~ae, "steeY," in 
another fragment; comparison of them may be helpful. 
Heraclitus speaks of "the thought (yvc611~v ) which steers 
all things through all things (O~{~ ~Ku~{pv~ae nav~a Ota 
'TCa.v-rwv )" (41). The basic meaning of yvc611~ is "means or 
instrument of knowing": hence it was translated above (in the 
plural) "power of understanding (yvc611ac; )" (78), but these are 
its only appearances in the fragments and its exact meaning 
is not c1ear--even in the fragments in which it does appear. 
If Heraclitus does in fact tend to associate the un1ty 
of things, which is the object of men's genuine knowing, with 
a source of intelligibility, a supreme knower (which he ,sometimes 
speaks of as divine), then this "thought (yvc6~~ )- surely refers 
to that knower. Once again the question a~lses whether such a 
knower exists in Heraclitus's view of things, and once again 
we must say that the matter is not clear, but that it seems 
unlikely. The intelligible unity of all things and intelligible 
nature of unity itself are Heraclitus's chief concern--as is 
consonant with his concern for men's knowing and his general 
lack of concern with their relations with any divine being; 
it is not surpris1ng that he should speak of the pr1ncip1e (or 
pr1nc1ples) of ultimate un1ty as though they were the 1ntelligent 
governors of all things in his efforts to show that they are 
the fundamental bases of the unity which man can know in things. 
He would not be the only thinker who has substantialized his 
.' ,.', ,; 
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principles in order to speak of them and attributed to them, as 
to sources of unity through governance and jurisdictio~, the 
unity which they found as the bases of its intelligibility. 
The matter is not clear from the fragments at our disposal 
but it is clear that Heraclitus does not speak consistently or 
in any unified way about a substantial source of unity which is 
distinct from the unity of which it is a source--whether the 
unity concerned be the oneness of all things in ordered process 
or the basis of unity itself in a tension of OPposites.2~ 
Heraclitus repeatedly speaks in ways which indicate that the unit 
is within the process, is the order of the process itself, and 
that the basis of joining is tension of opposites whioh is the 
joining itself. His manner of speaking indioates that'there 
is no distinct maker of unity. 
The "thought which steers all things," then, is the 
intelligibility of all things itself, which man the knower grasps 
in understanding all things to be one; its "steering" is rfot the 
imposition of direotion upon an otherwise unruly or arbitrary 
process, but is rather the inner direotion of the prooess which 
man the knower grasps and speaks of as if it were distinct. 26 
25It is worth noting here, as a reminder, however, that 
Heraclitus does speak about "that which is wise" as "set 
apart from all things" (108). It is not clear, as has been 
pOinted out, that this statement refers to the distance men 
must travel to attain genuine knowledge, or whether it 'does 
in fact refer to some separated knower or all things; tbe 
question-will be raised again in chapter three when the gods 
are examined. 
26 While the exact meaning of the expression'ltall things 
through all things" is not clear, it seems to carry a 
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Thus the thunderbolt, the "thought (yvc.611fl )," the divine 
law, and even "the god" seem best understood as ways 1n/whioh 
Heraclitus sought to express the 1nner nature of the unity of 
all things 1n process and the profound nature of un1ty itself, 
which are the ultimate bases of the unity which man grasps because 
they are the ultimate content of what he understands when he 
understands that all th1ngs are one. Heraclitus speaks of 
these principles in the abstraot, as will be seen when the 
themes of logos and war, strife, and justice are examined; but 
he also speaks of them as though they were concrete and distinct, 
existing realities--as we still tend to do today--perhaps 
simply to explain them to those who did not understand, perhaps 
because he d1d not see as clearly as the: posit1on here may 
imply that the unity he had understood and was try1ng to teaoh 
resides in all things, is truly the un1ty of all things, is not 
imposed upon things from without. 
Again, in summary, the matter is not certain. But Hera-
clitus does not clearly speak of a distinct source of unity 
throughout the whole body of fragments, although a few 1solated 
fragments of obscure relationship to the whole do suggest it. 
He certainly does say and imply through the whole nexus of 
interrelated terms and themes of the whole body of the fragments 
connotation of dynamism, that things are changing, 1n process, 
that nothing is static. The term "steers" also suggests that 
l'1hat is being steered is mOVing, that the directing of all 
things is the direction of something dynam10. These oonnotations 
.are suitable in view of what has been stated expressly about all 
things, as has been seen. 
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that all things are themselves one; that the oneness 1srad1cal 
and basic to all things, and that oneness means harmo~of' 
opposites in tension. Now we must determine whether Herac11tus 
does in fact deal with these two basic aspects of unity through 
abstract principles to wh1ch the unity of all things in process 
and the basis of unity in opposing tension is ~ttribut~d.2? 
Logos 
Heraclitus uses the term logos (A6yoC; ) in five 
different ways in the fragments: "th1s logos (d A6yoC; 80£)" 
o. 
(1 twice); "the logos Cd A6yoC; )" (2, SO, 72); the logos 
of soul (45, 115); "the same logos (-r~v a.6-rbv A6yov )" (31); and 
logos in the sense of "word, opinion, report" (39, 87, 108). 
Before anything else it is important todetermine the relationship 
of these varying uses of the term. 
In three places, Heraclitus uses logos ilL>a context 
which suggests that the word simply means "word," or some 
closely related concept: "A foolish man is apt 'to be in a 
flutter at every word (lrclrccfv-n A6yrot)" (87); and he speaks 
of "Bias, whose fame (A6yoC; ) is greater than all the rest" (39); 
and of Uthose whose d1scourse ( A6youC;, the plural form) I 
have heard" (108). None of these phrases indicates any·· 
connection with the themes of unity, all things, that which 
27The"statewen~ referring to "the hours which bring 
lall things (ropac; at rcav-ra ~£poucrt )" (100) has already been mentioned above in footnote 24 of chapter two; it stands in some sense parallel to the two statements examined in this section, 
'but as a "bringer" rather than a "steerer" of all things. 
107 
is common, the process of all th1ngs, the jo1n1ng of oppos1tes; 
it 1s reasonable to conclude that the term is being us~ in 
qu1te an ordinary way 1n these fragments. 
In two places 1n the same fragment, Heraclitus speaks 
of "this logos": "Although th1s logos ex1sts forever ('rou o~ 
), men are void ~f understanding" (1);28 
and "Though all things come to pass in acoordanoe w1th this 
logos (ytVO~{VillV yap rrav~illv Ka~a ~~v A6yov ~~vo£ ), men seem 
as 1f ignorant" (1). "This logos" is thus linked with the 
coming-to-be of all things; it ex1sts forever; and above all 
it 1s an object of not-know1ng. 
In three places Heraclitus speaks of "the logos." 
It 1s important to determ1ne 1ts relationship to "th1s logos." 
28The expression translated "exists forever, men are 
void of understand1ng" can bear a d1fferent 1nterpretation 
because of the position of the term ad, "always," in the Greek 
text. It could be translated "exists, men are always void of 
understand1ng. ItT~'btte""'interpretation makes Heraclitus 1nto· 
something of a pessim1st about men's achiev1ng genu1ne knowing 
while the rest of the evidence from the fragments suggests 
his conviction that men oould aoh1eve genu1ne understand1ng. 
The former interpretation 1s preferable,for several other reasons 
as well. For Heraolitus uses the termad only one other time. 
In that fragment the term appears in conjunction with a form ofEi~{, stands in ex~otly t~ same pos1tion to that form of 
d~{ as 1n this oase (E6v~o<;; ad -1; fiv &d -30), and oan 
hardly be translated in any other way than as mod1fy1ng the 
form of El~(. rl!oreover, Herac11tus does not employ a form of 
Ell1{, "to be," as a pred1cate verb w1th the sense of "ex1sts"--
that is, as more than a s1mple oopula--save 1n statements 1n 
whioh an adverb of time 1s 1nvolved (1~ 30, 31), wh1ch suggests 
that the adverb modifies the form of £tl1(. On the other hand, an 
infinitive form of Ell1{ is used in one plaoe to mean "exists" in 
indirect disoourse (89) and twioe there are forms 1n prodoses 
of contrary-to-faot condit1ons (7, 23) whioh mean "eXists" 
without the adverb of t1me be1ng present--all of wh1ch indicates 
a preferable reading, but that the matter 1s not closed. 
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He says: "Listening not to me, but to the logos (-rou J...6you ), 
it is wise to agree that all things are one" (50); "alt)1ough 
the lOgQ~ (-rou A6you ) is common, most men live as if they 
had a private understanding of their own" (2); "the logos 
(~t A6yillt ) with which they associate most closely, from it 
they are separated; and those things whioh they enoounter 
daily seem to them strange" (72). "The 10gQ.f!." is olearly 
an object of not-knowing and associated with genuine knowing, 
with "that which is common," with the unity of all th'lpgs, with 
the near-at-hand which is present to men every day, with 
wisdom. 
Both lithe logos" and "this logos" are clearly dealt 
with as objects of not-knowing and as related to the unity 
of all things whioh is the~imate object of genuine knowing. 
Both endure through time in some sense, and are dea1t with as 
continually present to men. Neither is spoken of in connection 
with the joinings of opposites. These similarities, and the 
interrelationships of the terms and themes to which each 
is related as well, suggest that the logos referred to 
in these two expressions is one and the same logos. It is the 
object of men's genuine knowing (and thus of their not-knowing). 
It is that according to which all things come-to-be (1) and 
is therefore present to men at all times in every thing 
which is part of the process of all things. It is the unity 
of all things in process viewed precisely as the object of 
human knowing; and hence, after the manner of speaking 
109 
explained in the previous sect10n, logos 1s spoken of once as 
the source of that knowledge ~f un1ty (50). From the po1nt of' 
view of things which are one, the principle to which the1r 
unity is attributed 1s called "that which 1s common" to all 
the things; from the p01nt of view of man knowing that unity 
of all things, the pr1nciple to which that unity is attributed 
is called "the logos" or, in certain contexts, "this logos .... 29 
As was pointed out, "the logos" is not anywhere 
associated with the joinings of opposites. 'This fact suggests 
that it was used by Heraclitus to attribute to a principle 
only the unity of all things 1n proces~. This conclus1on 1s 
further suggested by another of the fragmentsl "the turnings 
of fire: f1rst, sea; and of sea, half is earth and half fiery. 
Earth is liquified into sea, and has its meas~e in the same 
logos as existed before it became earth (Kal ~E~p€E~a, El~ ~bv 
) (31)." 
The same logos endures throughout the process of all things 
in the turn1ngs of f1re and is the basis of the measur1ng 
whereby the process as a whole is ordered (30).30 "The same 
29several authors, includ1ng Guthrie, have suggested that 
the fragment presently placed first in the corpus, 1n which 
both references to "this logos" occur, was the f1rst statement 
1n a book or series of statements and was preceded by a 
title such as "On the Logos." This hypothesis needs to be 
validated after the foundational synthesis has been finished; 
but as will be seen, the logos is not the only principle of 
unity, nor is the unity of all things in process, to which it 
refers, the most profound unity which Heraclitus speaks of. 
In any case, this is not a question for a foundational synthesis. 
30The mention of "measures" in the statement concerning 
the sun and justice, which was noted above (94) is worth 
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logos" is the basis of order in the process of all th1ngs; 
and this ordered process 1tse1f has already been seen ~o be 
the unity wh1ch Heraclitus saw'as primar11y s1gnificant 
(rather than a un1ty based on the s1ngle element of f1re). The 
basis of the order of the ordered process 1s a logos wh1ch 
endures through t1me; the 1mp11cat1on 1s clear that "the 
same logos" of th1s fragment (31) 1s the same pr1ncip1e of 
un1ty of the process of all th1ngs that has been under 
discussion. 
liThe logos" then, is the pr1nc1p1e of order and thus of 
the un1ty of the process of all th1ngs, and thus of all 
things themselves, s1nce the1r un1ty 1s the unity of the 
ordered process; it 1s th1s un1ty as grasped by man the knower 
and attributed by h1m to a pr1nc1p1e of wh1ch he can speak. 
As has already been exp1a1ned, th1s un1ty 1s not bestowed upon 
the process by some substant1a1 souroe~of un1ty exter10r to 
it; the un1ty Herac11tus 1s speak1ng of 1s the un1ty of the 
process itself, attr1buted for the sake of be1ng spoken of 
to various pr1no1ples--of wh10h lithe logos" ("th1s logos" and 
reiterating here, particular1ir because of the 11nk1ng of logos 
and just1ce through "measures' wh1ch seems to be poss1ble in 
view of the link between logos and "measures" whioh has already 
been examined. Another possi51e reference to "measures" and 
logos appears in the statement: "The soul of man (an1ma hom1n1s), 
with the injury of any part of the body, travels to that part 
quickly, as if 1mpatient with the injury of the body, to wh1ch 
it is j01ned (.luncta) firmly and 1n measure (proportionaliter)" 
(67a). Unfortunately, we have no Greek text for th1s fragment, 
only Latin, and it 1s imposs1ble to determ1ne whether "sou1 t1 
refers to \lIux1f and whether "1n measure (proport1ona11ter) tt 
refers to "measures," as we have dealt with them, or logos; and 
it 1s not clear whether the "j01n1ng" referred to relates to 
the joinings which we have dealt with. 
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"the same logos" refer to the same pr1nciple) is the ch1ef 
and most frequently spoken of. / 
Why should Herao11 tus have ohosen logos;' as his way of 
referring to the basic un1ty of all things in process? Two 
reasons suggest themselves immed1ately. First of all, this 
term 1mmediately relates the un1ty conoerned to ,man the 
knower, for in ordinary speech 199os is an object of knowing; 
whenever anyone speaks, both his words themselves and the 
sense of what he says oan be termed his logos. Secondly, 
beoause logos also carried, 1n certain contexts, particularly 
oontexts where measurement and quantities might be involved, 
the meaning of "proportion." Both of these meanings fit the 
prino1ple of unity of all th1ngs in an ordere:9. proo'~ss.wn.1oh 
is spoken of preoisely as the objeot of knowing; logos refers 
to the intelligible unity of things within a prooess whose unity 
·'1s·,' , of oom1ng-to-beand pass1ng-away, exchange, prooess. 31 
There are two other fragments which deal with a,logos, 
the logos of soul: "The logos- of the soul ( \}ruxfic; A6yoC;) 
is 1noreas1ng 1tself" (115); and "the l1mits of the soul 
would you not find though you should travel every road: so deep 
a logos has 1t' (OUT(I.) ~aeuv A6yov €XE: 1. )" (45) This logos 
31Guthrie provides a catalogue of eleven ways in whioh 
the term 16g~ was used in Herao1itus's day; one of these 
is to mean "proportion," wh10h suggests a oonneotion w1th the 
fragment involving the Latin term proportionaliter (67a); others 
relate to various translations of the term when not used in 
a teohnioal oontext in these pages (39, 87, 108). A detailed 
philological analysis of the term, however, can only be 
performed and evaluated upon completion of a foundational 
synthes1s of Heraclitus's thought. 
112 
bears some connection with notions of measure and quantity, 
for it relates to "the limits (1CE{pa-ra ) of the soul" $fid 1s 
said to be "increasing itself (au~(l)v). Yet the logos spoken 
of here does not relate to "the logos" dealt with above in 
any other of the latter's correlations with all things, unity, 
process and interchange; nor is there any explicit conneotion 
with fire, although soul bears some connection with fire, as 
was pOinted out in the analysis of the fragments dealing with 
that theme. 
Since there are some parallels between the logos of ..... 
soul and "the logos," which is the principle of the unity of 
all things in process, and some parallel between soul and fire 
in its turnings in the process of all things, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the logos of soul serves as some sort of 
principle of unity of soul. But again the relationship between 
soul and fire is not clear, and the relation between soul's 
logos and "the logos" of the process of all things must 
therefore remain unclear as well. Light may be shed on both 
of these questions, however, when soul is examined in chapter 
three in its relationship to man's life, death, actions, and 
morality. 
"The logos," referred to also as "this logos" and 
lithe same logos" in certain contexts, is a theme of considerable 
importance within the fragments; through it Heraclitus speaks 
of the unity of all things 'in process precisely as the objects 
of human knowing, as intelligibility. But there is another 
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aspect of the ultimate unity whioh is the objeot of genuine 
knowing whioh Heraolitus develops, the theme of the joip1ngs 
of opposites whioh touohes upon the ultimate nature of unity 
.. itself. liThe logos" deals only with the unity.::of all things 
in prooess; it is important to ask whether Heraolitus attributes 
the ultimate nature of unity itself, as founded in tension of 
oppOSites, to an abstraot prinoiple. This is the subjeot of 
the next seotion. 
War, strife, and justice 
"War," says Heraolitus, "is the father of all and the 
king of all, and some he reveals as gods, others as men, 
some he makes slaves, others free" (,53). Elsewhere he says: 
"One must know that war is oommon (~bv ~6A€~OV l6v~a ~uv6v ), 
and justice is strife, and that all things oome about by 
way of strife and neoessity" (80). 
War (n6A€~O~ ) is given jurisdiotion over all things, 
and has the power to oreate opposites out of things--some as 
gods, others as men; some as slaves, others as free. 32 While 
it may not be signifioant that war is oalled "father," whenoe 
generation (y€~{aeat ) would take its origin, it is olear that 
war's jurisdiotion is over the generation of oPPosites,. that 
war is in some sense a basis of opposition. War is related to 
all things; war is also said to be oommon, and war's oommon-ness 
32The only other referenoe to a king is in the statement 
mentioned above wh10h says: "time is a ohild playing a game 
of draughts; the kingship (~a(HA11 (11 ) is a.· . >.: "; ~ .. : .• : .. ;::.. ;, 
oh1ld
'
sl!(52) • 
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is a matter for genuine knowing. War thus seems to be related 
to the ultimate unity of things by being common, by itS/relation 
to all things, by its relation to genuine knowing, and as 
king and father and foundation, in some sense, of things which 
are opposed. 33 
"All things come about by way of strife and necessity 
( ''0 v611Eva -rcav-ra xa-r' ~p 1. V xa ~ XP ec.6v) tI (80). Strife and 
necessity have jurisdiction over the coming-to-be of all 
things, just a.s "the logos fI is said to have such jurisdiction 
in the almost identical statement examined above (1). What 
is the relationship between strife and necessity and "the 
logos"? And what is the:...relat1onship between strife and 
necessity and all things? 
As for necessity (xpe~v), there is·litt~e that can be 
said, for the term does not appear anywhere else in the frag-
ments. 34 It is not unlikely that Heraclitus would say that the 
33war is spoken of in one other place, where it is joined 
l'ri th peace, and the joining 1dent 1f1ed with "the god It (67). As 
all things are just, although men separate them into just and 
unjust (102), so war and peace are one. The joining of 
opposites does not destroy the opposition, nor does the fact 
of opposition destroy the union; but the nature of unity 
~ opposites in tension; hence war and peace, justice and strife, just and unjust, connected and separate, all things are one. 
34'I'he ver:b "it is necessary (Xp~ )" appears several times 
in the fragments (35, 43, 44, 80, 114); but it does not add to 
our understanding of the noun "necessity," except perhaps in 
the fact that it invariably is used with reference to what is 
necessary for man, either in the attainment of genuine knowing 
(35, 80, 114) or in ethical matters (43, 44); this might 
~uggest that the necessity of all things coming about is becessity 
only from the point of view of man; that is, only because he is 
a knower; this would relate to what has been said concerning 
the source of unity--there is no substantial power Which imposes 
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principles to which the ultimate structure of all things, in 
their unity of process and in the nature of unity itself, is 
attributed are to be considered "necessary" because the1r 
jurisdiction 1s unqua11fied. But 1t is 1mportant to recall 
again that these pr1nc1ples are not dist1nctt substant1al 
governors or sources of unity, but rather pr1nciples 1:0 wh10h 
the actual unity of all things and the actual nature of 
unity are being attributed in order to be spoken of at all. 
In this context, "necessity" refers not to 1mpos1tion of a 
certain structure by some unqual1f1edly powerful outs1de force, 
but rather to the unqualified actuality of what man observes 
and aff1rms about unity when he speaks of such pr1nc1ples and 
his knowing 1s genu1ne. But, unfortunately, Herac11tusdoes 
not elaborate 1n the fragments about the mean1ng of th1s 
once-used term, f'necessity" (80). 
Concerning str1fe (Ep,S ), accord1ng to wh1ch "all th1ngs 
come about (Y'VOll£va. rrav-ra. )" (80), Heraclitus has only 
one further comment to add: "Justice [is] str1fe (O(KfjV :.r:v 
EptV )" (80). This fact is presented as a necessary object or 
genuine knowing and may be suspected to have someth1ng to do 
with the ultimate unity of things, to wh1ch the statement or 
strife's universal jurisdiction clearly rerers. 35 Just1ce is 
unity necessarily; rather unity is there, 1s actual, 1s so 
real as to seem even necessary in the eyes of men. 
35As has been pOinted out, it is ·justice wh1ch keeps 
the sun within its measures: "The sun will not transgress h1s 
measures; otherwise the Fur1es, ministers of just1ce, w111 f1nd 
him out" (94). Besides this poss1ble relat10n to the logos, 
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also related to all th1ngs 1n one place: "To the god. all 
th1ngs are beaut1ful and good and just (o(xutU ); but men 
have assumed some th1ngs to be unjust. others just" (102). 
Thus both str1fe and just10e are related to all th1ngs. and 
just1ce 1s somehow related to un1ty of apparent opposites w1th 
regard to all th1ngs. 
In p01nt of fact. the very not10n of "strife" suggests 
oppos1t10n 1n the first place; and if justioe is related to 
the unity of opposites. it is not surprising to read that 
"just1ce is strife" (80). l'1oreover. justioe is linked with 
beauty 1n the fragment o1ted in the previous paragraph: "To 
the god, all things are beautiful (xuAa ) and good and just" 
(102). This theme of beauty has already been seen to be linked 
with the theme of j01n1ng of oppos1tes: "That wh10h 1s in 
oPPosit10n 1s 1n concert and from things that differ comes 
the most beautiful harmony (xUAA(O''t"l1v ctPllov(QV )" (8). 
Beauty is the sign of the harmony of opposites in tension, as 
in the bow and the lyre (51). Thus. as 'has already been pOinted 
out. "the god" associated w1th the un1ty of oPPosites in 
wh1ch 1s the bas1s of the measure of the turnings of fire, justice 
1s related to genu1ne know1ng and thus to the unity of all things 
in some say: "Just1ce will convict those who fabr1cate and testify 
to l1es" (28). Justice is also spoken of in relation to knowing 
in the statement noted in chapter one: "They would not"", know 
the name of just1ce if these things did not ex1st" (23). where 
it is not stated what "these things" are; it seems clear that 
men do know the name of justice--hence they assume some things 
are just and others unjust (102); but they do not know justice 
itself, it seems. as is stated and implied in several statements (80, 102) and by the whole theme of not-knowing to which justice 
has been seen to be related. 
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conjunction with beauty and justice (102), 1s elsewhere 
identified with joined oppos1tes (67) and is spoken ot:/there 
also perhaps as a unity which men fail to grasp. Finally, 
in another place, beauty 'is associated with "a dust-heap piled 
up at random (€lxfi )" which is "the most beaut1ful eosmos 
(~ xaAAtO''t'ot; xdCJ1l0t; ),If the most beautiful ordered unity (124). 
Justice and beauty are thus explic1tly linked with the 
unity of opposites 1n several places in the fragments, and 
are linked w1th each other explicit'ly in one place as well. 
Justice in turn is linked with the theme of strife, and makes 
exp11cit the implication of the term's 'basic meaning that 
it refers to the opposition of things; but "justice is strife 
(80)," opposition is union of opposites; and strife, the 
opposition which is union, has jurisdiction over all things: 
ItAll things come to pass by way of strife and necessity" (80).36 
It is possible that the terms and themes being examined 
here were not intended to be related to each other this closely. 
That possibility remains in every effort of ours to disoover 
36It is noteworthy that the Greeks' notion of justice 
has traditionally been linked with a concept of right order, 
a concept which fits well the place of justice within the 
nexus of interrelated themes of Heraclitus's thought; for justice stands as the principle of joined opposites, the 
union of opposites in tension, which is itself the basis for 
the unity of all things in ordered process. It may be 
significant that it is justice which is named as having 
jurisdiotion over the ohanges of the sun, the measures of its 
prooess. Again it is a matter of a connotation proving apt upon 
being examined in the light of the way the term 1s used in the 
fragments. The link between cosmos and justice through the 
theme of beauty is further confirmed by th1s connotation 
as well. 
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the lines of Heraclitus's thought from a limited number of 
. 
fragments. But it has already been made olear that th~theme 
of the joinings of opposites, whioh deals with an ins1ght into 
the nature of unity itself, 1s one of the most signifioant 
themes in the fragments. When terms such as "war" and "strife" 
are found, which seem to relate by their very meaning to this 
theme, and when investigation of their uses and of the terms 
and themes used in connection with them reveals that the unity 
of oPPosites is in fact explicitly dealt with through them, 
then we must procede to try to determine more exactly the 
content of the; terms in relation to that theme. 
Strife and its correlate, justioe, bear a signifioant 
relationship to the theme of the joinings of opposites. It 
is important to ask, then, how "strife" oan be said to have 
jurisdiction over the~ing-to-be of all things; for the 
principle of the unity of the prooess of all thing~ has already 
been identified as "the logos." In a similar way, the relation-
ship between war and all things must be determined; for war 
is also given jurisd1ct10n over all th1ngs, and has been found 
to be related to the joining of oPPosites and to be somehow 
related to the unity of all things by being "oommon." Finally, 
e must ask how justice is related to all th1ngs; for it is 
linked to the joinings of oppos1tes both expressly and through 
the parallel theme of beauty; and it 1s linked to all things 
expressly and also through its oorrelate, str1fe, and perhaps 
Iso through beauty's relationship to cosmos (124).-
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It is proposed here that Heraclitus does not single 
out one expression to be used when speaking about the / 
fundamental nature of unity, as he does speak generally of 
logos when speaking of the basic intelligible unity and order 
of all things from the point of view of man the knower,and 
uses the term "common" 'When dealing with the unity of all 
things from the point of view of all things, the term cosmos 
when his point of view is the order of all things in process. 
He uses three terms as roughly interchangeable--war, strife, 
and justice--for all three carry the significant content that 
unity is the tension of opposites; and his use of the term 
"beauty" is also related. But it is important to note that 
these terms bear a similarity to "the logos" which such 
expressions as cosmos and "that which is common" and other 
examples which could have been named do not; for Heraclitus 
speaks of "the logos" and of war, strife, justice sometimes 
as though they were substantial beings which have actual 
jurisdiction over all things as the basis of unity of all things 
and as the bas.is of unity itself in its fundamental nature. 
The evidence which indicates that Heraclitus did not actually 
conceive of such a distinct substantial source of jurisdiction 
has already been presented; but it is significant to note tha~ 
Heraclitus treats Uthe logos" and war, strife, and justice in 
much the same way in this regard; he tends to speak of these 
above all others as principles and sources, and as though 
distinct and substantial. Once again the two realms of unity 
120 
to which these expressions refer stand out as Heraclitus's 
main concerns in his understanding of all things. / 
The world,: of Heraclitus is a world of profound unity, 
a unity of all things in one ordered process of coming-to-be, 
a unity whose basis is opposing tension; this unity, in both 
its aspects, is all around man as he lives and acts and 
thinks he understands his world; but nevertheless, in general, 
he remains ignorant. If he grasped these two basic truths 
about all things, the unity of their process and the unity of 
their every difference and opposition, then man could find 
his way out of his own personal world (2), could live as 
one awake and aware (73, 112), having achieved the genuine 
knowing which Heraclitus seeks to lead him to. 
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CHAPI'ER II I 
MAN IN A WORLD HE UNDERSTANDS 
What is man's life like when he understands the world 
for what it is? And what is lacking to his life and actions 
when his understanding is dim? How does man stand in relation 
to death, to society, to the mystery rites and the gods? How 
does he compare with the brutes? Within the process of all 
things, where is man's place and what is the relationship 
between being a man and being in the world whose unity has 
been seen to be of such concern to Heraclitus? These questions 
are treated in varying detail in some of the fragments; and, 
although the statements available are not numerous, it is 
possible to discover some of Heraclitus's answers to them. 
This is the task of the present chapter. 
The first section of this chapter will deal with man's 
efforts to attain genuine knowledge and :the effect of these 
efforts on his life and action. The second section will deal 
with ethical man and examine the relationship of the unity of 
the world in which man lives with the order of his own ethical 
life, with the life and ~eath of his soul, and with his own 
life after death. In the third section, finally, man's' 
relationship to "the gods· will be examined, as well as the 
views of Heraolitus on the mystery rites. 
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Striving to Understand the World 
The important theme of the not-knowing of men haS 
already been examined at length in the first ohapter. It 
has been determined that what men do not know is the unity of 
all things, a unity whose two basic aspeots have been 
disoovered and examined in chapter two. It is worth reiterating 
here, however, that this unity is first grasped by men in the 
concrete. Man grasps the unity of things through his ordinary 
experience, as has been pointed out in chapter one; and the 
unity which he grasps is the concrete unity of all things 
in their actual, ordered process, and the concrete unity of 
opposites in tension towards each other. Heraclitus does 
not see the object of genuine knowing or not-knowing as 
some abstracted source of unity, whether sUbstantial or 
mental, but rather as the concrete unity of the world of 
all things. 
It follows, then, that men's not-knowing itself will 
be concrete and related to men's actions. This conclusion 
is verified not only in a number of the statements conoerning 
the near-at-hand-ness of the object of not-knowing, Which has 
already been examined in chapter one, and the relation of all 
things to this object, together with certain references. to time 
and the daily, continual presence of this unity to men,but 
also in several concrete statements about it: "The rest of 
mankind are unaware of what they do while awake, just as 
they forget what they do while asleep" (1); men's not-knowing 
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affeots their aotions: 1 "Most men live as if they had a private 
understanding of their own" (2), overlooking that wh1o}y is . 
oommon (2)--their not-knowing extends~to their whole lives. 
This theme of living in one's own private world is also 
linked with the parallel theme of sleep in one place (89). 
"Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act according to nature" 
(112); but Heraolitus oan refer to "men who do not know how to 
listen or how to speak" (19). 
But if not-knowing is so ooncrete and real, not simply 
the absenoe of some abstraot and irrelevant form of knowledge, 
then there ought to be a reason for men's failing so generally 
to aoh1eve it. The reason is partly given in the theme of the 
hiddenness of the objeot of not-knowing, whioh was studied in 
ohapter one. In several other statements, Heraolitus speaks 
about the effort one must make to attain his goals; these 
statements, while apparently intended to pe generally 
applioable to all of men's aotivities, have plaoe here: "Those 
who seek gold dig muoh earth and find little" (22); "if one 
does not hope, one will not find the unhoped-for, since there 
is no trail to it and no path" (18). In one other plaoe, 
Heraolitus says that men are unaware that they are failing 
in the aohievement of genuine knowing: "to themselves, they 
seem ~o understand) (000E ~ae6v~€S Y\V~crKOUcr\V, ~~u~oicr\ oE 
'I 1Heraolit~s;uses this oomparison of not-knowing in aotion 
with sleep in several plaoes; one fragment has been examined 
several times (89); another reads: "We must not aot and speak 
like men asleep" (73). See also footnote 11 of chapter two. 
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OO'K~ou(n )" (17). Thus he indicates that those whom 
men accept as wise are not always so: "The knowledge o~ the most 
famous man is but opinion (ao'K~ov-ra )" (28); and "What intelli-
genoe or understanding have they' They put their trust in 
popular bards and take the mob for their teacher, not knowing 
that 'the majority are bad, and the good are few'" (104). 
Heraolitus's oritioisms of his predeoessors, examined in chapter 
one, are also pertinent, as is the statement' that: "A foolish 
man is apt to be in a flutter at every word (l~l ~av-r' A6YOO1 )" 
(87) • 
How are men to achieve genuine knowing then? His guide-
lines for genuine knowing, statements of what is necessary and 
what one must do, have already been examined 1n chapter one 
(2, 35, 47, 80, 114); h1s statements about h1mself as knower 
have also been treated there (1, 35, 50, 55). In sum, men must 
beg1n w1th the1r ord1nary exper1ence, listen to "the logos," 
follow what is oommon rather than s1mply remain w1thin the 
oonfines of the1r own world--wh1oh means that they must be 
open to all th1ngs and to the unity of all things; they must 
examine eaoh and every thing and understand how it is. 'These 
matters have been exam1ned in detail above. 
Men's knowledge also 1noludes themselves, a theme 
whioh is mentioned only twioe 1n the f~agments: "I searohed 
myself" (101); flall men have the oapaoity of know1ng themselves, 
and aoting with moderation (&vap~~o,a, ~aa, ~{-rEa-r' y'v~a'KE'V 
loou-rou~ 'Kat O'C.1tppovEiv)" (116). Th1s last fragment.suggests that 
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the question of self-knowledge, as is to be expected, is 
related to the question of the norms of man's actions, )T1th 
man as ethical. The concreteness of man's not-knowing also 
suggests that not-knowing in general should have ramifications 
in man's ethical life. The next section, then, will seek to 
understand the norms of man's oonduot which Heraclitus 
mentions and their relationship to the unity of all things in 
the world in which man lives. 
Living and Acting in the_Ordered World 
Man's knowledge of the unity and order of all things 
in the world has been seen to penetrate his concrete life 
through and through, just as it was seen before to be founded 
upon his ordinary, day-to-day, near-at-hand experience of all 
things'. Now we need to examine his actions themselves in 
search of order and unity, and to ask whether the norms by 
which he is guided in his actions have any relation to the order 
and unity of all things. This task will be undertaken in two 
steps. First of all, the norms which are set down in the 
abstract will be examined, the best virtue, wisdom as a guide tor 
action, law, and the actions of the men whom Heraclitus judges 
the best among men. Then the statements, which indicate the 
best and wisest soul will be examined, and the relationship 
of the soul of man to his death and to afterlife will also 
be looked into. 
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Virtue, wisdom, law, and the best among ~ 
"Moderation is the greatest virtue (a~cpPovEiv &P'E"~ 
llEy{o-r11 ) and wisdom (aocp(11 ) is to speak the truth and to act 
according to nature, being aware (~rra?ov,.ac; )" (112). The 
phrase "according to nature" has already been examined in its 
relation to genuine knowing and the unity of all things; and 
wisdom has been seen to be closely related to the unity of 
all things as well; "being aware (lrra?ov-rac; ) has been examined 
in its relationship to ordinary experience, and will be seen 
below to characterize the wisest and best soul. Thus moderation 
seems to be related to the order and unity of all things; it is 
also linked with knowing in another fragment which was 
cited in the previous section (116). The very notion of 
moderation, moreover, implies the presence of oppos1tes, 1n 
terms of which the moderate man is seek1ng a m1ddle course; 
there 1s some s imilari ty 1mplied here be:tween v1rtue and the 
tension of opposites which 1s, the foundation of un1ty 1tself 
w1th1n Heraclitus's world, but Herac11tus does not ment10n th1s 
sim11arity between moderat10n and the joinings of opposited 
anywhere in the fragments. Only one set of opposites named, 
moreover, even suggests an ethical context: "hunger and sat1ety" 
(67). Nevertheless, there is a similarity in thought that 1s 
worth not1ng. He does, in one place, warn men to avo1d one 
extrem1 ty of v1ce: "One thould quench arrogance· ( uf3P' v ) 
rather than a conflagrat10n" (43); th1s and the reference to 
moderat10n as the "best virtue" are the only references to 
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specific virtues or vices in the fragments. 
Heraclitus does speak about "law (v611o~ )" in s,,"Teral 
places. He is referring to man's life within political society 
--the term v6'110~ ordinarily means "political law"--th1s is 
especially clear in this fragment: "The people should fight 
for the law (v611oU ) as if for their city-wall" (44). But, 
as was noted when questions about what is divine were being 
considered, Heraclitus refers in one of these fragments to 
both the political law and "the one divine law" as well (11~). 
In another place he says that "to obey the will of OBe (f3ouAflt 
1t'E(aEcraat tvbC;') is also law (v611o~ )" (33), a,statement which 
was also examined above. The connection of political law 
w1th,·,d1v1ne law, however, is not made clear in these fragments; 
it is not inconceivable that Heraclitus saw the concrete norms 
of right and order and justice within the political body as 
related to the order of all things and as an aspect of the 
universal order, but he never makes this any clearer than 
has already been noted in the comment:"for all human laws 
are nourished by one which is divine" (114). 
Heraclitus's indictment of the Ephesians for expelling 
Hermodorus (121) is somewhat related to this matter of political 
and social order; it bears more relation, however, to the theme 
of "the best men." Thus he contrasts the action of the'Ephes1ans 
with Hermodorus's excellence, and puts into their mouths the 
words: "Let us not have even one valuable (6vtf'o'''0~ ) man; 
but if we do, let him go elsewhere and, live among ,others" (121). 
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In another place he says: "to me, one man is ten thousand, if 
he is the best (ldv aptaTO~ ~t ) II (49); and he agre,s that 
"the majority (ol rroAAOr ) are bad and the good are few" (104).2 
"The best men(l( ol ap t aT01. )," he says, "choose one thing 
rather than all else: everlasting fame among mortal men. 
The majority (ol b~ rroAAol ) stuff themselves like cattle." (29).3 
This view concerning honor is repeated in two other fragmentsl 
"gods and men honor those slain in war" (24); "greater deaths 
(1l6po1. ) win greater portions (or: rewards;llOtpa~ )"(25). The 
question of what happens after death will be examined below. 
The comparison of men with brutes also has place elsewhere in 
the fragments: "if happiness lay in bodily pleasures, we would 
call oxen happy when they find vetch to eat" (#).4 Finally, this 
2Als 9. noteworthy with regard to the best men is the 
statement: 'In Priene was born Bias son of Teutamos, whose fame 
is greater than that of the rest" (39). Heraclitus s other 
favorable comments about his predecessors are worth noting 
here (56, and perhaps 35). 
3It is worth noting that .;the phrase translated "among 
mortal men" could also be translated "rather than things mortal." 
The latter interpretation would suggest that human death 
is final, without after-life; the former seems more likely, 
however since what is being spoken of is fame, which is a 
mortal ~hing while being everlasting as well, and which is 
definitely had only "among men." Neither interpretation raises 
any significant difficulties. 
40n the question of men's similarity to the brutes, 
Heraclitus's comment on men who have "barbarous souls" may be 
significant (107); the fragment states that such men's eyes 
and ears are bad witnesses, a fact which suggests a link with 
the fragment stating that the drunken man is not aware of 
where he is gOing, having a wet soul (117); the link between 
"being aware" and a dry soul is also suggested elsewhere (112, 
118). Also of possible relation to the statements about brutes 
and men is the statement that "donkeys would choose sweepings 
rather than gold" (9); ;' .tr: the reference to "enjoy.1ng oneself 
in mud" (13); and" every crawling thing is driven with a blow(llJ'if 
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theme of "the best men" is strongly oomplemented by a set of 
referenoes to "the majority" or "the rest of men." Two/suoh 
/ 
referenoes have already oome to light (104, 29); others appear 
in statements about not-knowing of various sorts: thus "the 
rest of mankind (-rous a ~ aAAous ) fI aot as if asleep (1); and 
Itthose whose disoourse I have neard (d'K60'(.l)v A6youS ~'KouO'a ) It 
are laoking in understanding (108); both these referenoes seem 
to oontrast men in general with Heraolitus himself. Others 
speak of the "many (0 l 1Collo ~ )" who live as if t~ey had a 
private understanding of things (2) and "many (1COAAO() It who 
do not know what is near-at-hand (17), and of "most (1CAE (cr-r(.l)V )" 
who aooept Hesiod as their teaoher regardless of his errors (57). 
The best men are linked with right aotion and genuine knowing, 
and the rest of men with brutes and not-knowing; the implioation 
is oertainly strong that right living and genuine knowing are 
related. 
The soul and death 
The oomparison of the majority of men with well-fed 
oattle (29) may have been in Heraolitus's mind when he saida 
"It is not better f.or men that whatever they wish (e€AOUO'tV ) 
oome to pass (Y1.vtO'eat )" (110). If there is a differenoe 
the man who does not know and whose life is not in aooord with 
genuine knowing, these various statements may refer to his 
oondition, as do those given in the text; but the matter is 
far from olear. One statement might refer to men's not-knowing 
in this way: "dogs bark at those whom they do not reoognize" (97); of. (87). But it may well be that the statements are 
intended to tell us something about the animals oonoerned; the 
explioit link between men and brutes is made only twioe (4, 29). 
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between men and brutes named in the fragments, besides the 
search for everlasting fame mentioned along with the r~erence 
to cattle (29), th1s d1fference 1s "soul." For Heraclitus speaks 
a number of t1mes about "soul" 1n such a way that he seems 
most certa1nly to be talking about man's soul, and its relation 
to the right order of his actions. 
"To f1ght des1re (eupEh )," he says, "is hard: whatever 
1 t wishes (e {A1'l t ), 1 t buys at the price of soul" (85). This 
perhaps is the sense of the statement that "for souls1t is 
enjoyment (~€p*tv ), or rather death, to. become wet" (77). The 
price wh1ch the soul pays for becoming wet (~yp~Ota, yev{aea,) 
seems to be death (eava~ov ); this association of the soul's 
death and becom1ng water has already been noted above: "for 
souls 1 t 1s death (eava~o<; )to~,become water (uoQ)P yev€aea t ) n 
(36); also related are statements that soul comes from water 
1n the process of th1ngs, which were examined above in chapter 
two (12, 36). 
The ethical sign1f1cance of the soul's becoming wet 
appears in another fragment where Heraclitus remarks: itA dry 
soul 1s w1sest and best (au1'l *UXtj aOcpo:l~c!-r1'l lW l &p (Q'1l'1'l ).. (118); 
here dryness of soul 1s associated with wisdom and being best, 
just as wetness was associated with desire. In another fragment, 
he says: 'IA man, when he gets drunk, is led stumbling along 
by an immature boy, not being aware (06K lrra?Q)v ) where he is 
gOing, having his soul wet (Jyp-?}v -rtjv VUXtjv EXQ)V )" (117).5 . 
5The term lrra?Q), "being aware," appears in another 
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Here drunkenness (and perhaps pleasure as well) 1s assoo1ated 
w1th wetness~of soul; 1t m1ght even have been 1ntended fouite 
11terally by Heraolitus that too muoh dr1nking resulted 1n 
a wet soul; of more consequence, however, 1s the associat1on ot 
wetness of soul and the d1sordered state of the man with h1s 
I , '{ l '? 
"not be 1ng aware (OU x €na ow )"; for ttbe 1ng aware (Ena ~ ov't'a,C; )" 
was the condit1on expressed 1n the statement expla1ning the 
nature of w1sdom (O'ocpfl) ) as "to speak the truth and to aot 
accord1ng to nature, pay1ng heed (or: be1ng aware, ~na?ov't'a~ )." 
Thus wetness of soul 1s associated w1th a cond1t1on of pleasure 
and lack of awareness, and dryness of soul 1s assoo1ated w1th 
w1sdom and awareness. In the concrete, the wetness of the soul 
affeots the moral order of the man, places h1m at a greater 
d1stance from w1sdom and r1ght act1on, and is related to 
pleasure and perhaps to be1ng brutish and less than human,(107). 
It 1s poss1ble that wetness of soul does this by dull1ng the 
senses, makes a man unaware of where he 1s go1ng; but Heracl1tus 
does not make this last po1nt any more exp11c1t; h1s conv1ction 
. 
that foundation of w1sdom and genu1ne know1ng 11es 1n ord1nary 
exper1ence, however, 1s not 1nsign1f1cant 1n th1s regard. 
fragment wh1ch has already been exam1ned several t1mes (112), 
in wh1ch "be1ng aware", Ot; "pay1ng heed" 1s presented as a 
cond1t1on of w1sdom ( €na'{ov't'u~). It 1s worth not1ng that the 
phrase "accord1ng to nature (xu-ra. cpuO't v )" 1n that fragment 
could be taken w1th "be1ng aware" rather than w1th "act" (112). 
The object of "be1ng aware" 1n the present fragment (117) has 
several parallels 1n "the road or way," a concept wh1ch appears 
1n context with knowing and the unity of oppos1tes several 
times (45, 59, 60, 71). 
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But becoming wet is also associated with the death of 
the soul. Does this death of the soul bear any relati~ to 
the death of the whole man? Is human death s1mply the 
dissolution of the man's soul into water within the process of 
all things? 
Heraclitus does not explicit~y answer these questions 
in the fragments. The statements in which soul stands parallel 
to fire in relation to water within the process of all things 
were examined in chapter two; the conclusion reached there was 
that soul is not to be identified with f~re within the process 
of all things, although it bears certain similarities. It 
was also noted that passing-away is referred to as death 
(eaya~o~ ) only in the statements about soul's becoming water, 
but never when the element which becomes water is fire. Related 
to this, perhaps, is the statement: "The same thing in us 
(~a6~o ~' EY') is living and dead, and waking and sleep1ng, 
and young and old; for these things when they have changed, 
are those, and those when they have changed back again are 
these" (88). If "the same thing in us" were soul, then the 
soul would be living and dead, depend1ng upon the state of change 
within the process; but lithe same thing within us" is not 
explained. Similarly, Heraclitus states: "mortal 1mmortals, 
immortal mortals, living their life and dying the1r death·' (62); 
the reference seems to be to those who ~e living and dying 
at the same time, such as men who are alive but mov1ng always 
towards death; their principle of life could be said to be 
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a prinoiple of death as well. 
It might seem that the association of a logos wj"th soul 
would indioate that soul and fire are identical; but it has 
already been discovered that the referenoes to the logos of 
soul distinguish it from "the logos," which is the principle 
of the unity of all things in the process of fire. Moreover, 
there is one statement in which Heraclitus speaks of the soul 
being in Hades, the place of life after death: "souls·have the 
sense of smell in Hades tt (98),6 which would suggest that the 
soul does not cease to exist at the death of a man. On the 
other hand, Heraclitus twice speaks about death as fate (~6po,) 
(20, 25), and in one of these plaoes he says that in death 
men "come to rest (&vun'u\.5t:oeut )" (20); men, he says, "leave 
behind children to become victims of fate (literally: fates, 
deaths; 1l6pouC; )" (20). In one place he says" tlcorpses are 
more worthy to be thrown out than dung" (96); and in another 
that "there await men, after they are dead, things which they 
6There is a possibility that a relationship exists 
between fire and smoke, as when perfumes are added to fire and 
it is named after the various scents (67); if so, then this 
relationship between the soul and the sense of smell may be 
signif1cant, s1nce smoke is what the nose can smell (7). 
It is also possible that Hades is to be identified with 
dea th, rather than taken as the plaoe where the dead go; 
in this sense of Hades, the death of man might simply be his 
losing his soul, which would return to ordinary elemental 
fire (rather than fire within man, which is called soul); thus 
the statemants abo~t smoke and sme~l would fit together. 
Opposing this cOnj.ecture, however, is the statement that 
Hades and Dionysius are same (15). It is, in any case, simply 
a oonjecture suggested by the fra6ments treating smoke, 
smell, soul, and Hades (7, 67, 98). 
neither expect nor imagine" (27); but both of these statements 
can be read e1ther way, indicating that death is the a9Bolute 
end of man or indicating that there is a life aflter death. 7 
Ultimately, it must be conGluded that the evidenoe on 
these matters is inadequate. There is only one statement 
to indicate that the soul is active after death--in Hades (98); 
but that statement itself is not clear, particularly in. view 
of Heraclitus's views on the mystery religions, which shall 
be examined in the next section. It is not clear whether the 
soul is one aspect of fire, fire as it gives life either to 
all living beings or perhaps just man; it is not clear whether 
soul's death is the death of man; it is not clear whether the 
death of man is final. What can be concluded·, however, is 
that the soul is definitely re1ated to man's ethical activity, 
as he strives to rise above the brutes, and to his wisdom as 
he strives to move from the basic awareness of what is around 
him in experience to an understanding of the order of all things 
as it relates to his own moderation in action according to 
'" ... ' 7Concerning the after-life, the statement: "The greater 
the fate (v..6p'o't ), the greater the reward" (25) might seem signi-
ficant; but it could simply refer to the "everlasting fame among 
mortal men" mentioned elsewhere (29), since Heraclitus speaks 
explicitly of honoring the war-d.ead \24) and others. On the 
other hand, death seems to be simply part of the process of coming 
-to-be and passing-away in one statement: 6"when they are born, 
they wish to live and accept their fate (~ pou~ ), or rather 
come to rest; and they leave behind their children to become 
victims of fate (literally: fates, deaths: ~6pou~ )11 (20). This 
might also be the intent of the reference to "children of our 
parents" (74)t although there is little that can be said about 
these two worns. It is not unlikely that Heraclitus would view 
death as simply part of the process of all things; and he does 
speak of the :pass ing away of soul into water as "death" several 
times (36, 77); he does not speak of fire in this manner 
however. 
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nature, his living like the best of men and not like the 
majority, his preservation of the wisest and best soul~/ 
The Gods and the Mystery Rites 
Statements in which lithe gods (eEol )" and men have 
stood in identical relationships to war (5;), to the cosmos 
of all things (30), and to those slain in war (24) have already 
been cited; it has been pOinted out that "the gods (eEol )" are 
not sources of universal jurisdiction or control over the 
process of all things nor over the nature of unity within 
Heraclitus's world. What is men's relationship to "the: 
gods lt then? And, for that matter, do "the gods" exist at all 
in Heraclitus's view of things? 
"They purify themselves by staining (l1tatV611EVOt ) 
themselves with other blood, as if one were to step into mud 
in order to wash off mud. But a man would be thought mad" ( 
(l1a {VEcreat ) if any of his fellow-men should perceive him 
acting thus. Moreover, they talk to these statues as if one 
were to hold conversation with houses, not understanding what 
.. "., t ~ J ) gods and heroes really are ( e€Ou<; oub T}proa<; 0 t -rt Vt;;<; €HH) If (5 • 
Heraclitus makes fun of the mystery rites, even punning on 
"staining" and "be thought mad." In another place he speaks 
of: "night-ramplers, magicians, bacchants, maenads, mystics; 
what are regarded by men as mysteries are unholy rituals" (14). 
Heraclitus does not make it explicit in these statements 
whether the rites are "unholy" and'hlad u because there are no 
gods (eEol ) or because the rites which men practice are 
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themselves shameful and foo11sh. In one place Heraclitus 
• 
says: "if it were not in honor of Dionysius that they / 
conducted the procession and sang the hymn to the male organ, 
their activity would be completely shameless" (15). But 
even here he might be excusing their shamelessness somewhat by 
reason of their failure to understand that Dionysius does not 
exist rather than by reason of, their good intentions to do 
Dionysius service. This fragment continuesl "But Hades is the 
same as Dionysius, in whose honor they rave and perform the 
bacchic rites" (15); and we have already seen the comment that 
"souls have the sense of smell in ('Ka't"Q. ) Hades" (98), but have 
also noted that it is not clear that Heraclitus expects an 
after-life, which makes this latter statement of uncertain 
meaning as well. 
The number of statements about the gods (eEot ) and their 
relationship to war, cosmos, and honored men, as well as the 
fact that Heraclitus seems to have some criterion of "holy" 
or not-shameless. rites and speaks of "what gods and heroes 
really are" (5)·, suggest that he does consider his statements 
about "the gods (eEol )" to be positively mean1ngful. He 
could be using the terms and expressions in some figurative 
way, perhaps with reference to the principles of unity examined 
in chapter two. But the evidence seems to point somewhat more 
strongly to a belief in "the gods ( eEol)" as subordinate to 
the process and unity of all things, just as men and every 
other element in the process is subordinate, that ~s, is part 
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of the unity of the whole, but as real beings nonetheless. 
If there are gods (eEol,), then they seem to holft some 
superior rank over men; and if there are not gods really, 
whatever is being referred to in the statements about "the 
gods ( eEot )" stands as a principle of higher rank than man 
within the world: "man is called childish compared with a 
daimon ( oa(llWv), as a child compared with a man" (79), where 
daimon refers to some being of higher rank than man. Yet 
there is another statement which attributes daimon to man 
himself: "for man, nature ( ~e~) is daimon" (119). In another 
place, Heraclitus statet:;, as has already been noteda "human 
nature (~eO~) has no power of understanding, but divine 
tnature] has" (78); and the statements connecting wisdom and 
law to that which is divine may also be intended to indicate 
the subordination of man to "the gods," although those statements 
have seemed more related to the unity of all things in process 
and to the basis of unity itself in tension of opposites. 
In summary, it must be said that the matter of ~'the 
gods (e€"ol)" is not clear. The view which best handles both 
the statements about "the gods ( eEol )" and the statements about 
what is divine, which were examined in chapter two, is one which 
judges that "the gods {eEO\ )",do actually exist for Heraclitus 
as beings who rank above men and possess the genuine knowing 
which is men's goal; thus they are associated with "that which 
is Wise," which they possess (as that "that which is wise" 
is thus linked in some sense with the name of Zeus). Their 
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understanding of the unity of all thingsand the nature of 
that unity surpasses man's understanding; and through ~em; per-
haps, man comes to achieve genuine knowing. This view would 
take:i~the statements employing the termee t oc; , "divine," to 
refer to "the gods" (78, 114); it would take the phrase "that 
which is wise" to refer to the goal of genuine knowing, which 
is in fact possessed by "the gods" (32,41, 108); it would·take 
the expression "the god," (0 eeoC; ), however, to refer to the 
ultimate principle of unity itself in the joining of oPPosites, 
as indicated in the discussion of the relevant statements 
in chapter two (67, 102). But it must be stated again that 
this view of these statements is. a conjecture which happens to 
handle a number of loose ends fairly tidily, but must not be 
viewed as anything else. So far as the internal evidence of 
the fragments also goes to confirm, these matters must be 
considered uncertain. 
In sum, as man lives within the ordered world,his 
not-knowing affects all his actions--affects not only·nis doing 
of the actions themselves, his "knowing how," but also affects 
his actions in a more significant way by affecting him as 
a~ ethical being, as one whose actions can be good or bad, 
virtuous and best or brutish 'and controlled by desire. HiS 
soul is related to his ethical actions; it is wisest and best 
when it is dry and is able to "be aware, pay heed" and he 
acts according to nature. Both his way of living and his soul 
are related to his death, to the question of life after death, 
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and to his relations with "the gods" through the mystery 
rites and, perhaps, as~possessors and souroes of what ~ wise. 
In many of these matters, there aref.many loose ends beoause 
the evidenoe from the fragments is not plentiful; but this 
muoh is olear: as man's life takes plaoe within the order of 
all things, its order and well-being are related to the order 
of all things, and are dependent upon man's aohieving, upon 
the foundations of his oonorete experienoe, a genuine under-
standing of the unity of all things. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
It is important that all the assumptions or apparent 
assumpt10ns whioh underlie what has been ,presented here be 
made as olear as possible so that the synthesis presented . 
in these pages may be understood to be no more oertain than 
it is, and be held to with no more qualifioations than are 
justified. 
The work found in these pages is dependent first of all 
upon the textual oritioism of Diehls-Kranz, upon the materials 
to be found in Liddell and Soott's lexioon, upon the skill 
and ability to oommunioate of Freeman and Guthrie, and upon 
numerous other students of Heraolitus who have laid the ground-
work within the author of this paper for 'understanding the 
Greek language and in partioular the Greek and its English 
equivalents of the fragments of Heraolitus. These preliminaries 
are obvious, and are no more assumptions than our willingness 
to grant that all human efforts to know are limited. 
There is an assumption, however, whioh is partioularly 
important to the work of this foundational synthesis of 
Heraolitus's thought. For it has been necessary to assume 
that words with related meanings have some basic similarity 
in every use. Thus the various different terms for knowing have 
been dealt with generally on a par, as carrying the basio 
oontent of "knowing" whioh could be d~pended upon 1n every 
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case. Other theme ideas have been developed through the 
same sort of assumption. This assumption does not seem to . / 
be one which cannot be justified from the conditions of posSibilit 
of human communication and a study of the underlying facts of 
language; but it does mean that our conclusions in these 
pages 'should be approached with the proper qualifications 
being operative within our judgment. In some particular cases, 
as in the references to wisdom and "that which is wise," and. 
other situations in which the Greek use of articles with 
substantive neuter (and other) adjectives leaves us uncertain 
in some cases even with the help of the context and the nexus 
of interrelationships of all the fragments, this qualification 
of the conclusions needs to be stressed; in such specially 
difficult cases, the conclusions reached in the pages of the 
synthesis were qualified as they were reaohed. It is'hoped 
that the oonolusions reaohed in these pages have been worded 
with suffioient care that unjustified oonolusions, doubtful 
conolusions, conclusions whioh bear questioning, conolusions which 
are not absolutely clear, and conclusions which can hardly 
be doubted are distinct from one another. The certainty of 
a particular oonclusion depends not only on the olarity of 
the texts, but also on the volume of material available on 
a particular question, upon the strength of the relationships 
of the particular theme with other terms, themes, and relation-
ships within the fragments, and upon the aptness of the 
oonclusion within the total synthesis itself. 
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This brings us to the most basic and most signif10ant 
assumption of these pages, namely that Heraolitus was trying 
to make sense, that there is unity to his thought. If th1s 
---------------------------------
posit1on is rejeoted from the outset, then there 1s no 
poss1bil1ty of understand1ng the man; for understanding, 
1ntel11g1b111ty, is what is being rejeoted. Should it be 
impossible to disoover any unity within the man's thought, 
then we might justifiably oonolude that he is not trying to 
make sense, or even 1s trying not to make sense. But the 
assumption of the student must be that Heraol1tus 1s try1ng to 
~~~. --------------------------------------------~~---
make sense; that therefore, if in some respeot he does make 
-- -.--- .. -------.--~---~.-
sense, 1f un1ty and intel1ig1bil1ty are d.1soovered 1n what he 
has ~~jd. then this unity of.thought is the goal of the_!tud~. 
The unities must be stated as clearly as poss1ble, w1th all 
due qualifioation and oarefu1 1ndioat~on of what evidenoe 
there is for eaoh part of the result; but the unity of the 
man's thought 1s the goal. It is important to rea11ze that 
this unity of thought is what is be1ngsought after, not 
s1mp1y some better understand1ng of seoondary materials of 
whatever sort; the1r funotion is ult1mately only to oontribute 
to the disoovery of the sense of what the man sa1d. And 
the1r dependence upon the toundat1onal work of analysis and 
! 
synthesis, as has been said, makes this foundational work 
the most important step in reaohing the desired goal. 
This most basic, necessary assumption 1s the ultimate 
justifioat1on for present1ng a synthes1s of Herao1itus's or 
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anyone's thought in the first plaoe; and it founds every 
interrelating of data that takes plaoe in the formation of . 
suoh a synthesis. Thus every step of this paper has been 
based upon the fundamental belief that Heraolitus intended 
"\--- ' 
-------------------
to make sense, that his thought is intelligible. Working from 
---------~------------=-----------~----
this basio view of Heraolitus and this neoessary position of 
anyone trying to understand another man, we oan now at the 
end of our foundational work oonolude that the evidenoe has 
oonfirmed our assumption; unity is to be had within the fragments. 
There are many patterns of thought whioh appear repeatedly in 
the fragments, and whioh are oonsistent both internally and 
with eaoh other; some of these are more explio1t than others, 
---
---.--.. ~-----
some are muoh more olear in their details than others, 
some have been mentioned here simply beoause they are present, 
but have been distrusted beoause other statements in the fragments 
seem to oontradiot them or beoausethey are oonjeotures never 
,.--
really oonfirmed by the words of the fragments,in any definite 
way. By presenting in this way every oonolusion whioh the 
fragments themselves suggest, it is hoped that this paper will 
provide material for further study of uncertainties on the 
basis of evidenoe from outside the fragments themselves; the 
presentation of the less oertain oonolusions and the relatively 
unoonfirmed oonjeotures suggested in the fragments also serves 
to indioate, by oomparison and oontrast, how olear and oertain 
some of the themes and patterns of Heraolitus's thought really 
are. 
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With considerable certainty, based upon explicit 
statements, careful study of the use of terms, 'carefulpomparison 
of themes, similarities and differences in expression, and 
detailed examination of the interrelationships of all these 
materials from every fragment in every case, the following is 
offered as a prier: summary of the basic teaching of Heraclitusl 
Heraclitus believed that men in general, with few 
exceptions, were failing to achieve a type of knowing which 
he deemed possible for them and ultimately significant in their 
concrete lives of perception and awareness, of learning and 
accepting the teaching of others, and of acting and living 
according to various norms in an ordered way; this knowing has 
been termed here "genuine" or, loosely but aptly, "philosophical." 
This knowing is universal; it reaches out to all things. 
This knowing 1s a grasping of unity; its ultimate object is 
the unity of all things. 
This unity of all things is grasped by the genuinely 
knowing manunder two aspects; he grasps the unity of all things 
in one ordered process of coming-to-be, in which fire is the 
primary element, and in which important parts are played by 
soul, and perhaps by human death and the changes of the s~n 
as well in some way; and he grasps the unity of all things by 
understanding the very nature of unity itself: unity is tension 
of opposites, without opposition there is no unity, unity is 
ever unity out of multiplicity, unity out of and based upon 
opposition; unity and opposition are coterminous and, in the 
concrete, identical in some sense. 
These two aspects of the unity of all things ar~grasped 
by a man through his ordinary experience; they are not special 
revelations, nor infused or based upon transcendent insight, 
but come rather from being aware of the reality of all things 
dea.l t with every day; hence numerous examples 'of these aspeots 
of unity can be discovered within the most concrete realms of 
experience. 
Grasping the unity of all things under these two aspects, 
and seeking to communicate his understanding, a man speaks 
of principles of unity, tending in his language to attribute 
distinct and substantial being to these principles as to aotua1 
sources or causes of unity; he tends to refer the unity he 
understands to divine causes and transcendent souroes of 
intelligence, but what his language reflects is rather the 
absolute actuality of the unity he grasps in every thing of 
his experience; the unity is not distinct from all things, 
rather "all things are one." In this manner, however, he 
comes to speak of a principle of unity with regard to eaoh 
aspeot of the real unity he grasps; he speaks of logos, the 
principle of order in the process of all things coming-to-be, 
and associates the measures and limits of that prooess in the 
ooncrete with the logos he speaks of; and speaks of war, strife, 
justioe, harmony, which are ways of referring to the very nature 
of the principle of unity as tension of opposites; and he 
relates these two principles with eaoh other in the abstraot 
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and in the concrete because they are aspects of the one unity 
of all things in actuality. / 
Turning back to man again, Heraclitus reflects that the 
ordering of man's life relates to norms which suggest these 
principles. He understands that that ordering will only be 
achieved by men whose knowing approaches. the understanding of 
all things and their unity; and he judges that man is above 
all a part of the process and finds his own unity through 
tans ion of opposites. 
Heraclitus's insight is profound, though expressed in 
short form in every case and demanding great efforts to uncover 
the possible interrelationships of what he has to say in so 
many apparently isolated fragments. It is possible that some 
elements of the syntheSiS which has been presented here in 
his name were only implicit in his thought, that he did not 
understand the world and man soWell, so explicitly; but this 
does not detract from the significance of what he has to say, 
nor from our attributing to him what was his, even though 
he may have lacked words to say it as clearly as we can. For 
nothing has been attributed to him here which is not founded 
upon and clearly confirmed, though admittedly not always in 
so many words, within the fragments at our disposal. 
The picture of Heraclitus presented here clearly differs 
from the picture of him which has ~ommonly been presented in 
the past. Heraclitus has long been treated as a sceptiC, or at 
least as a man who radically distrusted sense knowledge. The 
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ev1denoe of the fragments is that Heraol1tus valued sense 
knowledge and ordinary exper1enoe as the basis upon which 
further understanding of things is bUilt; it follows quite 
reasonably, moreover, that he should have turned repeatedly 
to ordinary exper1enoe for examples when he was examining the 
unity of all things in its various aspeots. 
Heraol1tus has been presented as .teaoh1ng that there is 
no stability or unity of any sort in the world, that the world 
is oonst1tuted utterly of arbitrary ohange. But it has beoome 
olear that the unity of all things and the bas10 nature of 
unity itself are Heraol1tus's oh1ef oonoerns. His world is 
a world in wh10h everything is ohang1ng; but it is not an 
arbitrary, orderless world, a world without intelligibility in 
wh10h only soept101sm would be reasonable. Nothing oould be 
olearer than the faot that Heraol1tus was oonoerned with the 
unity of things and the understanding of this unity by men; the 
unity of all things and the failure of. men to aoh1eve genuine 
understanding of that unity are the most repeated themes of the 
fragments. 
Heraol1tus has been treated as a man bas10ally without 
hope, as a pessimist and a deliberate r1ddler who had no 
oonf1denoe in men to aoh1eve the genuine understanding of 
things wh10h he saw them to be laok1ng. It has already been 
pointed out, however, that Heraol1tus affirms men's ability 
to aoh1eve genuine understanding not only expl101tly in a few 
plaoes, but more importantly by his olear.oonv1ot1on that he 
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h1mself had ach1eved some degree of th1s genu1ne understand1ng 
and by h1s efforts to teach men what he had come to know. The 
p1cture of Herac11tus as a r1ddler w1thout hope 1s hard 
to accept when we are presented with his efforts to teach 
men of the1r own lack of understand1ng and to turn the1r 
attention to the un1ty of all th1ngs and 1ts relationship. to 
their daily l1ves which they are fa1l1ng to grasp. 
It 1s clear, of course, that the p1cture of Herac11tus 
as a despa1r1ng riddler or a scept1c follows from the p1cture 
of his world as one of arbitrary change, w1thout mean1ng.".orcier, 
or rationa11ty. Similarly, the v1ew of h1m proposed here, as 
a concerned teacher, lead1ng men to an awareness of the1r own 
19norance and str1v1ng to turn the1r attent10n to the un1ty 
of all things 1n 1ts var10us aspects, 1s related to the p1cture 
of h1s world revealed 1n the fragments and presented 1n these 
pages, a world whose change is a total ordered process whioh 
1s rad1cally rat10nal and 1s bas1cally aeess1ble to man's 
understand1ng. 
In all of this, Herac11tus grasps both sides of the 
d1chotomy wh1ch bases all metaphysics; there 1s change, 
mult1p11c1ty, dlffe~ence; and yet there 1s also order, 
1ntel11gib1l1ty, un1ty. He may be deemed an opt1m1st for 
preserv1ng, 1n h1s v1ew of th1ngs, order and intelligib111ty; 
but he must also be deemed a rea11st for preserv1ng, together 
w1th th1s convict10n in 1ntel11g1bi11ty, a constant awareness 
of the world as it is presented to us 1n ord1nary exper1ence. 
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This response of his, grasping both sides of the diohotomy which 
are presented as genuine, is signifioantly paralleled, ~nd 
perhaps founded upon--or perhaps serves as the ultimate 
foundation for--his understanding of the fundamental nature 
of unity itself. Unity, he teaohes, is harmony; unity is 
tension of opposites. 
In this dootr1ne of the bas10 nature of unity itself 
lies Heraclitus's most profound insight and his greatest 
oontribut1on to philosophical thinking. It is an insight 
regained again and again throughout the history of philosophy, 
and oonsidered with every rediscovery to be a return to reality. 
But what is most signifioant about this profound insight of 
Heraolitus is that, radical though it be, it does not stand alone 
as an isolated thought. This radically unifying insight into 
all things is itself a tension of opposites, a tension between 
the search for unity and intelligibility and the evident 
experience of change and multiplicity. Both by expl10it 
statements about unity andunderstanding and by his whole manner 
of approach, Heraclitus teaches that thought must remain 
bound up with experience, that man the thinker is one with 
his world. Genuine knowing, the effort to achieve the unity of 
all things through thought, must preserve the tension whence 
it arises: man in transaction in the world. 
Every facet of this man's work ought to be compared, 
of oourse, with what has been said about him in the past and 
with what has been observed and understood about all things 
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since he passed from our midst. The foundational synthesis 
presented in these pages, it is hoped, provides a thoro~gh,. 
detailed, and properly qualified basis of understanding of 
Heraclitus's thought upon which his contributions to our 
understanding of all things may grow more and more ev1dent. 
APPENDIX I 
This appendix contains the texts of the fragments of 
Heraclitus as they are to be found in Diehls-Kranz, 2!! 
Fragmente ~ Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1951-1952), sixth 
and subsequent editions. only the Greek text which 
Diehls-Kranz accept as genuine will be given here, the 
various statements of the authors who are qutoing Heraclitus 
will not be included here, although they may be~found in 
Diehls-Kranz~ this policy will:also be followed when the 
text of the fragment is in Latin. In their presentation 
of· .the fragments, Diehls-Kranz make thi.s distinction between 
actual genuine text and comment by th~ source-author by 
placing the former in italic print. ·The fragments will be 
numbered here, as they are .. throughout this paper, according 
to the numbers given them by Diehls-Kranz. 
3. 
4. 
TOU oE A6you TOUO' l6vTO~ &El &~UVETOt y(vovTat avepoonot 
", - )" ,. - .I }tat np60eEV 1) a}tOU0at M.alo a}toucaYTE<; Tv npoorOvr ytVOp,t.VOOV 
yap naVTOOV }taTa TOV A6yov T6vOE anE(pOt0tV EO(M.a0t, 
'!I'L ')" , t ( '!I. nEtp~~EVOt M.a]' Ent.OOV }tal. EPYOOV TOtOUTOOV, O}tO OOV Ey,w 
Ot1)YEup.at }ta.Ta CPU0tV otatp€oov EM.aOTOV l{al cppo..sOOV OM.OO<; 
EXEt. ToDc; OE aAAOU<; &vepwnOu~ AaVeo.VEt dl1.oca ly£pe€VT£~ 
- II t" , 1:1.4 nOtOu0tV, O}tOO0nEp O}t00a EUOOVTE<; EntAav9UVOVTat. 
OtO OEt EnE06at Twt ~UVWt. TOU A6you 0' l6vTO<; ~UVOU 
( ~,/" ~ .s~OU0tV Ot nOAAOl w<; tOtav EXOVTE<; cppvV1)O'V. 
lupo<; nOOO<; &v6poonE(OU. 
Si felicitas esset in delectationibus corporis, boves 
felices diceremus, cum invenient orobum ad comedendum. 
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xa6a{pov-rat 0' aAA(J)t arlla-rt lltatv611EVOt o10v Ef -rt~ Elc:; 
n~Abv lll~a~ n~Aillt &nov(60t -r0. lla{vEO'6at 0' &v OOKO{~~ Ef 
-rt c:; aD-rbv av6pwnwv tnt cppaO'a t -ro 'ou-rw nOt Eov-ra. KM -rOt" 
" '" .It " t,.,." ";) ayaAllaO't o~ -rOu-r~OtO'tv Euxov-rat,'OKOtOV Et -rtc:; 0611010'" AEO'X~VEUOt-rO, ou -rt ytVwO'KwV eEOUC:; oDo' ~pwac:; OfTtV€C:; El~t. 
6. VEOC:; lcp' ~llEP~t lO'-r(v. 
7. Ef nav-ra -ra ov-ra Kanvbc:; YEVOtTo, piVEC:; &v OtayvoiEv. 
8. -rb &v-r{~ouv O'ullCP€POV: iK Tillv otaCPEp6vTWV KaAA(O'T~v dpllov(av. 
9. ovouc:; O'uPlla-r' av €A€O'6at 11aAAOV ~ XpuO'6v. 
t, ~.I" 6 -10. oAa Ka. oux oAa, O'UVCPEP llEVOV ~ta~EP611EY.OV, O'uvatOov 
0tatOOV, Kat ·lK na.VTWv EV Kal El; Evbc:; mfvTa. 
11. nay €pnE-rbv 1(A~Yfi't V€l1ETat. 
- tIW ,,..,, '{ t, 1 " 12. no-rallotO't TOtO'tV au-rotO'tV Ell~a vouO'tv E-rEpa Ka E-rEpa 
" , ,.,. , , ~, ~ ,.,. , ,.,., ,.,. 
uoaTa EntpPEt· Kal> \ltuxa~ Ot:,; anu TWV uypwv avaeulltwv-rat (1 ). 
13. ~op~6pwt Xa{pEtV. 
14. vUK-rtn6AOtc:;, 11aYOtc:;, ~aKXOtC:;, A~vatC, 11uO'-ratc:;· -ra yap 
6 ",/!. ~ 1 ..,.,. VOllt6 11Eva Ka-r avepwnouc:; lluO'-r'IPta avtEpwO'Tt llUEUVTat. 
15. Ef llD yap atovuO'Wt n011nDv tnotouv-ro Kal U11VEOV dtO'lla 
aloo{otO'tV, &vatO€O'-ra-ra Efpyaa-r' a~· ~uTb~ O~ 'A(O~C:; KQl 
A~,0VtlG'(1),..'. O-rEwt 11a{vov-rat Kal A~va?60uO'tV. 
16. -rb 11~ ouv6v nOTE nooc:; av -rt~ AaeOt; 
, .. .It - ('..(" - ,~ 
';.7. ou yap CPpOv~oUo't TOtau-ra nOAAO , OKuO'Ot EYXUPEUo'tV, ouOt;. , ,.,. 
11a66v-rEC:; ytvwOKOUO'tV, EWU'-rOtO't oe,OoK€ouO't. 
, " , .It ' '): ~ '): , 1e~ EaV ll~ EAn~-rat, aVt;.AntO'TOV OUK E~EUPIIO'Et, aVE~EpEUV~TOV , ~ ,,, EuV Kal> anOpov. 
,,.,. ", ,~, I -19. axouO'at OUK EntO'-rallEvOt OUu E nEtV. 
6 ./!., .It ~ , " -'\ '\ ~ ~ 20. rEV llEvOt 6WEtV E6~AOUO't l1opoUC:; -r EXEtv, 11a~ov ut:,; 
avanauEO'6at, Kal naioac:; Ka-raAE(nOUo't 116pouc:; YEVEo'eat. 
21. eava-r6c:; €o-rtv dK6O'a lYEpe€VTEC:; dp€Ol1EV, dK6o'a Oe 
II .. EUOOV-rEC:; unVOC:; .. 
,. 
22. XQuO'bv yap dt ot6~l1evOt yfi'v nOAADv 6puO'o'oUo't Kat 
EUp(O'KOUO'tV OA(yOV. 
" ,,,,, 1""). .:t 23. O{K~C:; ovopa OUK av ~tOeo'av, El -raUTa Pll liV. 
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27. avepw~ou~'~€vet a~oeav6v~a~ acrcra 06K €A~Ov~at 065~ 50KEOUcrtV. 
28. OOK€ov~a yap d oOKt~~a~o£ ytvwcrKet, ~uAacrcrEt: Kat ~EV~Ot 
Ka 1 0 (Kfl Ka~aAt!'lrE~a t 'lreuo(J.)v -r€it~ova~')Ka t .llocfp~upa~. 
" 
K6crlJ.oV ~6vbE, ~bv a6~ov d~av~(J.)v, ou~e ~t~ eemv OU~E 
avepro~(J.)v ~rt'O(flcrEV, aAA' ~v ae1 Ka1 €cr~tV Kat €cr~at ~up 
ae(b(J.)ov, d~~6lJ.EVOV lJ.€~pa Ka1 art'ocr~evv~~evov lJ.€~pa. 
31. ~upb~ ~po~a1 ~pw~ov eaAacrcra, eaAacrcrfl~ 5~ ~b ~~v ~~tcru y~, 
~O bE ~lJ.t~u rt'Pflcr~t!P. 1D ~aAacrcra OtaXEe~~t, Kat lJ.E~p!E~at 
€l~ ~bv au~ov A6yov, OKOtO~ rt'p6creev ~v fl y€v€creat Yfl. 
32. EV ~b cro~bv lJ.OUVOV AEy€creat 06K le€AEt Kat le€AEt 
II ZTlvb~ ovo~a. 
33. v6lJ.o~ Kat ~oUADt rt'€(eecreat lv6~. 
a~Uv€~ot aKo~crav~E~ K(J.)moicrtv lO(Kacrt· ~a~t~ a6~oicrtv 
.... 6 ,;t. lJ.ap~upet ~ap€ v~a~ a~etvat. 
34. 
35. xg.~('ya.p di lJ.dAa ~OAAWV i'cr~opa~ ~tAocr6~ou~ a.vopa~ Elvat. 
" 
36. 'lruXDcrtv eava~o£ ~o(J.)p YEV€creat, ~oa~t OE ecfva~o~ YDv 
YEvecreat, lK YTl~ .. 5E ~o(J.)p y(vE~a" ~~ ~oa~o~ bE 'lruxtt. 
37. Sues caeno, cohortales aves pulvere vel cinere lavari. 
38. ~pw~o~ acr~poAoYDcrat. 
39. rrptt!vTlt B(a~ ~y€ve~o d Teu~cf~E(J.) 03 ~AE((J.)V A6yoS ~ ~wv &AA(J.)V. 
40. rt'oAulJ.ae<fl v60v EXetv 06 OtOcfcrKe,o'Hcr(ooov yap &v ~o(ba~E 
Kat rrueay6Pflv a3~(~ ~E Sevo~cfvecf ~e Kat 'EKa~aiov. 
41. EV ~b cro~~v, ~~{cr~acreat yvrolloflv, ~~€Tl ~E ~Ku~€pVTlaE ncfv~a 
Ota. ~cfv~(J.)v. 
42. ~6v ~e ,"OlJ.TlQov a.~tov lK ~wv ayrov(J.)v ~K~cfAAeaaat Kat p art' {b Ecreat 'ApX{AOXOV • 
43. u~P'v Xp~ cr~Evv~vat lJ.UAAOV ~ nUPKait!v. 
44. ~ax£crea\ Xp~ ~~v b~~ov 0nEp ~ou v6~ou oKoocrn€p ~€{X€O~. 
45. ~UX~S n£{pa~a lilly 00K av ~~£~PO\O, nacrav ~n\~op€u~?€VO~ 
ob6v· o~hoo~aeuv A6yov EX€ t. 
46 " '~6 • Ot~cr\V t£p v V crov. 
47. ~~ €lK~ n£pt ~wv ~£y{cr~oov cru~~aAA~~€ea. 
48. ~W\ o~v ~6~oot ovo?a ~(o~, EPYOV b~ eava~o~. 
49. E'~ ~~ol ~~Ptot, lay aptcr~os ~t. 
49a. no~a~otS ~otS a0~ot~ l~~a{vo~€v ~E Kat 00K ~~~a(vo~€v, 
El?€v ~£ Kal 00K E7~Ev. 
50. 00K l~ou, dAAa ~ou A6you dKo~craV~€~ d~OAOy£iv cro~6v 
J c\" ')"' Ecr~tV EV nav~a E~Vat. 
51. 00 ~uvtacrtv OKOOS bta~Ep6~EVOV loou~wt d~OAOY€E\· naA(v~pono~ 
dP~OV{~ oKoocrnEp ~6~ou Kat A~p~S. 
52. alillvnai~ lcr~\ na{toov, nEcrcrE~ooV· na\b~~ ~ ~acrtA~{~. 
53. n6AE~os navfwv ~EV na~~p lcr~\, nav~oov bE ~acrtAE~S, Kat 
~ouS ~EV eEOUS EbEt~E ~ouS bE &vep~nou~, ~ou~ ~Ev Oo~Xou~ 
lno{~crE ~ouS b~ lAEUe€POUS. 
54. dP~OV{~ d~av~s ~avEp~s KpE(~~OOV. 
55. ocroov o*tS &KO~ ~ae~cr\S, ~au~a ~yill npo~t~€oo. 
56. l~~na~~v~at ol aveprorrO\ np~s ~~v xvwcrtv ~wv ~avEpwv napanA~cr{(J.)q 'Op.11'P(J.)t, OS lY€VE~O ~(J.)V '~EAA~V(J.)V crO~c.6~EPO~ 
nav~(J.)v. lK£7v6v ~E yap natbES ~e€1pac Ka~aK~€{voV~€~ If,~na~~aav Eln6v~ES· ocra Eibo~€v Kat lAa~O~€V, ~au~a 
, { II),"" "'1, ... arroAE nO~Ev~ ocra be O~~E Etbo~EV ou~ EAa~o~Ev, ~au~a 
~€po~£v. 
, - J "." 57. btbacrKaAos bE nAE{cr~(J.)V Hcr{oboS· ~ou~ov En{cr~aV~a\ nAEtcr~a 
£lb€vat, ocr~tS ~~€p~v Kat E0~p6v~v 00K ly{voocrKEV· ~cr~t ¥ap 
I' EV. 
58. 0/ youv la~pol ~€~VOV~ES, Ka{ov~£s, lnat~€ov~at ~~bEV 
a~\o\ ~tcrebv Aa~~aVE\V, ~a0~a lpyatb~EVOt. 
59. yva~E{(J.)t dbbs E0~Eia Kal 6~oXt~ ~(d l&~f.Kal ~ a0~~. 
60. ~o~~ avoo Ka~oo ~{a Kat ~u~~. 
61. eaAacrcra ub(J.)p Kaeapc.6~a~ov ~al ~tap~~a~ov, lxeuot ?~V ~6~,?ov 
Kat cr(J.)~~PtOV, &veprorrOt~ b~ ano~ov Kat OA€eptOV. 
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62. &eava~ot 6vD~0(, eVD~ol &eava~ot, kWV~E~ ~bv lKE(VWV 
edva~ov, ~bv O~ €KE(VWV ~(ov ~EeVEW~E~. 
/ 
63. £v6a 0' lov~t lrrav(a~acreat Kal ~~AaKa~ y(vEcr6at l~~p~l 
bWV~wV Kal VEKpWV. 
64. ~a OE rrav~a olaK(bEt KEpauv6~. 
6S. XPDcr~ocr~vDv Kal K6pov. 
66. rrav~a yap ~b rrup lrrEA6bv KptvEi Kal Ka~aA~~E~at. 
67. d eEb~ ~~~PD ED~p6vD, ~Et~WV e~~o~, rr6AE~0~ Etp~vD, K6po~ 
At~OS, aAAOtOu~at· OE oKwcrrrEp rrup, drr~~av cru~~ty~t euw~acrtv, 
" ">. ,;, 
670.. 
68. 
ovo~abE~at Kae DOOV'jV EKacr~ou. 
sicut aranea stans in medio telae sentit, quam cito musca 
aliquem filum suum corrumpit itaque illuc celeriter currit 
quasi defili persectione dolens, sic hominis anima aliqua 
parte corporis laesa illuc festine,·meat:·:qtlasi impatiens 
laesionis corporis, cui firme et proportional iter juncta est 
" aKEa. 
69.(Diehls-Kranz do not accept any of this fragment as genuine.) 
70. rra(owv &e~p~a~a. 
71. ~ou lrrtAav6avo~EvoU ~t ~ dOb~ aYEt. 
72 •. a;t ~aAt cr~a Ot ~VEKQ)S 9~tAOU£t A6yw.b ~wt" ~O~~Wt ota~€pov~at, 
Kal 6t~ Kae' D~Epav EyKUpOUcrt, ~au~a au~ot~ ~€va ~a(vE~at. 
73. oD oEi wcrrrEp KaeE~Oov~a~ rrotEiv Kal A€YEtV. 
74. rraioa~ ~OKEWVWV. 
75. ~o~~ KaeE~Oov~a~ lpya~a~ Elvat Kal! crUVEPYOU~ ~wv €V ~Wt 
K6cr~t YtVO~EVWV. 
76. £Diehls-Kranz do not accept any of this fragment as genuine.) 
., 
77. ~uX~tcrt ~~p~tv D eava~ov uyp~tcrt YEV€creat. b~V ~~a~ ~bv 
EKE(VWV eava~ov Kal b~V lKE(va~ ~bv ~~E~EPOV eava~ov. 
78. ~eos yap &V~PWrrEtOV ~ev , " yvw~a~, eEiov oe " OUK EXEt EXEt. 
79. &v~p v~rrto~ .;fKOUcrE 1(pb~ oa(~ovo~ ., rrai~ rrpo~ &vop6~. oKwcrrrEp 
80. Elo€vat OE XP~ ~bv rr6AElloov l6v~a ~uv6v, Kal o(KDV " EptV, 
Kat ytv61loEva rrav~a ' " l xPgf/;v. Ka~ EptV Ka 
15.6 
82. (Diehls-Kranz do not accept any of this fragment as genuine.) 
83. (Diehls-Kranz do not accept any of this fragment is genuine.) 
84a. ~ETa~aAAov dvarraUETa\. 
84b. Ka~aT6e; tcrT\ Tote; aOTOte; ~OxeEtV Kal elpx£crea\. 
8~. eu~mt ~aXEcrea\ xaA£rr6v· d yap elV e€A~t, ~ux~e; ~v£iTat. 
86. &rrto'T{T)1. btacpuyyavE\ ~~ ytyvc6crK£O'eat. 
87. ~Aa~ avepwrroe; trrt rravTt A6ymt lrrTo~O'eat CPtA£i. 
88. TaOT6 T' £V\ bWv Kal T£eVDK~e; Kal ~YPDyop~e; Kat Kae£UOOV 
Kal v€OV Kal YDpat6v· Tab£ yap ~ETarr£cr6vTa tK£tva €O'Tt 
KdK£tva rraAtv ~ETarr€0'6vTa TauTa. 
89. Tote; €YPDyop6crtv Eva Kat Kotv6v K60'~ov £lvat ••• ~OtOv. 
90. rrup~e; T£ dVTa~Ot~~ Ta'rraVTa Kat rrup &rraVTmv OKmO'rr£p 
xpuaou XPD~aTa Kat XPD~aTmv xpua~~. . . 
, ,. 92. t{~uAAa ~atvo~€vmt aT6~aTt aY€AaO'Ta Kal a~aAA~tcrTa Kal 
&~uptaTa cpe£yyo~€va bta T~V e€6v. 
93. ~ ava~. 03 T~ ~avTE16v laTt T~ lv A£ACPoie;, O~T£ A€y£t O~TE 
KpurrTEt dAAa O'D~a{v£t. 
94. "HAtoe; yap o~x J1(Ep~11crETat ~€Tpa· El b~ ~1f, iEptvuEe; »tV 
~(KDe; trr{KoupOt ·l~£up11aouO'tv. 
95. &~ae{Dv yap a~EtvOV KpurrT£tv ••• KpurrTEtV &~ae(DV Kp€O'O'OV. 
96. V€KUEC; Korrp{mv lK~ADT6TEPOt. 
97. KUV£C; yap Kara~aabouatv ~v av ~~ ytv~crKmO'to 
98. al ~uxal 60'~vTat Kae' "AtOTjv. 
99. El ~~ ~AtOC; ~v, EV£Ka TWV aAAmv aO'Tpmv £Ocpp6vTj av ~v. 
tI ", ~ 100. mpac; at rraVTa ~~pouat. 
101. lOtbDcra~Dv l~£muT6v. 
lOla. 6cpeaA~ol yap TWV ~Tmv &KPt~€O'T£POt ~apTup£c;. 
102. TWt ~~v eEWt xaAa rravTa Kal dyaea Kal O(Kata; Clvepwrrot O~ 
a ~EV aOtKa rtEtA~cpaO'tV a bE O(xata. 
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103. ~uvbv yap &px~ Kal n€pa~ int KdxAou nEpt~EpE(a~. 
104• Tl~ yap aOTwv v60~ ~ ~p~v; b~pillv &otbotat nE(aOvT~t Ka\ 
b 1. bacrKctAill1. XP E (illvTa t 011 (Aill t OOK E lb6T£~ Cht. 'ol rcollo\ 
KaKo(, 6A(yOt be &yaao(.' 
105. &aTpoA6yov TOV "Ol1TlPov. 
106. ~Hat6billt &yvoouvTt ~uatv D~€pa~ ~rcaaTl~ ~(av 03aav. 
107. KaKo( ~apTupE~ &VapIDrcotatv 6~aaA~ot Kat ~Ta ~ap~apou~ 
~uxac;': lX6vTillV. 
109. (Same as fragment 95.) 
110. &vapwrcOt~ y(vEaaat dK6aa a€AouatV OOK a~EtVov. 
111:,vouao~ ~ltE(TlV lrco(TlaEV Dbu Kat &yaa6v, At~~~ K6pov, 
Ka~aTo~ avarcauatv.· , 
112. aill~povEtv &pETD l1El(crTTl, Kat aO~(Tl &ATl~€a A€yetv Kat 
rcOtEtV KaTa ~uatv Ena?OVTa~. 
113. ~uv6v laTt rcaat TO ~pOV€EtV. 
114. ~uv V6illt A€yovTa~ laxup(!.Eaaat Xp~ Trot ~uvwt rcavTillv, 
OKillOrcEP V6~illt n6At~, Kal nOAU laXupOT€pill~. Tp€~ovTat 
yap rcavTE~ Ot' &vapWTCE1.0t v6~ot Jrco ~VOS TOU aE(OU· 
KpaTEt yap ToaouTov dK6aov la€A£t Kat E~apKEi rcaat. 
Kat rcEP1.Y(VETa1.. 
-, 6 ' ~ " 115. WUXTl~ EaTt A yo~ EaUTuV aUXillv. 
116. &vapwrcotat rcaa1. ~€TEaTt Y1.VWaKEtv ~illUTOU~ Kat aill~pOvEtV. 
117. &v~p dK6Tav ~Eauaa~t, a,ETat urc~ rcatbo~ &v~~ou a~all6~Evo~, 
OOK lna?illv OKTl ~a(vEt, uYP~v T~V WUX~v eXillv. 
118. aUTl WUX~ aO~illTdTTl Kat &p(aTTl. (Diehls-Kranz also admit of 
another, less likely reading of this fragment as possibles 
aOYTl ~TlP~ WUX~ aO~illTdTTl Kat &p(aTTl.) 
119. ~ao~ &VepIDrcillt. ba(~illv. 
120. ~OU~ Kat €an€~a~ T€p~aTa D apKTO~ Kat &VT(OV Tn~ apKTOu 
Oupo~ alep(ou At6~. 
121. a~tov 'E~Ea(o~ ~~Tlb6v &rcC!ycaaeat. naat. Kat Toi~ &v~~Ot~ T~V 
n6AtV KaTaAtnEiv, oiTtVE~ 'Ep~6billPOV avbpa ~illUTWV 3v~taTOv 
lE.~AaBov coavTEC:· nt:L~illV Jl.1'}be Efe; 6\f!1'taTOS eaTill--!. El be ~~ 
1~ 
122. &yx,~aa{Dv. / 
123. ~ua,s Kpu~~Eaaa, ~'AEi. 
124. ~a~Ep aap~a ElK~ KEXU~EVIDV d KdAA\a~OS K6a~os. 
125. Kat d KUKEWV o,{a~a~a, ~~ K\VOU~EVOS. 
125a. ~~ l~'A{~O' ~~as nAOU~OS, 'E~~a,o\, fv' l~EA€YXOtaaE 
nOVDPEu6~EVO'. 
126. Ta ~UXpa a€pE~at, aEp~~V ~~x£~a\, Jypbv a6a(v£~a\, 
Kap~aA€ov VO~{~ETa\. 
/ 
APPENDIX II 
THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE FRAGMENTS 
Only two authors have attempted to give a fairly 
complete set of translations of the fragments of the Diehls-
Kranz corpus. These are Guthrie, Histo!! of Gree~ Philosophy, 
V0~. I (Cambridge, 1962), and Freeman, Ancilla to the Presocratic 
Philosophers (Oxford, 1948). The translations of the fragments 
which have been used in this paper have been drawn from these 
two souroes, although certain phrases or terms have been adapted 
in ~ndividual cases, based upon the work of Liddell and Scott, 
A Greek-English ~exicon C-Oxf<;>roj- 1940 ), if the relationship of 
a fragment to 0ther fragments warranted it. One ~ranslation 
of a particular fragment was preferred to another on the basiS 
of being closer to the literal meaning of the fragment and 
more suited to the fragment's place in the nexus of interrelation-
ships of terms and themes. 
The procedure in these pages will be to state the 
translation of the fragment which has been used in this paper 
and then to explain briefly the source of the translation and 
the reasons for any changes which might have been made. 
159. 
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1 
/ Although this logos exists forever, men 
are void of understanding of it both 
before they hear" it, and when they have 
heard it for the first time. For, 
" though all things oome to pass in aooordanoe 
with this logos, men seem as if ignorant 
when they experience such words and things 
as I set forth, distinguishing eaoh thing 
according to nature and telling how it is. 
The rest of mankind are unaware of what 
they do while awake just as they forget what 
they do while asleep. 
The translation is entirely from Guthrie except for 
"both before they hear it, and when they have heard it for the 
first time," which is from Freeman and is closer to the literal 
sense of the Greek. Freeman and Guthrie both supply an "its" 
before tlnature," which is not found in the literal Greek and 
is not suggested by the uses of "nature" elsewhere in the " 
fragments. Therefore, it has been removed here. Both Freeman 
and Guthrie translate &~\JVE-rO' in the sense of "unable to 
understand"; Liddell and Scott also admit "void of understanding" 
as a translation of this term. Since the fragments indicate thAt 
men are capable of understanding, the~"latter expression has been 
used here. As has already been indicated in a footnote, the 
term logos has been left untranslated in this paper. 
2 
Therefore one must follow that which is 
common; but although the logos is common, 
most men live as if they had a private 
understanding of their own. 
The translation is basically Guthri~'s, except for 
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"therefore" which Guthrie does not include, although it appears 
in the Greek text and is translated by Freeman, and "tl;lat which 
is common": Guthrie translates this express ion (,.0>, ~uv~, ) 
as "what is common"; Freeman's .translation has been preferred 
here because it is more substantial, since this phrase will be 
used often in examining Heraolitus's thought, and seems to 
carry into words more adequately Heraol1tus's generalization 
on "oommon. If. 
See Appendix III 
4 
If happiness lay in bodily pleasures, we 
would call oxen happy when they find 
vetch to eat. 
Guthrie's translation is identical, except for the word 
"pleasures" which he renders as "delights." The term in the 
fragment, whose text is Latin, is delectat1on1bus. 
5 
They purify themselves by staining 
themselves with other blood, as if one 
were to step into mud in order to wash 
off mud. But a man would be thought 
mad if any of his fellowmen should 
perceive him acting thus. Moreover, 
they talk to these statues as if one 
were to hold conversation with houses, 
not understanding what gods and heroes 
really are. 
This is Freeman's translation exoept for the phrase 
"not understanding what gods and heroes really are," wh10h 
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is based on Guthrie. Guthrie, however, translates the 
participle ytVc.6O'KWV as "does understand," rather than / 
participially as is done here. The rest of Guthrie's translation 
agrees with Freeman; Freeman's concluding phrase reads "in 
his ignorance of the nature of both gods and heroes," which is 
not as close to the Greek, especially in the use of the word 
"nature," as what has been used in this paper. 
6 
_Is new each· day. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's reads: "The 
sun is new every day." The sense of both is the same; "each" 
, " L carries the Greek phrase E~ ~~~p~t better into English, however, 
and does not imply that a form of 7t'ac;;, 7t'av, "all, It has been used 
--"every" suggests that there is a form of 7t'ac;; ,7t'av in the frag:"', 
ment. liThe sun U does not appear in Diehls-Kranzls accepted text. 
7 
If all existing things turned to smoke, 
the nose would distinguish. 
The prodosis is from Freeman, with Guthrie in agreement 
save in translating Y€VOt-ro as "become." Freeman's apodosis 
reads: "the nose would be the discriminating organ"; Guthrie's 
translation reads: "the nostrils would distinguish them"; 
but there is no "them" in the Greek, much less any "organ." 
"Distinguish" is preferred although the ·Greek term C).-oItfiI.<JV 
was also translated "distinguish" in fragment 1. 
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8 
That which is in opposition is in 
concert; and from things that differ 
comes the most beautiful harmony. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does 
/ 
not accept the fragment as genuine; Guthrie's translation, 
however, reads much like Freeman's except in replacing 
"in ooncert" with "helpful" for O'uvcp~pov 
• 
9 
Donkeys would choose sweepings rather 
than gold. 
The translation given here is Guthrie's; Freeman 
~oes not disagree signifioantly, but is not as olose to 
~he literal text of the Greek. 
10 
Joinings: wholes and not-wholes, 
oonnected-separate, consonant-dissonant, 
and from all things one and from one 
all things. 
Freeman translates O'Uvd\jftE<;as "joints"; Guthrie 
does not translate it; "joinings" is based on Liddell-Scott. 
"Wholes and not wholes" is from Guthrie; Freeman puts both 
~erms in the s1ngular although the Greek 1s plural. The 
~ext two phrases are from Freeman; Guthrie doesn't translate 
~hem. The final phrase is for some reason exoluded by Freeman 
~nd is taken from Guthr1e~ 
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11 
Every crawl1ng th1ng~; 1s dr1 ven w1 th 
a blow. 
/ 
Guthr1e does not translate th1s fragment; Freeman 
translates ~P7CE.1'~v as "creature" and v€p.e:1'a, as "dr1ven to 
pasture." 
12 
Exhalat10n • • • those go1ng 1nto the 
same r1ver have d1fferent waters 
flow1ng ever upon them • • • souls are 
exhaled frommmo1st th1ngs. 
The m1ddle statement 1s from Freeman; Guthr1e does 
not acuually translate 1t. The last statement 1s from Guthr1e 
and s1m1lar to Freeman; the f1rst word stands alone 1n the 
fragment and 1s the same as the verb 1n the last part, hence 
the present translat1on. 
13 
Enjoj&ng oneself 1n mud. 
Both Freeman and Guthr1e translate more than 1s accepted 
as genu1ng by D1ehls-Kranz; only the pbbase ~~p~op~, xa(pe:,v 
1s accepted 1n the cr1t1cal corpus. 
14 
N1ght-ramblers, mag1c1ans, bacchants, maenads, 
myst1cs; what are regarded by men as 
myster1es are unholy r1tes. 
Th1s 1s Freeman's translat1on; Guthr1e translates only 
Ithe f1rst part, d1ffer1ng only 1n "mag1" for "mag1c.1ans tt 
~nd "1n1t1ates" for "myst1cs." 
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15 
If it were not in honor of Dionysius 
that they conducted the procession 
and sang the hymn to the male organ, 
their activity would be completely 
shameless. But Hades is the same as 
Dionysius, in whose honor they rave 
and perform the bacchic rites. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ 
significantly. 
16 
How could anyone hide from that which 
never sets? 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's is the same 
except for "escape the notice of" for "hide from." 
17 
Many do not understand such things, 
indeed all who come upon them; they do 
not grasp them after they have learnt; 
but to themselves, they seem' (to 
understand) • 
The first clause is from Guthrie;" the latter two are 
from Freeman. The two translators do not differ significantly 
on this fragment. 
18 
If one does not hope, one will not find 
the unhoped-for, since there is no trail 
to it and no path. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer 
a translation of this fragment. 
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19 
Men who do not know how to listen or 
how to speak. / 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie differs only 
in translating the partioiple as a partioiple instead of as 
a relative olause, but he negleots to indioate the masouline 
plural subjeot whioh is implied. 
20 
When they are born, they wish to 
live and aooept their fate, or rather 
oome to rest; and they leave behind 
ohildren to beoome viotims of fate 
(literally: fates, deaths; 116pouC;; ). 
Guthrie does not translate this fragment; this translation 
differs from Freeman's only in the word "Wish," for Freeman 
translates ~e€AOUC)f. less literally as "are willing." Freeman, 
however, has no translation for llaAAov o~ &vanadEOeal, 
or rather oome to rest." 
21 
What we see when awake is death, 
what we see asleep is sleep. 
This is Guthrie's translation. Freeman supplies an 
unwarranted "all" before eaoh part of the fragment. 
22 
Those who seek gold dig muoh earth 
and find little. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not 
~iffer signifioantly. 
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2) 
They would not know the name of 
justice if these things did not exist. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation, whioh Guthrie follows 
exaotly except for the tense of the verbs; the word "justice" 
has been preferred here to "right" which both Freeman and 
Guthrie employ in order to indicate the relationship between 
the noun b('KT} used here 8.nd the adjective b('Ku\oc; 
used elsewhere (102).5ee footnote )6 of chapter two and comment 
for fragment 28 below. 
24 
Gods and men honor those slain in war. 
This translation is given by both Guthrie and Freeman. 
25 
Greater deaths win greater portions (or: 
rewards: l1o(puc;). 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not 
differ signifioantly, but does not parallel the sentence 
structure of the Greek as olosely; "reward" is Freeman's 
translation of 'jlo(pac;, "fate" of p.6po\. 
26 
In the night, a man kindles a light 
because his sight is quenched; while living, 
he appr~ximates to a dead man during sleep; 
while awake, he approximates to one who 
sleeps. 
This is Freeman's translation based ,on Diehls-Kranz; 
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Guthrie considers the text of the fragment uncertain and 
offers no translation. 
27 
There await men after they are dead 
things which they neither expect nor 
imagine. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not diff~r 
significantly. 
28 
The knowledge of the most famous men 
is but opinion; justice will convict those ..,---
who fabricate and testify to lies. 
This is Guthrie's translation except that "man" has 
been substituted for the plural "men,· following the Greek. 
Freeman agrees with most of this, but translates OOKt~~a~o~ 
as "most wise-seeming"; Liddell-Scott suggests that "most 
famous" is preferable. Guthrie fails to translate the word 
q:lu)..aa'O'Et from the Greek; its subject is OOKtl1c.lS~a~o~ and the 
verb means "preserves." Hence, the following clause should. 
be added after the first clause above: "(the most famous man) 
preserves (what is opinion)." The term "opinion" is plural 
in the Greek; and the word "but" does not appear in the Greek. 
29 
The best men choose one thing rather than 
all else: everlasting fame among mortal 
men; the majority stuff themselves like 
cattle. 
. The first clause is from Freeman; Guthrie does not 
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translate all of it, and is not significantly different; 
Freeman points out that aVTl'rIDv could mean "rather than things 
/ 
mortal," (see footnote 3 of chapter three~. The second clause 
is taken here from Guthrie; Freeman does not differ significantly 
but does not follow the Greek sentence structure as closely. 
30 
This cosmos, the same for all, none of 
the gods and none of men has made, but 
it was ever and is and shall be ever-
living fire, kindled in measure and 
quenched in measure. 
This is Guthrie's translation, which follows the Greek 
vocabulary more closely than Freeman's. The term cosmos has 
been left untranslated here, however (Freeman says "ordered 
universe;fI Guthrie says "world-order fl ); and Freeman's 'measure" 
has been used rather than Guthrie's "measures" in spite of 
the Greek use of the plural, ~{Tpa, as indicating the sense 
of the term better in English. 
31 
The turnings of fire: first, sea; and 
of sea, half is earth and half firey water-
spout. Earth is liquified into sea, and 
has its measure in the same logos as 
existed before it became earth. 
This is Guthrie '.~ translation, except for "earth is 
liquified into sea," which is from Freeman and which Guthrie 
does not translate; Freeman's translation of the rest of the 
fragment is substantially the same as Guthrie's. 
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32 
That which alone is wise is one; 
it is willing and unwilling to go 
by the name of Zeus. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not differ 
significantly, but does not follow the Greek text as closely. 
33 
To obey the will of one is also law. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not differ 
significantly. 
34 
Void of understanding, although they 
have heard, they are like the deaf. 
The proverb bears witness to them: 
"Present yet absent." 
This is Freeman's translation except for the expression 
"void of understanding"; Freeman translates &~\5VE1"Ot as 
"not understanding"; see above on fragment 1 concerning this 
term. Guthrie translates this word "fools."; he translates 
the aorist participle "when they hear"; Freeman seems closer 
to the Greek. 
35 
Men who love wisdom must be inquirers 
into very many things indeed •. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not differ 
" significantly, though he does translate ~tAoa6~ou~ avOpa~ 
as "men who are philosophers." 
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36 
To souls, it is death to become water; 
to water it is death to become earth. 
From earth comes water; from water 
(comes) soul. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation. Guthrie does not differ 
save in supplying a "but" at "from earth'comes"; the Greek 
has a b~ at this juncture, but it also has one in the second 
and fourth clauses which Guthrie does not translate, leading 
to the conclusion that all three are simply connectives, 
with no significant opposition implied. 
37 
Pigs wash themselves in mud, birds (wash 
themselves) in dust or ashes. 
This is Freeman's translation of the Latin text; 
Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment. 
38 
See Appendix III. 
39 
In Priene was born Bias, son of Tautamos, 
whose fame (Bias') is greater than all 
the rest. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ 
significantly. 
40 
Much learning does not teach one to have 
intelligence; for it would have taught 
Hes10d and Pyth~~orast and again . Xenophanes and Hecataeus. 
172 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ 
save in translating v60v as "sense" and the phrase a\Jr(C;/ ortas "or 
again •• t 
41 
That which is wise is one: to know the 
thought (yv~~D ) by which all things are 
steered through all things. 
The first part is from Freeman; Guthrie does not 
offer a translation of it. The second part, from "to know 
• • • 
is Vlastos's translation, which is adopted by Guthrie. Freeman 
translates yvc.Gp.D as "purpose"; it has seemed better to use 
the English term "thought" here, with Vlastos and Guthrie, 
but to supply the Greek as well whenever the term is being 
examined. Freeman's active verb "which steers" reflects the 
Greek verb lKU~{pvD~E more literally; but the passive 
construction of Vlastos carries the weight of the connective 
d~{D as well. This fragment is examined in detail in the third 
section of chapter two of the paper. 
42 
Homer deserves to be flung out of the 
contests and given a beating; and also 
Archilochus. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie seems to take 
the fragment as a paraphrase of Heraclitus. but in any case 
does not differ significantly from Freeman in his translation. 
43 
One should quench arrogance more than"a 
conflagration. 
" 
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This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not 
differ significantly. 
44 
The people should fight for the law as 
if for their city-wall. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation. Guthrie's does not 
differ significantly. 
45 
The limits of the soul would you not 
find though you should travel every 
road: so deep a logos has it. 
Freeman's translation, while much the same, is still 
more clumsy than this one based on Guthrie. Guthrie supplies 
a "wouldst thou" and a "thou shouldst" with it as well, 
attempting to give it the sound of a religious pronouncement, 
which is his interpretation of it. Guthrie fails to translate 
the Greek term l~v explicitly in the first clause, hence 
Freeman says: "you could not in your going find ••• II 
Again logos has not been translated. 
46 
See Appendix III. 
47 
Let us not conjecture at random about 
the greatest things. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ 
significantly. 
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48 
The name of the bow is "life"; but 
its work is death. 
/ 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ 
significantly. 
49 
To me, one man is ten thousand, 
if he is the best. 
This is Freeman's translation with the "to me" moved 
from between "man" and "is" for the sake of olarity; Guthrie's 
translation does not differ significantly. 
49a 
We step and do not step into the 
same rivers, we are and are not. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ 
significantly. 
50 
Listening not to me, but to the 
logos, it is wise to agree that all 
things are one. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not 
differ signifioantly. Again, logos is left untranslated. 
51 
They do not grasp how that which 
differs from itself is in agreement; 
harmony consists of oPPosing tension, 
like that of the bow and the lyre. 
This is Freeman's translation; it is closer to the 
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literal sense of the Greek than Guthrie (and Vlastos). 
52 
Time is a child playing a game of 
draughts; the kingship is a child's. 
/ 
Guthrie questions the translation of al~v as "time," 
saying instead "aeon (time?)." Freeman simply says "time" 
as here; Liddell-Scott indicate al~v as "a space or period of 
time." The rest of this translation is from Guthrie, except 
that he repeats the word "playing." 
53 
War is the father of all and the 
king of all; and some he reveals as 
gods and some as men, some he makes 
slaves, others free. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's is similar, 
except for a "both" bet'ore "father" and the use of "it" 
instead of "he" and the translation of the aorist as "has 
revealed" and "has made." 
54 
The hidden harmony is stronger than that which 
is evident. 
-Freeman and Guthrie both translate cpavepf)<; as "visible"; 
the present translation of the term as "evident" is based upon 
the term's other appearance in the fragments (56); the whole 
question is exa~ined in the fourth section of chapter one 
of the paper. 
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55 
Things of which were is sight, hearing, / 
learning--these are what I prefer. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's differs 
only in supplying a "those" in front of "things" and in 
translating llcfaf}CH C;; as "knowledge" and npo't"tll€(.I)as "honor most. 
An examination of the meaning oflldaf}OtC;; in the fragments will 
be found in the fourth section of chapter one of the paper; 
"honor most" loses the connotation of preference over other 
available choices which is basic to npo't"tll€W. 
56 
Men are deceived in the knowledge of 
things which are evident, ~n the same 
way as Homer, who was wiser than all 
the Greeks; for he too was deceived 
by boys killing lice, who said: "What 
we saw and caught, that we left behind; 
but what we did not see and did not 
catch, that we bring." 
The translation is taken mostly from Freeman, excepting 
the words "caught, left behind, and catch" which are from 
Guthrie, and the first clause which is based on Guthrie's 
,.. 
comments about cpavEp(.l)V meaning "not hidden" and on the evidence 
of the fragments on these matters, which appears in the fourth 
section of chapter one of the paper. 
57 
Most men's teacher is Hesiod--they are 
sure he knew most things, he who did 
not understand night and dayz for they 
are one. 
The first part of the fragment is from Guthrie's 
17'1· 
translation, the second part, from "he who," is from Freeman; 
the two translations do not differ significantly. / 
58 
For ins tance, phys 1c 1e.ns, who cut 
and burn, demand payment of a fee 
though undeserving, s1noe they 
produoe the same. 
This is Freeman's translation of the fragment; Guthrie 
does not offer a translation of it. 
59 
For the fuller's screw, straight and 
crooked, is one and the same. 
Guthrie translates the fragment from a different 
Greek text; this is Freeman's translation. 
60 
The way up and down is one and 
the same. 
This is Freeman's trans lat 1on:j. Guthrie's does not 
differ significantly, but does not follow the Greek sentenoe 
structure as closely. 
61 
Sea-water is the purest and the most 
polluted; for fish it is drinkable, 
and life-giving; for men, not drinkable 
and destructive. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not 
differ significantly. 
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62 
Mortal immortals, immortal mortals, 
living their life and dying their death. / 
The first part here is from Guthrie's translation; 
Freeman supplies oopulas "immortals are mortal, mortals are 
immortal," but the Greek does not have them expressed. 
Guthrie and Freeman both take the two instanoes of 'E(VroV to 
work together as "eaoh ••• others"; this is not a oommon 
usage of lKEivo~ however, whioh is usually simply demonstrative. 
Taking both instanoes of lKE(vroV as simply demonstrative, 
an intelligible fragment results,as presented here and 
explained in seotion three of chapter two of thi~ paper, 
where the oneness of the opposites of life and death is 
examined. 
63 
When he (it?) is there, they arise 
and beoome watohful guardians of the 
living and the dead. 
This is Freeman's translation, excepting the "(it?)"; 
Guthrie translates only from "they arise" on, beoause of 
the unoertain meaning of the Greek EvGa 0' l6v~'. 
64 
The thunder-bolt steers all things. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman translates 
~a 7Ca.v~a as "the universe." 
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65 
Need and satiety. / 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie says "want and 
satiety." 
66 
For fire will come and judge and 
convict all things. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman translates l~eAebv 
according to its participial form "having come upon" but 
has to supply it then with an object not found in the Greek 
"having come upon them." 
67 
The god is day and night, winter 
and summer, war and peace, satiety 
and hunger; but he changes, just as 
fire, when it is mingled with perfumes, 
is named according to the scent of 
each. 
This is Guthrie's translation. The expression "the 
god" has been used to distinguish the Greek phrase from 
eeol, 
"the gods." Guthrie employs the former expression 
on several occaSions as well. Freeman renders 0 eEb~ simply 
e'AA .) "god"; she renders Ka. ' .... OV'IV as "according to each man's 
lKacr-rou 
pleasure, tl which does not seem to agree with the sense of the 
fragment but is certainly legitimate from the literal point 
of view. 
67a 
Just as the spider, standing in the 
middle of his web, senses immediately 
that a fly is disturbing even one fiber 
of his web and runs quickly to the 
place, as if pained by the qutting of 
that thread, so the soul of man, with 
the injury of B.ny part of the body, 
travels to that part quickly as if 
impatient with the injury of the body, 
to which it is joined firmly and in 
measure ... 
/ 
This fragment, whose text is given in Latin in Diehl~­
Kranz, is not translated by either Freeman or Guthrie. It is 
discussed in greater detail in footnote 30 of chapter two of 
this paper. 
68 
See Appendix III. 
69 
See Appendix III. 
70 
See Eppendix III. 
71 
The man who forgets which way the road 
leads. 
This is Freeman's translation. Guthrie does not offer 
a translation of this fragment. 
72 
Though men associate with the logos 
most closely, yet they are separated 
from it; those things which they 
encounter daily seem to them strange. 
The first olause is based on Freeman's translation, which 
reads "the logos: though men assooiate with it mostcl9Sely 
••• ," but is oloser to the sentenoe struoture of the Greek; 
Guthrie does not translate the A6yo.)t -riOiin the first olause, 
but the rest of his translation parallels Freeman's. Guthrie 
does not. translate the seoond olause; the tran·slation here is 
Freeman's. 
73 
We must not aot and speak like men 
asleep. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie renders 06 Oei 
as "it is bad," which goes beyond the basic sense of the 
Greek in suggesting that the statement is explicitly ethical. 
74 
Children of our parents. 
This is Freeman's translation of the two Greek words 
involved; Guthrie translates more than the text acoepted by 
Diehls-Kranz, but his translation of these two words is 
identical with Freeman's. 
75 
Sleepers are workers and oooperators 
in the things happening in the oosmos. 
The first part of this translation is from Guthrie; 
Freeman says muoh the same thing. Guthrie translates the 
latter part as "what goes on in the world," and Freeman as 
"the activities going on"; in view of the discussion of 
182, 
y(yvo~a, in the first section of chapter two in the paper, the 
present translation seems preferable. Guthrie does no~accept 
the fragment as genuine. 
76 
See Appendix III. 
77 
For souls it is enjoyment, or rather death, 
to become wet. We live their death, 
and they live our death. 
The first sentence is from Guthrie, excepting the phrase 
"or rather death," which Guthrie does not translate and which 
is taken here from Freeman; the seeond sentence is not 
translated by Guthrie and is also from Freeman. 
78 
Human nature has no power of under-
standing; but divine (nature) has. 
This is Freeman's translation, with the "it" after 
"has" left out; Guthrie's translation is identical, save in 
its translation of yvc.6p.ac; as "insight." This word is 
discussed several times in the paper; see yv~~~ in the index. 
79 
Man is called childish compared with 
a daimon, as a child compared with 
a man. 
This is Freeman's translation except for ~aic;, which she 
renders "boy" instead of "child"; the latter is from Guthrie, 
who translates 7t'pbc; as "1n the eyes of." Both,authors 
183. 
transla.te Oa(llovoc;, Freeman as "divinity" and Guthrie as 
"god"; but the meaning of the term is unclear and not rJsolved 
by the context or the fragment's relationships with the rest 
of the fragments. 
80 
One must know that war is common, 
and justice (is) strife and that 
all things come about by way of 
strife and necessity. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not differ 
significantly; nether inserts "(is)" in the same clause as is 
done here for the sake of clarity. 
81 
The prince of cheats, Pythagoras. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's does not 
differ singificantly, although she does translate &pX~y6C; as 
"original chief." 
82 
See Appendix III. 
83 
See Appendix III.' 
84a 
In changing, it is at rest. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman interprets the 
fragment considerably when she says "it rests from .change." 
184. 
84b 
It is weariness to toil and obey for 
the same (men?). 
/ 
Freeman's translation is identical to this save in 
supplying an article before :!'l.ea.~in~ss which does not appear 
in the Greek and placing "for the same" after "weariness"; she 
interprets "same" to refer to the elements of the human 
body. Guthrie does not translate the fragment, but does 
suggest that "the same" may refer to the indirect object of 
"toil and obey"; the present translation follows Guthrie's 
suggestion. 
85 
To fight desire is hard: whatever 
it wishes it buys at the price of 
soul. 
This is Guthrie's translation; Freeman's is not 
significantly different save in her supplying a "the" before 
"soul" which is not present in the Greek text. 
86 
Escapes recognition through unbelief. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie translates more 
than Diehls-Kranz accept as genuine, but his translation of 
the four Greek words concerned is not significantly different. 
87 
A foolish man is apt to be in a flutter 
at every word. 
185. 
This translation is Freeman' s; Guthrie renders A6yoa 
as "rumor, report" in this fragment. 
88 
The same thing in us is living and 
dead, and waking and sleeping, 
and young and old; for these things 
when they have changed are those, 
and those when they have changed back 
again are these. 
/ 
This is Guthrie's translation except for a "the" which 
he has inserted before "waking" and "sleeping" and except for 
naA,vwhich Guthrie does not translate but which is here 
rendered as "back again." Freeman's translation confirms 
these changes in Guthrie's and does not differ significantly, 
but is not as close to the literal Greek text as the major 
part of Guthrie. 
89 
To those who are awake there is 
one common cosmos. A private one. 
This translation is based on Freeman's translation; she, 
however, translates more than is accepted as genuine by 
Diehls-Kranz; she also translates cosmos as "ordered universe." 
The final phrase is from Guthrie's translation, which also 
includes texts not accepted as genuine. 
90 
There is an exchange: all things for fire 
and fire for all things, like goods for 
gold and gold for goods. 
This .. :'is Freeman's translation; Guthrie renders the first 
186. 
part as "All things are an exchange for fire and fire and 
fire for all things," whose sense is basically the sam~ the 
two authors do not differ significantly on the rest of the 
fragment. 
91 • 
For it is not possible to step into 
the same river twice. They scatter 
and combine again • • • and approach 
and separate. 
This is Freeman's translation except that the "twice" 
and "again" have been moved from positions before their 
respective verbs; Guthrie does not differ significantly save 
in his translation of the four plural verbs as s1ngular w1th 
"1t" as the subject. 
92 
The sibyl, with raving mouth, uttering her 
unlaughing, unadorned, unincensed words 
under the inspiration of the god. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer 
a translation of this fragment; Freeman also adds a translation 
of texts not accepted as genuine by Diehls-Kranz. 
93 
The lord, whose oracle is at Delphi, 
neither speaks nor conceals, but 
indicates. 
This is Freeman~ translat10n; Guthrie's translation 
does not d1ffer s1gn1ftcantly. 
187· 
94 
The sun will not transgress his 
measures; otherwise the Furies, the 
ministers of justice, will find him 
out. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not 
differ significantly. 
" , 
95 
It is better to hide ignorance. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not of~er 
a translation of this fragment. 
96 
Corpses are more worthy to be thrown 
out than dung. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation 
does not differ significantly. 
97 
Dogs bark at those whom they do not 
recognize. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation 
is not significantly different, and does not follow the 
literal sense of the Greek text as closely. 
98 
Souls have the sense of smell in 
Hades. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie says "smell (i.e • 
.,. -
the use of the sense of smell)" for oO\lvwv't'a t, but the rest 
188 
of h1s translat10n 1s 1dent1cal w1th Freeman's. 
99 
If there were no sun, so far as 
depended upon the other stars, 1t 
would be n1ght. 
Th1s 1s Freeman's translat10n; Guthr1e renders 
/ 
II 
EVE'Ka 
as "w1th" rather than "so far as depended on"; the latter· 
expresses the same not10n more fully 1n Eng11sh. 
100 
The hours that bring all th1ngs. 
Th1s 1s Freeman's translat10n; Freeman inserts "seasons" 
in parentheses after "hours. tt '-I Guthr1e r.enders the word wr<S 
as:i!~Is.easons," and translates cp{pOUCH as "produces." 
101 
I searched ~yself. 
Th1s is Guthrie's translation; Freeman renders the 
fragment "I searched 1nto myself," which does not follow the 
literal Greek text quite as closely. 
lOla 
Eyes are more exact w1tness than ears. 
Th1s 1s Freeman's trans;lation, except that the article 
"the" before "eyes" and "ears" has been dropped as in Guthr1e, 
who does not differ s1gn1ficantly. 
1 ". 
' .. 
189. 
102 
To the god all things are beautiful 
and good and just; but men have 
assumed some things to be unjust, 
others just. 
This is Freeman's translation except that the 
/ 
between "beautiful" and "good" has also been translated as 
"and" and the phrase 1'05\ e Em\ has been translated as "the 
god" to distinguish it, as is done· in the text of the paper, 
from "the gods." Guthrie does not differ significantly. 
103 
Beginning and end are common in the 
circumference of a circle. 
This is Freeman's translation of the fragment, eXdept 
that I;uvbv is rendered here as "common," as. it is through-
out the paper; Guthrie translates the word as "common" in 
this fragment; Freeman translates it as "general," as she 
does in a few other places. Guthrie does not translate the 
whole fragment, but does not differ significantly in what he 
does translate. 
104 
What intelligence or understanding have 
they? They put their trust in popular 
bards and take the mob for their 
teacher, not knowing that "the majority 
are bad and the good are few." 
The first sentence is from Freeman; the rest is from 
Guthrie. The two authors do not d1ffer significantly. 
190. 
105 
Homer was an astrologer. / 
Th1s 1s Freeman's translat1on; Guthr1e does not offer 
a translat10n of this fragment. 
106 
Hes10d was unaware that the nature 
of every day 1s one. 
This 1s Freeman's translation; Guthr1e does not offer 
a translation of this fragment. 
107 
Eyes and ears of those hav1ng 
barbarous souls are bad w1tnesses. 
Th1s 1s Freeman's translat10n exoept that the art101e 
"the" has been dropped from 1n front of "eyes"; Guthr1e 
interprets the 11teral express10n "those hav1ng barbarous 
, 
souls" as "men if they have souls that understand not the 
language." 
108 
None of those whose d1soourse I have 
heard arr1ves at the realizat10n that 
what 1s w1se 1s set apart f~om all 
th1ngs. 
Th1s 1s Freeman's translat10n exoept that the "none" has 
been removed from after "heard" and piaoed at the head of 
the sentenoe and that O'ocp6v is rendered here as "what 1s wise" 
rather than "that wh10h 1s w1se," wh10h 1s reserved 1n these 
pages for the Greek phrase ~b O'o~6v. Guthr1e's translat10n 
191. 
does not differ exoept in rendering the last phrase "separate 
from all things." 
109 
See Appendix III. 
110 
It is not better for men that 
whatever they wish come to pass. 
/ 
The first part of this translation appears in both 
Freeman and Guthrie; Freeman ends the fragment "to obtain 
all that they wish" and Guthrie ttto get all they want"; the 
literal Greek text, however, reads "that whatever they wish 
oome to pass," employing a form of y(yvop.a~ whioh should 
appear in the translation. 
111 
Siokness makes health pleasant and 
good, hunger (does-;so to) satisfaction, 
weariness (does so to) rest. 
This is Freeman's translation of the fragment, except 
that two parenthetical additions have been made for the sake 
of clarity; Guthrie's translation does not differ significantly. 
112 
Wisdom is to speak the truth and to 
act according to nature, paying heed 
(being aware). 
This is Freeman's translation, with the addition of the 
second translation of l~arOvTas noted here in parentheses. 
Guthrie does not offer a translation of this fragment. 
192 
113 
,The thinking facult~ is common to all. / 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer 
a translation of this fragment. 
114 
If we speak with intelligence, we must 
base our strength on that which is common 
to all, as the city on the law and even 
more strongly; for all human laws. are 
nourished by one which is divine; for it governs 
as far as it will and is sufficient for all 
and more than enough. 
This is Freeman's translation of this fragment; Guthrie 
does not differ significantly, save in linking the last 
clause to what precedes as a relative clause modifying the 
"one which is divine." 
115 
The logos of the saul is increasing itself. 
This translation is based on Guthrie's comment about 
the fragment; Freeman's translation does not differ significantly 
116 
All men have the capacity of knowing 
themselves and acting with moderation. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer 
a translation of this fragment. 
193. 
117 
A man, when he gets drunk, is led 
stumbling along by an immature boy, 
not being aware where he is going, 
having his soul wet. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ 
significantly, although he does translate the final part~cipial 
phrase "for his soul is wet." 
118 
A dry soul is wisest and best. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation is 
identioal. 
119 
For man, nature is ~aimon. 
Freeman translates ~aoc; as "oharaoter," Guthrie as 
"individuality." "Nature"1s employed here si~ply to ind10ate 
that the same term is being used here as was used in fragment 
78; Freeman translates ba(p.mvas "destiny," Guthrie simply 
transliterates it as here. 
120 
The limits of morning and evening are 
the Bear and, opposite the Bear, the 
boundary-mark of Zeus god of the olear 
sky. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer 
a translation of this fragment. 
194. 
121 
The Ephesians would do well to hang 
themselves, every adult man, and bequeath 
their city-state to adolescents, since 
they have expelled Hermodorus, the 
most valuable man among them, saying: 
"Let us not have even one valuable man; 
but if we do, let him go elsewhere and 
live among others." 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie does not offer 
a translation of this fragment. 
122 
., 
See Appendix III. 
123 
Nature likes to hide. 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's does not differ 
significantly, although he translates the infinitive Kp~~~Eaaa, 
as "concealment." 
124 
A dust heap piled up at random is 
the most beautiful cosmos. 
This is based on Freeman's translation; she translates 
, however, as "universe" and lttlA»O'~~.:as "fairest"; 
the terms used here are used throughout these pages; Freeman 
also inverts the word order from the Greek text, which is 
restored in this translation. Guthrie offers no translation 
of this fragment. 
195. 
125 
See Appendix III. 
125a 
See Appendix III. 
126 
Cold things grow hot, hot things grow 
cold; the wet dries, the parched is 
moistened. 
/ 
This is Freeman's translation; Guthrie's translation 
does not differ significantly. 
/ 
APPENDIX III 
In this appendix those fragments will be examined 
briefly wh1oh, for one reason or another, have not been part 
of the foundational synthesis presented in this paper. These 
fragments all appear within the corpus of fragments of 
Heraclitus to be fo"nd in the sixth and subsequent editions 
of D1ehls-Kranz; but, for various reasons, they have not 
been able to be significantly related to the terms and themes 
of the synthesis of Heracl1tus's thought ,presented here. 
Breadth of a human foot. 
This fragment is so short that, on the basis of internal 
evidence from the fragments themselves, little can be said of 
it. Secondary sources suggest that it is intended to indicate-
the size of the sun, but this is not substantiated anywhere 
in the fragments. 
38 
The first to study astronomy. 
, 
This fragment is also so short that little can be said 
of it from the fragments themselves. D10genes says that 
Thales is being referred to, but there is no"-: evidence in the 
fragments to verify this. 
196 
197. 
46 
Oiasis,the sacred disease." / 
This fragment is also too short, and the meaning of the 
first word variously interpreted as blindness (Guthrie and 
others), conceit (Freeman), and so on. It does not relate 
to any of the fragments or themes examined, except perhaps.to 
seeing, provided thato61."'!fa1.v means "blindness." 
68 
Remedies. 
This one word is not repeated and does not relate to 
any of the themes examined in the synthes'is in these pages. 
69 
Diehls-Kranz do not accept any part of this fragment 
as actually genuine. 
70 
Children's games. 
This fragment is too short to be significantly related 
to any other term or theme in the fragments, except perhaps 
the reference to time's being a child playing draughts (fragment 
52), or the description of men as childish when compared with 
a daimon (fragment 79). 
76 
Diehls-Kranz do not accept any part of this fragment 
as genuine. 
198-
82 
/ Diehls-Kranz do not accept any part of this fragment 
as actually genuine. 
83 
Diehls-Kranz do not aooept any part 01' this fragment 
as actually genuine. 
109 
This fragment is simply an exact copy of fragment 95. 
122 
Approximation. 
This word does not show any significant relationships 
with any other:"1Brm or theme in the fragments. 
125 
The kykeon also separates if it is 
not stirred. 
This fragment speaks about a drink made with wine and 
grated-cheese or barley meal; it has been taken as a figure for 
various themes to be found in the fragments, but no clear and 
significant relationship between it and other terms and themes 
is in the fragments. 
125a 
May wealth not fail you, men of Ephesus, 
so that you may be convlcted of your wickedness." 
Although it is possible that Heraclitus wishes ill upon 
199. 
the Ephesians because of Hermodorus (see fragment 125), there 
is no mention of Hermodorus in this fragment. Heraclitus 
/ 
himself was an Ephesian; and that fact may be related to 
this fragment. In any case, the fragment bears no important 
content related to the terms and themes of the foundational 
synthesis of these pages. 
/ 
INPEX 
The follow~ng index consists of three ~artsl a 
concordinance of the Greek terms to be found in the fragments 
accepted as genuine by Diehls-Kranz1 an index to the major 
themes treated in this paperr and an index to the fragments 
examined in this paper. With this index, the reader will be 
able to trace any fragment and any major theme through all its 
appearances in this paper, and will be able to follow any Greek 
term through all its appearances in the fragments. In this way, 
it is hoped, the reader will be able to grasp in more complete 
detail the fundamental, exhaustive work of analysis which had 
to precede the foundational synthesis presented here, and will 
be able to reconstruct more accurately and verify for himself 
the collating and interrelating of materials whic~.has gone\into 
each part of the synthesis. 
Concordinance of Greek Terms 
-
Every term which appears more than once will be found herer 
" " ~ the only exceptions are persons· proper names and the article O,~,~y. 
Certain terms which appear only once but are built upon the same 
stems are also recorded here. If a term is missing. from this 
concordinance, it appears only once in the corpus of fragments. 
&fa66c; 102, 104, 111. 
dP.E (V(J.)V 95, 110.] 
ap , 01"0 C; 29, ·49, 11 8. ] 
clE{ 1, ·30. 
~ &Et{h(J.)OC; 30.] o.~vaoc; ?2.] aic[)v 5?j 
A?b~C; 15, 98. 
clK(~IJ(J.) 1 ,12, 34,.9:>, 79, 108. 
aKo11' S5.J 
" alloc;· " 5, 39, 99 l 121 • . (a)..)..a 30" '30~ 93. 
(0.)..)..0\6<» 67.J 
201 . 
o.v S, 71' 9, 15, 16, 23, 40, 
45, 97, 99. 
ava1Cauw 20, 84ao 
[&va1Caucrt~ 111.J 
&vrfp 3'5,79,117,121. 
o.vep(l.)1(O~ 1, 5, 14, 24, 26, 
27, 30, 53, 56, 61, 87, 
1 0'2, 1 1 0, 1 1 6. 
[&Vep~1CEIO~ 3, 78, 114, 119.0 
av-r( 29. 
[&v-ra~o(f311 90 .• J 
[&v-r(eoo~ 8.J 
[ &. v-r ( 0 ~ 1 20. J 
aetO~ 42, 58, 1210 
'f!' 34 a,UVE-ro~ 1, • 
&.1C6 12. 
[ II J a1CE qu 57, 91. 
&.1COcrf3{vvu~, 26 j 3 • [crf3{VVU~t 43. 
O,1C-rW 26, 30. . 
. [cruva\lrt ~ 1 D. J 
ap~ov(a 8, 51, 54. 
&,cr-rPOAOY{W 380 
[&cr-rpoA6yo~ 105.J 
(30) 118. 
[aua (vw 126. J 
a6-r6~ 5, 12, 15, 17, 23, 26, 
30, 31, 34, 490., '51, S5, 56, 
57, 58, 59, 60, 72, 84f3, 88, 
91, 104, 108, 115, 116, 121. 
f3acr tAE U ~ 53. 
[f3acrtAl1?l1 52.J 
f3'(0~ 48, 62. 
yap 1, 14, 1 5, 17, 22, 25, ~ 
28, 29, 40, '56, 57, 78, 85, . e 
88, 90, 94, 95, 97, lOla, 
103, 104, 114. 
y(y~o~at 1, 7, 2 0, 31, 36, 39, 
56,57,63,75, 80j 97,110. L1CEPty(yvo~at 114. / . 
Y t YVc.6crK(O 5, 17, 28, 86, 1 08, 116. 
[. yvc.6P.l1 41, 78.] 
[yvc.6crtC; 56.J 
[Otaytyvc.6ol(W 7.] 
oa(p.wv 79, 119. 
o { 1, ?, 5, 1 2, 17, 2 , 21, 26, 
31, 36, 53, 56, 57, 61, .64, 67, 
73, 78, 80, 94, 102, 104, 121. 
o~p.o~ 43, 104. 
ota41, 92. 
o tat p {w 1. 
[al p {W 9, 29.] 
OtOacrKw 4 • 
[OtOacrKaAoc; 57, 104.] 
o(~l1p.a' 22,1010 
O(Kl1 23,28,80,94, 112. 
[o(l(a,o~ 1 2.] 
OOK{W 5, 17,27,28. 
~re(pw 1, 21j 26, 88, 89. 
L lYEp-r( 63. 
lYKUP €w 17, 720 
lI~ 1.to 49, 5 , 55, 10 1 • ~P.Et~ 121.] 
l1~{-rEPOC; 770] 
E l 5, 7, 1'5, 23, 9 4 , 121. 
[lay 18, 49.] 
" 56, 97, 8 104, EIOW 23, , 
121. 
ElK~ 47, 124. 
115, 
" EqU 
;0, 
53, 
91 , 
1,2,5,6,7,18,21,23, 
31, 35, 49, 49 a , 5 0;, 52 , 
57, 59, 63, 8 , 84f3, 88, 
93 , 99, 1 Ql6 , 11 30 
Et7l0Y 19, 56. 
[£TCO<; 1. l 
, 
Et<; 5,31, 108, 121. 
" ( I, Et<;, p. a, EY 10, 
49, 50" 57, 59, 
114. 
[P.~OE(<; 58.] 
[ouoe(<; 108.] 
iK 8, 10, 36, 42. 
" cATCOO 18, 27. 
[avEATC{o'-rO<; 18.) 
" EKacr-ro<; 1, 67. 
29, 32, 33,' 
60, 89, 106, 
l~~a(yoo 5, 12, 49a, 91~ 
L ~a 1. voo 11 7. J 
lv 26,39,75,88,93. 
l~EUp(crKOO 18, 45, 94. 
[avE~Eup~-ra-ro<; 18.J 
" EOt Ka 1, 34. 
J '( ETCa 00 1 1 ? , 1 1 7. 
eTC( 87, 1°3. 
lTC{cr-rallat 19, 41, 57. 
, I' ETCollat 2, 15. 
EPloV 1, 48. 
[ 
Epya!,ap.a 1. 58.] 
lpya-rT')<; 75~] 
cruvEpy6<; 75.] 
EUOOO 1, ?1, 26. 
[KaeEUOOO 73, 75, 88.] 
E~~p6yT'} 26, 67, 99. 
202 
E XOO 1, 2, 20, 45, 78 , 1 07, 1: 'I' • 
117. . 
Z£u<; '2, 120·. 
t~ 2, 20, 26, 62, 63, 77, 88. 
" T'} 1, 9, 31, 39, 43. 
t)oov11' 67. 
[~OuC; 111.] / 
~eoc; 7~, 119. 
~ll{pa 6, 57, 67, 72, 106. 
eaAaO'cra 31, 61. 
eava-roc; 21, 36, 48, 62, 7J. 
e {AOO 85, 11 0. [le{AW 20, 32, 114.] 
eE6C;_5', 24, 30, 53, 67, 92, 102. 
[eE\OC; 78, 114. j 
e EPW 126. 
[eEpp.6<; 126.U 
[e£p6c; 67.] 
, ev1crKOO 26, 62, 88. 
[aTCoev11'crKOO 27.] 
ev~-r6c; 29, 62. 
[aeava-roc; 62.] 
e U1J.O C; 85. 
, [avaeUll\aoo 12.] 
" \ o~oC; 2, 89. 
Ka ( 1, 5, 10, 1 2, 15, 18, 20, 
22, 24, 28, 30, 33, 40, 49a, 
51, 53, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 
73, 75, 77, 80, 84~, 88, 89, 
,90,91,.92,102,104,111,112, 
114, 116, 118, 120, 121. 
KaK6C; 104', 107. 
KaA6C; 102. 
[KUAA\C1-rOC; 8, 124.] 
Kap.a-roc; 84f3, 111. 
" 
Ka-ru 1, 14,67,72, SQ, 98,112. 
Ka-raAE (TCOO 20, 66, 121. 
[&TCOAE(TCOO 56.] . 
[eTC\AE(TCOO 125a.] 
KEtv6~ 56, 62, 77, 88. 
K6po~ 61), 67, 111. 
K6o'p,0~ », 75, 124. 
XPUTCTW 93, 95,1230 
Aavecfvw 1, 16. 
[lrctAavedvw 1,71.] 
Atyw 32, 73, 112, 114. 
A,p.6~ 67, 111. 
A6yo~ 1, 2, 39, 45, 5>, 72, 
87, 108, 115. 
p.a{vop.at 5,15,92. 
p,cie£w 17. 
[&l1ae {If 95. a 
[ lldel1 crt ~ 55.] 
[TCoAullae {'q 40.] 
p.cfAa 3'5. 
[llaA{oTa 72.] 
llcfllov 9, 20, 430 
p.apTUp tw 34. 
[llapTu~ 28, lOla, 10H.] 
P.{ytOTO~ 47 j 112. [llEtwv ?'5. 
llE v 31, 53, 61, 78, 1 Q-2. 
P.ETd 121 0 
f llC:Ta~allw 84a.J llC:Tarc{nTw 88.] ~{T£tllt 116.] 
l1{TpOV 30, 94. 
[l1ETpEW 31.]. 
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P.D-.J5,-16, .. 1-S, 23, 47, 86, 94, 
I 9 r{ , -99, 1 21, 125, 125a. 
?~P~~1~20~'25", '~J' 
:. '. .... ~'.,'._ J ... ) ~' ;", ; j ,-,. 
v'€oc; 6,88.· .. , 0(', 
~ . -, . 'I:;. t ,.. ,. ~ .: f. : 
v6110~ 33, 44';1'" 114. 
[vop,{tw 114.] 
v60~ 40, 104, 114. 
~&YVO{W lQ6~ 
i : / 
~uv6~ 2, 80, 103, 113, 114. 
(Kotv6~ 890] 
II 
ooe 1, 30, 88. 
,-
606~ 45, 59, 60. 
, .... 
OXOtOC;; 1, 5, 31 • 
. 
ox60'0~ 1, 17, 21, 108, 110, 114. 
fox6Tav 117.] 
orc6-rctV 67.] 
oxmc;; 1, 51. 
OKwOrcEP 1, 19, 44, 51, 67,79, 
"90, 114. 
5AtyOC;; 22, 1 4. 
01:!'tAl'W 72. 
"LOlltAO~ 104.] 
OllOAOY{W 50, 51 0 
5vop,a::'?3, 3?, 48. 
(6vollCltw 67. il 
II 6 OOo~ 55, 5 , 71. 
II 001t~ 5, 57, 121. 
"[OTEl1 41.J 
OTEW\ 15.] 
0 .. rt 104, 108.] 
c ". .... i t~" '1 t~, i ( , ... 
ou 5, 10, 17, 18, 19,23,27,32, 
39, 40, 45, 49a, 50, 51, 57, 73, 
78, 91, 93, 94, 1 4, 110, 117. 
OOOE 5,17,19,27. 
03c;; 101 a, 1070 
" 6 OUTE 30, 5 , 93. 
6cpecfAp,0~ 101 a, 107. 
o*\~ 26, 55. 
~ais 20, 52, 56, 73, 79, 117. 
~a:AlV 88, 91. 
[~aA(VT'pO~OS 51.J 
.... 
~as 1 , 7, 10, 1 1 , 29, 30, 
41), 50, 53, 56, 64, 
90, 100, 102, 
114, 121. 
Tl'E (ew 33, 104. 
Tl'E 'i pap 45. 
[1C€pas 1 Q3. J 
1CE (pw 1. 
[ aTl' E t po S 1. ] 
~REicrT'6S 57. 
[ ~A E (WV 39. J 
106, 
80, 
108, 
41~ 
87, 
113, 
204 . 
crw~pOV€w 112, 116. 
T'E 20, 40, 49a, 56. 
T'ts /5, 16, 300 
' . /:> .. !; 
T'(S 104. 
.... 
T'OlOUT'OS 1 , 17. 
T'6~ov 48, 51. 
T'P 01C11 31. 
[Tl'aA(VT'p01COS 51.] 
/ 
~OtEoo 1, 5, 3 , 53, 73, 
112. 
~yp6S 12, 117, 126. 
U brup 1 2, 36, 01. 
~1C€p 44. 
[~1CEPl3a(vw 94.] 
111,'11". 
~6AE~OS 53, 67, 80. 
~6A t S 1 1 4 , 1 21 • 
~oll6S 2, 17, 22, :29, 35, 1 g4. 
~6T'a~6s 12, 49a, 900 
1Cp6s 56, 79. 
[~p6crEt?t 91. ] 
1Cp6creEV 1, 31. 
Tl'POT' t l1€W 55. 
[T'tl1€W 24.J 
~pwT'6S 1, 31, 38. 
Tl'Gp 30, 31, 66, 67, 90. 
[rrupKa?a 45.J 
cro~6s 32, 50, 108. 
~ ~tA6crOCPOS 25. ] crOCP(l1 112. J crO~6T'EPOS 56.] cro~c.6T'aT'OS118.J 
auvcfyw 9 to" 
'·[&yW;"'71, 11 i; ] 
~1C6 114, 117. 
~a(vw 72. 
[&~avl1s 54.] 
[~avEp6s 54, 56.] 
~€pw 56, 1 000 
~tAEW 87, 123. 
~Pa:bW 1. 
[lTl't~Pa:boo 5.J 
~pov€w 17, 113. 
[~p6vl1crtS 2.J 
~ucrt S 1, 1 06, 112, 1230 
xpl1 35, 43, 44, 8 , 114. 
[Xp Ec.6V 800] 
Xpucr6s 9, 22, 90. 
wuxl1 12, 36, 45, 77, 85, 98, 
107,115,117,118. 
alcr'IEP 73, 1240 
.. [ooS 2. J 
(4)O'T'E ,1 8.] 
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Index 2! Themes 
/ The major themes treated in this paper are indexed here 
according to the pages of this paper on which they are treated. 
The reader is also referred to the table of contents, where the 
j 
extended treatments of the most important themes hQ~a1ready been 
indicated in the divisions of the paper. Many additional .sub-
sidiary themes have adtSD been i~tr1.eated of c;ourser the reader will 
find many of them by using the concordinance of Greek terms 
together with the index of fragments used in this paper which 
will follow. The numbers here indicate pages of this paper. 
all things passim 
asleep-awake 17, 35, 37, 53n, 
64, 66, 68, 68n, 74, 86, 88, 
89, 120, 122, 123n, 129, 132. 
awareness :14n, 17, 27, 28, 47, ,':;:'/ 
47n, 48, 56, 72, 120, 126, 
12 8n , 130 , 1 ~On , 131 , 134, ".' 
138. 
beauty 58, 73, 85, 90, 93, 
95, 96, 100, 116, 117, 118, 
119. 
coming-to-be (turnings, change, 
over and back, exchange) 22, 
29-30, 34, 38, 49, 52-56, 62, 
69, 73, 74, 75, 76-79, 81, 
82-84, 86, 87, 90, 91-94, 96, 
98n, 101, 102-120, 121, 122, 
130, 132, 133, 134n, 135, 136. 
common 14, 17, 22, 25, 26, 28, 
30, 31, 32, 38, 41-42, 59,·, 
60, 61, 63, 64, 64n, 66, 
67-71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 81, 
89n, 90, 91, 92, 94, 100, 
101, 107, 108, 109, 113, 114, 
118, 119, 122, 124. 
cosmos 15n, 17, 64, 66, 68, 
68n, 69, 71, 72-75, 76-79, 
88, 90, 94, 117, 117n, 118, 
119, 135, 136. 
day-night 1'5, 31, 32, 33, 64, 
71, 86, 95, 98n, 108, 122, 
125. 
death 53, 56, 82, 84, 86, 88, 
89, 89n, 112, 121, 125, 128, 
128n, 130, 132-135, 138. 
desire (wish, will) 24, 25, 26, 
60, 65, 65n, 97, 99, 129, 130, 
138. 
divine (the god, gods) 14n, i",,, 
15n, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 35, 
58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 65n, 76, 
86, 91, 94, 95-102, 103, 104n, 
113, 116, 117, 121, 127, 128, 
135-139. 
doing~aking) 17, 24, 27-28, 
72, 76, 94, 99, 112, 122,123, 
123n, 124, 125-129, 130, 131, 
134, 135, 138. 
enjoyment (delight) 82, 84, 
128, 128n, 130, 131. 
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ethical life 21n, 24, 27, 28, ~,\ 
35, 47, 80, 88n,;. 99, 112, 
114n, 121, 124, 125T 129, 130, 
131, 134, 138. 
fire 57, 62, 63, 66, 69, 73,' 
75, 76-84, 86, 90, 95, 96, ·.C';~I 
98n, 99, 102, 110, 112, 115n, 
132, 133, 133n, 134, 134n. 
genuine knowing 11-50 passim: 
59-60, 63, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 
73, 74, 90, 90n, 99, 101, 102, 
104n, 105, 108, 110, Ill, 112, 
113, 114, 114n, 115, 115n, 
119, 120, 121, 122-125, 126, 
128n, 129, 130n, 131, 137, 
138, 139. 
good (better, best) 27/,,5a;·~5.,9, 63, 
87, 95, 96, 116, 124, 125, 126, 
127-129, 130, 135, 138. 
governing (jurisdiction) 25, 
26, 28, 39, 41, 54n, 58, 59, 
60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 
73, 74, 80, 81, 94, .95, 97, 
98, 98n, 101, 103-106, 106n, 
113-119, 135. 
. harmony (tension of opposites, 
coming together) IS, 17n, 24, 
26, 31, 32, 34, 39, 56, 57, 
58, 62, 64, 64n, 66, 70n, 73, 
75, 80, 84-94, 96, 98n, 100, 
101, 102-120, 122, 126, 130n, 
135, 137, 138. 
hearing 17n, 20, 21, 32, 37, 
44, 45-45, 48, 49, 106, 108, 
Ill, 123, 124, 129. 
Heraclitus himself 17, I8, 
20-21, 27, 28, 37-38, 42-44, 
45-46, 48, 67, 71, 99, 108, 
124, 128, 129. 
hidden 14, 33-34, 35, 45n, 
47-48, 72, 83, 90n, Ill, 123. 
justice 14n, 22, 22n, 36n, 39n, 
58, 62, 74, 79n, 85, 95, 96, 
100~ 109n, 113, 115-119, 127. 
law 60, 61, 61n, 63, 64, 65, 
94, 100, 101, 127, 137. 
/ logos 15n, 21, 29, 30, 3~, 33, 
34-36, 37, 46, 67, 68, 69, 73, 
76-79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 90, 93, 
94, 98n, 102, lOS, 106-113, 
114, 115n, 118, 119, 124, 133. 
man 15-20, 21, 23, 23n, 26, 
27-28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 
43, 44, 47-48, 50, 56~ 58, 
59, 60, 61, 67, 68, 70, 71, 
73, 76, 86, '89, 89n, 94, 95, 
96, 97, 97n, 98n, 99, 100, 
101, 103, 108, 113, 144n, 
120, 121-139. 
measure 33, 34, 34n, 69, 73, 
76-79, 80, 83, 84, 93, 98n, 
102, 109, 109n, Ill, 112, 
115n, 117n. 
mystery rites and religion 35, 
49, 80, 96, 96n, 101, 121, 133, 
133n, 134, 135-139. 
nature 20, 27, 31, 33, 37\, 
39, 47, 64, 6~n, 71-72, 74, 
98n, 122, 126, 131, 135, 138 • 
near-at-hand 15, 31, 32, 33, 67, 
69, 108, 122, 125, 129. 
necessity 22, 38, 60, 64, 67, 
73, 74, 94, 100, 113, 114-115, 
117, 124, 127. 
not-knowing 13-19, 29-36, 40-42, 
44-45, 45n, 47-48, 63, 67, 68, 
69, 70, 83, 84, 89, 90, 90n, 
93, 96, 105, 107, 107n, 108, 
Ill, 115n, 120, 121, 122-125, 
128n, 129, 135, 136, 138. 
one 17, 24, 25, 26, 2~, 28, 30, 
33, 37, 39, 41-42, 46, 58-120 
passim, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 
127, 128, 133, 135, 136, 138, 
139. 
own (proper, private) 14, 17, 
37, 67, 68n, 108, 120, 123, 
124, 219. 
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strife 22, 38, 62, 69, 73, 74, 
90, 94, 105, 113, 114, 115-119. 
perception and ordinary exper-
ience 21, 32, 37, 41, 42-50, 
122, 124, 126, 131, 134. 
time 32, 33, 34, 46~ 73, 76-79, 
14n, 16, 18-19, >:~'~~~()~l81, 84, 95, 107, 107n, 108, 
47, 71, 124, .::'.~~t" 109, 110, 122, 125, 128, 130, 
predecessors 13, 
27, 28, 31, 44, 
127, 128n, 129. 
river 89 
seem 14, 15, 19n, 30, 32, 34, 
35, 47, 107, 108, 123, 124, 
134. 
separation (opposition) 15, 
17n, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 
41, 56, 64, 76, 84-94, 96, 97, 
98, 98n, 99, 101, 104n, 108, 
113-119,,122, 326, 130n. 
sight 21, 37, 44, 47, 48, 49, 
63. 
smell 49, 57, 133n, 136. 
soul 26, 27, 33, 44, 49, 
82-84, 86, 89n, 98n, 106, 
109n, 111, 112, 121, 125, 
128n, 130-135, 136. 
speaking 22, 24, 27, 44, 47, 
72, 96n, 99, 106, 111, 123, 
123n, 126, 131, 135. 
132. 
war 22, 38, 59, 62, 69, 90, 94, 
95, 105, 113~114, 118, 119, 
135, 136. 
water (wet) 27, 76-79, 81, 
82-83~ 84, 87, 89, 109, 128n, 
130, 131, 132, 134n, 138. 
wisdom (wise) 20, 21, 22, 23-28, 
29, "35, 37r" 38, 39-40, 46, 47, 
48, 58, 61, 62, 65n, 66, 67, 
72, 74, 97, 97n, 98, 99, 100, 
101, 104n, 108, 123, 125, 126, 
130, 131, 134, liS, 137, 138, 
139. 
Index of Fragments 
The fragments of Heraclitus acc~pted as genuine by 
Diehls-Kranz are indexed here, as numbered by Diehls-Kranz as 
they are throughout this paper, according to the pages of this 
paper on which they are mentioned. Those fragments which are 
not included, in the foundational synthesis presented in<this 
paper, which are indicated and discussed in Appendix III above, 
will not be included here. 
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fragmentl--13 r 14, 15, 17, 20, 27, 30, 32, 3~, 35, 37, 46, 
47, 52, 57n, 58, 68n, 69, 71, 
72, 73, 88, 94, 107, 107n, 
108, 114, 122, l24, 129. 
fragment 2--14, 16, 22, 29, 37, 
6't, 68ri, 69, 106, 108, 120, 
123, 124, 129. 
fragment 4--128, 128n. 
fragment 5--13, 16, 35, 135, 
13 • 
fragment 6--98n. 
fragment 7--13, 49, 53, 55n, 
56, 57, l07n, 133n. 
fragment 8--85, 93, 116. 
fragment 9--88n, 128u. 
fragment 10--56, 58, 66, 85, 
90, 92. 
fragment 11--128n. 
fragment 12--64n, 83, 89, 
130. 
fragment 13--128n. 
fragment 14--80, 135. 
fragment 15--133n, 136. 
fragment 16--98n. 
fragment 17--13, l~r 16, 32, 35, 45 t 45n, 47, b4n, 67, 69, 12~, 129. 
fragment 18--123. 
fra~ment 19--13, 16, 44, 97n, 
12 • 
fragment 20--53, 88, 133, 134n. 
fragment 21--49, 88. 
fragment 22--21n, 123. 
fragment 23--14n, 36n, 57n, l07n, 
1l5n. 
fra~ment 24--128, 134, 135. 
fragment 25--128, 133, 134n. 
fra~ment 26--49, 56, 58,' 88. 
fra~ment 27--88, 134. 
fragment 28--15, 16, 19n, 22n, 
39n, 115n, 124. 
fra~ment 29--59, 128, 128n, 129, 
13 , 134. 
fragment 30--57n, 59, 64n, 67, 
68, 69, 73, 76, 79, 80, 94, 95, 
98n, l07n, 109, 135. 
fragment 31--53, 64n, 67, 69, 
77, 79, 81, a2n, 94, 98n, 107n, 
109, 110. 
fragment 32--24~ 25, 26, 63" 65n, 97, 99, 138. 
frasment 33--58, 63, 127. 
fragment 
32;46. 
34--13, 16, 17n, 29, 
fra~ment 35--20, 22, 38, 42, 114n, 
12 , 128n. 
fra~ment 36--53, 82, 130, 134n. 
fragment 37--88, 88n. 
fragment 39--15n, 19, 53, ... 
106, I11n, 128n. 
fragment 40--15, 16, 19, 23n, 
29~44. 
fragment 41--14n, 23, 24, 25, 
26, 39, 58, 63, 94, 97, 97n, 
103, 138. 
fragment 42--19i 
fragment 43--80, 114n, 126. 
fragment 44--114n, 127. 
fragment 45--14, 14n, 16, 33, 
35, 45n, 57, 60, 83, 98n, 
106, Ill, 130n. 
fragment 47--21, 38, 124. 
fragment 48--88. 
fragment 49--128. 
fragment 49a--64n, 890 
fragment 50-;21,24, 26, 27, 
37~9, 46, 58, 63, 66, 67, 
99, 106, 108, 109, 124. 
fragment 51--13, 16, 31, 77n, 
85, 86, 87, 91, 116. 
fragment 52--54n, 113n. 
fragment 53--59, 69, 94, 95, 
113, 135. 
fragment 54--34, 47, 9On o 
fragment 55--21, 37, 4~, 45n, 
48, 49, 124. 
fragment 56--13, 14n, 15, 19~ 
23, 23n, 26, 27, 47, 47n, 4~, 
57, 128n. 
fragment 57--13, 15, 16, 19, 
31~3, 64, 86, 97n, 98n, 
129. 
fragment 58--64n, 88. 
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fragment 59--14n, 64, 86, 130n. 
fragment 60--14n, 64, 86, 13On. 
fra~ment 61--82n, 88. 
fragment 62--88, 132/~ 
fras;ment 63--88. 
fra~ment 64--57, 94, 98, ';!_102. 
fra~ment 65--89n. 
fragment 66--58, 69, 80,. 102. 
fragment 67--77n, 80 l 86, 90, 91, 95, 98n, 99, 11~n, 117, 
126, 133n, 138. 
fragment 67a--l09n, Illn. 
fragment 71--14n, 36n, 130n. 
fragment 72--tlt,.; 15~::'i16, 32, 
34, 64n, 67, 69, 106, 108. ' 
fra~ment 73--35, 37, 88, 120, 
12 n. 
fragment 74--134n. 
fragment 75--53, 73, 88. 
fra!ment 77--53, 82, 89n, 130, 13 n. 
fragment 78--14, 14n, 15, 23n, 
29, 96n, 97, 103, 137, 138. 
fragment 79--49, 137. 
fragment 80--22, 38, 52, 59, 
94, 113, 114l 114n, 115, 115n, 
116, 117, 12~. 
fras;ment 81--19. 
fra~ment 84a--77n, 89n. 
frasment 84b--64n, 89n. 
fraS,!!!ent 85--130. 
fraS!!!ent 86--13, 16, 23n, 29. 
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fraiment 87--15n, 57, 106, 111n, 
12 , 128n. 
fragment 88--64n, 77n, 86, 67, 
88, 89, 91, 132, 
fragment 89--17, 35, 37 t 57n, 64, 67, 68, 68n, 69, 74, 88, 
l07n, 123, 123n,'6 
fragment 90--57, 58, 69, 73, 76. 
fra~ment 91--64n, 87, 89, 91. 
fra~ment 92--96n. 
fra~ment 93--96n. 
fragment 
115n. 
94--34n, 79nj\. 109n, 
fragment 
4Sn. 
95--14, 16, 23n, 29, 
fragment 96--133. 
fragment 97--128n. 
fra!ment 98--49, 133,' 133n, 
13 , 136. 
fragment 99--98n. 
fragment 100--58, 98n, 106n. 
fragment 101--21n, 124. 
fragment 101a--49. 
fragment 102--14n, 36n, 58, 74, 
95, 114n, 115n, 116, 117, 138. 
fragment 103--34n, 67, 70n, 89n. 
fragment 104--13, 14, 15, 16, 
19n, 23n, 29, 124, 126, 129. 
fragment 102--19. 
fragment 106--13, 16, 19, 31, 
33, 57, 93, 64, 71,,.72,' 98n. 
fragment 107--44, 49, 128n, 131. 
fragment 108--13, 15n, 16, 17n~ 
, 20t 25, 26, 35, 49, 59, 97, 9~, 104n, 106, 111n, 129, 138. 
fragment 110--53, 129. 
fragment 111--81. 
fragment 112--24, 26, 27, 47, 
72, 99, I~O, 123, 126, 128n, 
130n. 
fragment 113--17~ 60, 67, 68, 69. 
fragment 114--22, 59, 60, 61n4 64, 65, 67, 68, 94, 114n, 12 ,
127, 138. 
fragment 115--83, 106, 111. 
fragment 116--17,21n,57, 124, 
126. 
fra~ent 117--14n, 36n, 47n, 
12 n, 130, 130n. 
fra~ment 118--23, 26, 27, 128n, 
13 • 
fra~ment 119--137. 
fragment 120--34n, 98, 96n. 
fragment 121--19, 127 • 
fragment 123--3:3, 72. 
fra~ment 124-,,:,73, 117, 118. 
frasment 1?6--87 • 
